Mitigation Strategy: Strict Hostname Verification and Certificate Validation
-
Description:
- Locate HttpClient Initialization: Find where the
CloseableHttpClient
instance is created (usually usingHttpClients.custom()
orHttpClientBuilder
). - Set Hostname Verifier: Ensure the
setSSLHostnameVerifier()
method is called on theHttpClientBuilder
. Usenew DefaultHostnameVerifier()
for standard browser-compatible verification. AvoidNoopHostnameVerifier
in production. - Trust Store Configuration (If Custom): If a custom trust store is used (not recommended unless absolutely necessary), ensure it's loaded correctly and contains only trusted root and intermediate CA certificates. Avoid using code that blindly trusts all certificates. This involves configuring the
SSLContext
and using it to create anSSLConnectionSocketFactory
. - Certificate Pinning (Optional, but Recommended): If implementing certificate or public key pinning, you'll likely need a custom
SSLSocketFactory
or to integrate with a library that provides pinning support (and potentially use an adapter to work with HttpComponents Client). This involves storing the expected certificate hash or public key and validating it during the TLS handshake.
- Locate HttpClient Initialization: Find where the
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks: (Severity: Critical)
- Impersonation Attacks: (Severity: Critical)
- Data Tampering: (Severity: High)
-
Impact:
- MitM Attacks: Risk reduced from Critical to Low (with pinning) or Medium (without pinning).
- Impersonation Attacks: Risk reduced from Critical to Low (with pinning) or Medium (without pinning).
- Data Tampering: Risk reduced from High to Low.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Hostname verification is implemented in
src/main/java/com/example/util/HttpClientFactory.java
usingDefaultHostnameVerifier
. - Default JVM trust store is used.
- Hostname verification is implemented in
-
Missing Implementation:
- Certificate pinning is not currently implemented.
- A formal process for regularly updating the trust store is not documented (although this is more of an operational concern).
Mitigation Strategy: Careful Handling of Redirects
-
Description:
- Locate HttpClient Initialization: Find where the
CloseableHttpClient
is created. - Limit Redirects: Use
HttpClientBuilder.setMaxRedirects(int maxRedirects)
to set a reasonable limit (e.g., 5 or 10). - Custom Redirect Strategy (Optional, but Recommended): Create a custom class that extends
DefaultRedirectStrategy
. Override theisRedirected()
method. - Validate Redirect URL: Inside
isRedirected()
, get thelocation
header from theHttpResponse
. Check:- Protocol: Ensure it's
https://
. - Hostname: Verify it matches the expected domain(s).
- Path (Optional): Perform additional checks.
- Return
false
to prevent the redirect if validation fails.
- Protocol: Ensure it's
- Disable Redirects (If Possible): If automatic redirects are not required, use
HttpClientBuilder.disableRedirectHandling()
.
- Locate HttpClient Initialization: Find where the
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Open Redirect Vulnerabilities: (Severity: Medium)
- Phishing Attacks: (Severity: High)
- Malware Distribution: (Severity: High)
- Infinite Redirect Loops: (Severity: Low)
-
Impact:
- Open Redirect Vulnerabilities: Risk reduced from Medium to Low.
- Phishing Attacks: Risk reduced from High to Medium.
- Malware Distribution: Risk reduced from High to Medium.
- Infinite Redirect Loops: Risk reduced from Low to Negligible.
-
Currently Implemented:
setMaxRedirects(5)
is set insrc/main/java/com/example/util/HttpClientFactory.java
.
-
Missing Implementation:
- A custom
RedirectStrategy
with URL validation is not implemented.
- A custom
Mitigation Strategy: Connection Pooling and Management
-
Description:
- Use
PoolingHttpClientConnectionManager
: Ensure theHttpClient
is built using aPoolingHttpClientConnectionManager
. - Configure Connection Limits:
- Set
setMaxTotal()
on the connection manager. - Set
setDefaultMaxPerRoute()
.
- Set
- Set Timeouts: Use
RequestConfig.Builder
to set:setConnectTimeout()
setConnectionRequestTimeout()
setSocketTimeout()
- Proper Resource Release: Use try-with-resources for
CloseableHttpClient
andCloseableHttpResponse
. Ensureresponse.close()
is always called. - Monitor Pool Statistics (Operational): Use
PoolingHttpClientConnectionManager.getStats()
.
- Use
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Resource Exhaustion (DoS): (Severity: Medium)
- Connection Leaks: (Severity: Medium)
- Stale Connections: (Severity: Low)
- Application Hangs: (Severity: Medium)
-
Impact:
- Resource Exhaustion (DoS): Risk reduced from Medium to Low.
- Connection Leaks: Risk reduced from Medium to Low.
- Stale Connections: Risk reduced from Low to Negligible.
- Application Hangs: Risk reduced from Medium to Low.
-
Currently Implemented:
PoolingHttpClientConnectionManager
is used.setMaxTotal(200)
andsetDefaultMaxPerRoute(20)
are set.- Timeouts are set.
- Try-with-resources is used.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Connection pool statistics monitoring (more operational).
Mitigation Strategy: Careful Handling of Cookies
-
Description:
- Use
CookieStore
: Use aCookieStore
(e.g.,BasicCookieStore
). Associate it with theHttpClientContext
. - Inspect Received Cookies: Examine cookies in the
CookieStore
after receiving a response. - Validate Cookie Attributes: Check
Secure
,HttpOnly
,Domain
, andPath
. - Avoid Storing Sensitive Data: Minimize sensitive data in cookies.
- Custom
CookieSpec
(Optional): For fine-grained control, create a customCookieSpec
.
- Use
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Session Hijacking: (Severity: High)
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (via Cookies): (Severity: High)
- Cookie Manipulation: (Severity: Medium)
-
Impact:
- Session Hijacking: Risk reduced from High to Low.
- XSS (via Cookies): Risk reduced from High to Negligible.
- Cookie Manipulation: Risk reduced from Medium to Low.
-
Currently Implemented:
BasicCookieStore
is used.Secure
andHttpOnly
are verified.
-
Missing Implementation:
- No specific validation of
Domain
andPath
attributes.
- No specific validation of
Mitigation Strategy: Content Encoding and Decoding
-
Description:
- Enable Automatic Decoding: Ensure automatic content decoding is enabled (usually the default).
- Handle Unsupported Encodings: If you encounter an unsupported encoding, handle the error gracefully. Do not process the response body without proper decoding.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Unexpected Behavior: (Severity: Low)
- Potential Vulnerabilities (Rare): (Severity: Low)
-
Impact:
- Unexpected Behavior: Risk reduced from Low to Negligible.
- Potential Vulnerabilities: Risk remains Low.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Automatic content decoding is enabled by default.
-
Missing Implementation:
- No specific error handling for unsupported encodings.
Mitigation Strategy: Request and Response Interceptors
-
Description:
- Review Existing Interceptors: Examine the code of custom
HttpRequestInterceptor
orHttpResponseInterceptor
implementations. - Security Checks: Ensure interceptors don't introduce vulnerabilities.
- Performance Checks: Ensure interceptors don't introduce performance overhead.
- Minimize Use: Only use interceptors when necessary.
- Review Existing Interceptors: Examine the code of custom
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Security Bypass: (Severity: Variable)
- Data Leakage: (Severity: Medium)
- Performance Degradation: (Severity: Low)
-
Impact:
- Security Bypass: Risk depends on the vulnerability; mitigation reduces risk to Low.
- Data Leakage: Risk reduced from Medium to Low.
- Performance Degradation: Risk reduced from Low to Negligible.
-
Currently Implemented:
- A custom
HttpRequestInterceptor
is used for authorization. Code reviewed.
- A custom
-
Missing Implementation:
- No specific performance monitoring of the interceptor.