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Threat Model Analysis for apache/httpcomponents-core

  • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious HTTP server that sends specially crafted, malformed HTTP responses to the client application using HttpComponents Core. The attacker aims to exploit potential vulnerabilities in the library's HTTP parsing logic. This could involve sending responses with invalid headers, incorrect encoding, or unexpected characters. Exploitation could lead to memory corruption or unexpected program behavior.
  • Impact: Denial of Service (DoS) due to application crash or resource exhaustion if parsing fails catastrophically. Potentially Remote Code Execution (RCE) if a buffer overflow or similar vulnerability exists in the parsing code, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the client system.
  • Affected Component: org.apache.http.impl.io.AbstractMessageParser, org.apache.http.io.SessionInputBuffer, header parsing and body parsing functionalities.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep HttpComponents Core updated: Regularly update to the latest stable version to benefit from security patches and bug fixes in the parsing logic.
    • Implement robust error handling: Wrap HTTP response processing in try-catch blocks to gracefully handle parsing exceptions and prevent application crashes. Avoid exposing detailed error messages to external users.
    • Consider input sanitization (limited client-side): While client-side sanitization of server responses is limited, be aware of potential injection points if the application processes response data in a way that could be vulnerable (e.g., displaying header values directly in UI without encoding).
  • Description: Developers misconfigure TLS/SSL settings when creating HTTPS connections using HttpComponents Core. This includes using weak cipher suites, enabling outdated TLS protocols (like TLS 1.0 or 1.1), or disabling essential security features. An attacker performing a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack can exploit these weak configurations to eavesdrop on or manipulate encrypted traffic.
  • Impact: Confidentiality breach (eavesdropping on sensitive data transmitted over HTTPS), integrity compromise (data manipulation during transit by the attacker), and potentially authentication bypass if weak ciphers are compromised or protocols are vulnerable to downgrade attacks.
  • Affected Component: org.apache.http.conn.ssl.SSLConnectionSocketFactory, SSLContextBuilder, TLS/SSL related configuration parameters.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce Strong TLS Protocols: Configure SSLContextBuilder to use only TLS 1.2 or higher. Disable older, insecure protocols like TLS 1.0 and 1.1.
    • Use Strong Cipher Suites: Specify a secure cipher suite list, prioritizing strong and modern ciphers like those based on AES and ChaCha20. Avoid weak or deprecated ciphers such as RC4, DES, or export-grade ciphers.
    • Regularly Review TLS Configuration: Periodically review and update TLS/SSL configurations to align with current security best practices and recommendations from organizations like NIST and OWASP. Use tools to assess TLS configuration strength.
  • Description: Developers incorrectly disable or weaken hostname verification during TLS handshake when using HTTPS with HttpComponents Core. This is a critical misconfiguration. It allows an attacker performing a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack to present a valid certificate for a different domain than the one being accessed. By bypassing hostname checks, the client application incorrectly trusts the attacker's server as the legitimate server.
  • Impact: Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks become trivial. This leads to complete compromise of confidentiality and integrity of communication. An attacker can intercept and modify all data exchanged between the client and the intended server, potentially stealing credentials, injecting malicious content, or completely impersonating the legitimate server.
  • Affected Component: org.apache.http.conn.ssl.SSLConnectionSocketFactory, hostname verifier configuration (e.g., using NoopHostnameVerifier or custom, insecure hostname verifiers).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Never Disable Hostname Verification: Absolutely avoid using NoopHostnameVerifier or any mechanism that disables hostname verification in production code. This is a severe security vulnerability.
    • Use Default Hostname Verification: Rely on the default and secure hostname verification provided by SSLConnectionSocketFactory. This is the recommended and safest approach.
    • Implement Custom Hostname Verifier (with extreme caution and expert review): Only implement a custom hostname verifier if there is an exceptionally strong and well-justified reason. If so, ensure it is implemented correctly, rigorously tested, and reviewed by security experts to avoid introducing vulnerabilities. Incorrect custom hostname verification is a common source of security issues.