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Attack Tree Analysis for apache/kafka

Objective: Disrupt Application, Exfiltrate Data, or Gain Control via Kafka

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Disrupt Application, Exfiltrate Data, or Gain Control via Kafka

├── AND Node: Disrupt Application Functionality │ ├── OR Node: Cause Denial of Service (DoS) on Kafka Cluster [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── Leaf Node: Resource Exhaustion (Disk Space) [HIGH-RISK] │ │ ├── Leaf Node: Resource Exhaustion (CPU/Memory) [HIGH-RISK] │ │ └── Leaf Node: Resource Exhaustion (Network) [HIGH-RISK]

├── AND Node: Exfiltrate Sensitive Data │ ├── OR Node: Gain Unauthorized Read Access to Kafka Topics [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── Leaf Node: Bypass Authentication [HIGH-RISK] │ │ └── Leaf Node: Bypass Authorization [HIGH-RISK] │ └── AND Node: Extract and Exfiltrate Data │ ├── Leaf Node: Consume Messages from Target Topic │ └── Leaf Node: Exfiltrate Data to External System

└── AND Node: Gain Unauthorized Control over Kafka Cluster ├── OR Node: Compromise Kafka Brokers [CRITICAL] │ ├── Leaf Node: Exploit Misconfigured JMX Ports [HIGH-RISK] └── AND Node: Use Compromised Access to Control Cluster ├── Leaf Node: Modify Kafka Configuration ├── Leaf Node: Create/Delete Topics ├── Leaf Node: Control Producers/Consumers ├── Leaf Node: Install Backdoor

  • Description: This node represents the attacker's ability to disrupt the Kafka cluster's availability, making it unable to process messages. This directly impacts the application relying on Kafka.
  • High-Risk Paths:
    • Resource Exhaustion (Disk Space):
      • Attack Vector: The attacker sends a large volume of messages, or very large individual messages, exceeding the configured disk space quotas for the Kafka brokers. This fills up the storage, preventing new messages from being written.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Novice
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • Resource Exhaustion (CPU/Memory):
      • Attack Vector: The attacker sends a high frequency of messages, potentially small in size, overwhelming the broker's CPU and memory resources. This can lead to slow processing, message loss, and ultimately, broker crashes.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Novice
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • Resource Exhaustion (Network):
      • Attack Vector: The attacker floods the network with connection requests to the Kafka brokers or sends large amounts of data, saturating the network bandwidth. This prevents legitimate clients from connecting and communicating with the brokers.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Novice
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy
  • Description: This node represents the attacker's ability to gain read access to Kafka topics they are not authorized to access. This is a prerequisite for data exfiltration.
  • High-Risk Paths:
    • Bypass Authentication:
      • Attack Vector: The attacker exploits weaknesses in the Kafka authentication configuration. This could involve:
        • No authentication configured at all.
        • Using default or weak credentials.
        • Exploiting a vulnerability in the authentication mechanism (e.g., a flaw in SASL implementation).
      • Likelihood: Low (if authentication is enforced)
      • Impact: Very High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (if authentication attempts are logged)
    • Bypass Authorization:
      • Attack Vector: The attacker exploits misconfigured Access Control Lists (ACLs). ACLs define which users/clients can access which topics. If ACLs are too permissive, or incorrectly configured, an attacker might gain access to topics they shouldn't.
      • Likelihood: Low (if ACLs are properly configured)
      • Impact: Very High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (if ACL violations are logged)
  • Description: This node represents an attacker gaining control over one or more Kafka broker servers. This gives them extensive control over the Kafka cluster.
  • High-Risk Paths:
    • Exploit Misconfigured JMX Ports:
      • Attack Vector: Kafka brokers expose management interfaces via JMX (Java Management Extensions). If JMX is enabled without proper authentication and authorization, or if it's exposed to untrusted networks, an attacker can connect to the JMX port and gain control over the broker. They could then modify configurations, stop services, or even execute arbitrary code.
      • Likelihood: Low (if JMX is secured or disabled)
      • Impact: Very High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (if JMX access is monitored)