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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for apache/rocketmq

Threat: Unauthorized Message Access in Transit

  • Description: An attacker could eavesdrop on network traffic between RocketMQ components (Producers, Brokers, Consumers, Nameservers) using network sniffing tools. They could intercept and read message content if TLS/SSL is not enabled.
    • Impact: Exposure of sensitive data contained within messages, leading to data breaches, privacy violations, and potential regulatory non-compliance.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Network Communication Channels (between Producers, Brokers, Consumers, Nameservers)
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Enable TLS/SSL encryption for all RocketMQ communication channels.
      • Use strong cipher suites for TLS/SSL.
      • Regularly update TLS/SSL libraries and configurations.

Threat: Unauthorized Message Access at Rest

  • Description: An attacker who gains unauthorized access to the Broker's server or storage volumes could directly access and read message data stored on disk. This could be achieved through compromised credentials, vulnerabilities in the broker server OS, or physical access.
    • Impact: Exposure of sensitive data stored in messages, leading to data breaches, privacy violations, and potential regulatory non-compliance.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Broker Storage (Message Queues, CommitLog, ConsumeQueue)
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement encryption at rest for message storage on brokers.
      • Secure broker server operating system and file system permissions.
      • Regularly patch and update broker server operating system and RocketMQ software.
      • Implement strong access controls for broker servers and storage volumes.

Threat: Message Tampering in Transit

  • Description: A man-in-the-middle attacker could intercept network traffic and modify message content while it is being transmitted between RocketMQ components. Without integrity protection, these modifications would go undetected.
    • Impact: Data corruption, manipulation of application logic based on altered messages, potential financial loss, and reputational damage.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Network Communication Channels (between Producers, Brokers, Consumers, Nameservers)
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Enforce TLS/SSL encryption for all RocketMQ communication channels, which provides integrity protection.
      • Implement message signing mechanisms for critical messages to ensure origin authenticity and integrity.
      • Use message checksums to detect data corruption during transmission.

Threat: Message Tampering at Rest

  • Description: An attacker with unauthorized access to the Broker's server or storage volumes could directly modify messages stored on disk. This could lead to persistent data corruption.
    • Impact: Data corruption, manipulation of application logic based on altered messages, potential financial loss, and reputational damage.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Broker Storage (Message Queues, CommitLog, ConsumeQueue)
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement strong access controls for broker server operating system and file system permissions.
      • Consider using file system integrity monitoring tools to detect unauthorized modifications.
      • Implement message signing or checksum mechanisms to detect tampering of stored messages.
      • Regularly audit broker file system access.

Threat: Message Injection/Spoofing

  • Description: An attacker could bypass producer authentication and authorization mechanisms (if weak or absent) and inject malicious or forged messages into RocketMQ topics. They could impersonate legitimate producers to send harmful data.
    • Impact: Introduction of malicious data into the system, disruption of application logic, potential for denial of service, and reputational damage.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Producer Client, Broker Message Handling
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement robust producer authentication and authorization mechanisms using RocketMQ ACL or external systems.
      • Use strong authentication credentials for producers and manage them securely.
      • Validate and sanitize all incoming messages at the consumer side to prevent processing of malicious content.
      • Implement input validation and rate limiting at the producer level if possible.

Threat: Nameserver Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Description: An attacker could flood the Nameserver with a high volume of requests (connection requests, topic registration, route queries) from a single or distributed source, overwhelming its resources and making it unavailable.
    • Impact: Disruption of the entire RocketMQ cluster as producers and consumers cannot discover brokers, leading to message delivery failures and application downtime.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Nameserver
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement rate limiting on Nameserver requests.
      • Configure connection limits on Nameservers.
      • Deploy Nameservers in a highly available cluster configuration.
      • Use firewalls and intrusion detection/prevention systems to filter malicious traffic.
      • Implement monitoring and alerting for Nameserver resource utilization.

Threat: Broker Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Description: An attacker could overload a Broker with a massive influx of messages, exceeding its storage capacity, processing capabilities, or connection limits. Alternatively, they could exhaust broker resources with excessive connection attempts.
    • Impact: Broker unavailability, message delivery delays, message loss if storage is full, and application downtime.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Broker
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement message rate limiting and message size limits at the producer level.
      • Configure broker resource limits (memory, disk space, connections).
      • Deploy brokers in a highly available cluster configuration.
      • Use firewalls and intrusion detection/prevention systems to filter malicious traffic.
      • Implement monitoring and alerting for broker resource utilization and queue depth.

Threat: Storage Exhaustion

  • Description: An attacker could send a large volume of messages to a topic, intentionally filling up the broker's storage space. This prevents the broker from storing new messages and can lead to service disruption.
    • Impact: Message delivery failures, message loss if retention policies are not properly configured, and application downtime.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Broker Storage (Disk Space)
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement message retention policies to automatically delete old messages.
      • Implement disk space monitoring and set alerts for low disk space.
      • Implement message quotas and rate limiting at the producer level.
      • Regularly monitor broker disk usage and capacity.

Threat: Unauthorized Access to Nameserver Management Interface

  • Description: An attacker could attempt to access the Nameserver's management interface (if exposed) by brute-forcing credentials or exploiting vulnerabilities. Successful access allows them to manipulate cluster configuration and routing.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of the RocketMQ cluster, disruption of message flow, data manipulation, and potential data breaches.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Nameserver Management Interface
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure the Nameserver management interface with strong authentication (e.g., username/password, certificate-based authentication).
      • Implement role-based access control to restrict administrative actions.
      • Restrict access to the management interface to authorized networks only (e.g., internal network).
      • Regularly audit access to the management interface.
      • Consider disabling the management interface if not actively used or if alternative secure management methods are available.

Threat: Unauthorized Access to Broker Management Interface

  • Description: Similar to Nameserver management, an attacker could attempt to access the Broker's management interface (if exposed) to manage brokers, potentially access or manipulate messages, and alter broker configurations.
    • Impact: Broker compromise, potential message data access or manipulation, disruption of message flow, and service instability.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Broker Management Interface
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure the Broker management interface with strong authentication and authorization.
      • Implement role-based access control.
      • Restrict access to the management interface to authorized networks only.
      • Regularly audit access to the management interface.
      • Consider disabling the management interface if not actively used or if alternative secure management methods are available.

Threat: Producer/Consumer Impersonation

  • Description: If producer and consumer authentication is weak or absent, an attacker could impersonate legitimate producers to send malicious messages or impersonate consumers to access messages they are not authorized to read.
    • Impact: Data breaches, introduction of malicious data, disruption of application logic, and unauthorized access to sensitive information.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Producer Client, Consumer Client, Broker Authentication/Authorization
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement strong producer and consumer authentication mechanisms using RocketMQ ACL or external systems.
      • Use unique and securely managed credentials (API keys, certificates) for producers and consumers.
      • Regularly rotate authentication credentials.
      • Enforce mutual TLS authentication for clients if possible.