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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for apache/rocketmq

Attack Surface: NameServer Resource Exhaustion (DoS)

  • Description: Attackers flood the NameServer with requests, consuming its resources (CPU, memory, network) and making it unavailable.
  • RocketMQ Contribution: The NameServer is a central, single point of failure (by design, though clustering mitigates this). Its exposed network port and RocketMQ-specific request handling logic are attackable.
  • Example: An attacker sends thousands of registerBroker requests per second (a RocketMQ-specific operation), overwhelming the NameServer.
  • Impact: Complete disruption of the RocketMQ cluster; producers and consumers cannot discover brokers, halting message flow.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rate Limiting (RocketMQ Configuration): Implement strict rate limiting on NameServer requests, configurable within RocketMQ's settings, both globally and per client IP.
    • Request Validation (RocketMQ Code): Ensure RocketMQ's internal code thoroughly validates all NameServer requests, rejecting malformed or suspicious requests specific to RocketMQ protocols.
    • Resource Monitoring (RocketMQ Metrics): Monitor NameServer resource usage using RocketMQ's built-in metrics and set alerts.
    • NameServer Clustering (RocketMQ Deployment): Deploy multiple NameServer instances, a standard RocketMQ deployment practice.
    • Firewall Rules (Targeting RocketMQ Port): Use firewall rules to restrict access to the NameServer's port (default: 9876) – specifically targeting the RocketMQ service.

Attack Surface: Broker Resource Exhaustion (DoS)

  • Description: Attackers overwhelm a Broker with a high volume of messages or connections, exhausting its resources (CPU, memory, disk space, network).
  • RocketMQ Contribution: Brokers are the core message storage and delivery components within RocketMQ. Their exposed ports and RocketMQ-specific message handling logic are attackable.
  • Example: An attacker sends millions of large messages to a specific topic, filling the Broker's disk space (managed by RocketMQ's storage engine).
  • Impact: Denial of service for clients using the affected Broker; potential message loss.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Message Size Limits (RocketMQ Configuration): Enforce maximum message size limits within RocketMQ's configuration.
    • Rate Limiting (Producer Side, RocketMQ Client): Implement rate limiting on the producer side using the RocketMQ client library's features.
    • Connection Limits (RocketMQ Configuration): Limit the number of concurrent connections to the Broker, configurable within RocketMQ.
    • Resource Monitoring (RocketMQ Metrics): Monitor Broker resource usage via RocketMQ's built-in metrics.
    • Disk Quotas (Managed by RocketMQ): Utilize RocketMQ's internal mechanisms (if available) to manage disk space allocation for topics/queues.
    • Broker Clustering (RocketMQ Deployment): Deploy multiple Broker instances, a standard RocketMQ deployment practice.
    • Flow Control (RocketMQ Feature): Utilize RocketMQ's built-in flow control mechanisms.

Attack Surface: Unauthorized Message Production/Consumption

  • Description: Attackers send messages to or consume messages from topics without proper authorization.
  • RocketMQ Contribution: RocketMQ's built-in ACL system, if misconfigured or if a vulnerability exists within RocketMQ's ACL implementation, allows unauthorized access.
  • Example: An attacker, without proper credentials, successfully publishes messages due to a misconfigured ACL rule within RocketMQ.
  • Impact: Data leakage, data corruption, injection of malicious data, disruption of application logic.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable and Configure ACLs (RocketMQ Feature): Enable and meticulously configure RocketMQ's built-in ACL feature. Follow the principle of least privilege.
    • Strong Authentication (RocketMQ Configuration): Use strong, unique passwords or access keys for all RocketMQ accounts, managed within RocketMQ's security configuration.
    • Regular ACL Audits (RocketMQ Configuration): Regularly review and audit RocketMQ's ACL configurations.
    • Use TLS (RocketMQ Feature): Enable and correctly configure TLS encryption for communication between clients and brokers, using RocketMQ's TLS support.

Attack Surface: Rogue Broker Registration

  • Description: An attacker registers a malicious Broker with the NameServer, potentially intercepting or injecting messages.
  • RocketMQ Contribution: The NameServer's RocketMQ-specific broker registration mechanism, if not properly secured, can be exploited.
  • Example: An attacker registers a rogue Broker that mimics a legitimate Broker, exploiting a weakness in RocketMQ's authentication for broker registration.
  • Impact: Message interception, message modification, denial of service, data leakage.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Authentication for Broker Registration (RocketMQ Feature): Require strong authentication for Brokers to register with the NameServer. This is a critical RocketMQ security setting.
    • NameServer ACLs (RocketMQ Feature): Use NameServer ACLs (part of RocketMQ's security model) to restrict which hosts can register Brokers.
    • Monitoring for New Brokers (RocketMQ Metrics): Monitor the NameServer for new Broker registrations using RocketMQ's monitoring capabilities.
    • Static Broker Configuration (Advanced RocketMQ Deployment): In highly secure environments, consider a static Broker configuration, bypassing RocketMQ's dynamic registration.