attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for apache/rocketmq

Objective: To compromise an application using Apache RocketMQ by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the RocketMQ deployment.

Attack Tree Visualization

The provided text does not contain markdown for visualization. It is a textual representation of the attack tree.

Attack Tree Path: Sub-tree 1: Data Exfiltration

• Goal: Data Exfiltration
  • OR Node:
    • Unencrypted Communication: [HIGH RISK]
      • Leaf Node: RocketMQ traffic is not encrypted (TLS/SSL not configured). [CRITICAL]
        • Attack Vector Breakdown:
          • Description: The attacker passively monitors network traffic between RocketMQ clients, brokers, and the NameServer. Because the communication is not encrypted, the attacker can read the contents of messages, potentially including sensitive data.
          • Prerequisites: Network access to sniff traffic (e.g., compromised network device, ARP spoofing, physical access).
          • Steps:
            1. Gain network access.
            2. Use a packet sniffer (e.g., Wireshark, tcpdump) to capture RocketMQ traffic.
            3. Analyze the captured packets to extract message data.
          • Mitigation: Enforce TLS/SSL for all RocketMQ communication. Use strong cipher suites and properly configured certificates.
      • Leaf Node: Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack intercepts unencrypted traffic.
        • Attack Vector Breakdown:
          • Description: The attacker positions themselves between the client/broker or broker/NameServer, intercepting and potentially modifying the unencrypted communication.
          • Prerequisites: Ability to intercept network traffic (e.g., ARP spoofing, DNS hijacking, compromised router).
          • Steps:
            1. Establish a MitM position.
            2. Intercept RocketMQ traffic.
            3. Read and/or modify message data.
            4. Forward the (potentially modified) traffic to the intended recipient.
          • Mitigation: Enforce TLS/SSL with certificate pinning or strict certificate validation. Network segmentation can also limit the scope of MitM attacks.
    • Unauthorized Client Access: [HIGH RISK]
      • AND Node:
        • Leaf Node: Weak or default credentials for RocketMQ clients. [CRITICAL]
          • Attack Vector Breakdown:
            • Description: The attacker uses default or easily guessable credentials to connect to the RocketMQ broker as a legitimate client.
            • Prerequisites: Knowledge of default credentials or the ability to guess/brute-force weak passwords.
            • Steps:
              1. Obtain a list of default RocketMQ credentials (from documentation or online resources).
              2. Attempt to connect to the RocketMQ broker using these credentials.
              3. If successful, subscribe to topics and consume messages.
            • Mitigation: Never use default credentials. Enforce strong, unique passwords for all RocketMQ clients. Implement a robust authentication mechanism (e.g., token-based authentication, multi-factor authentication).
        • Leaf Node: Lack of proper authorization controls (ACLs). [CRITICAL]
          • Attack Vector Breakdown:
            • Description: Even with strong authentication, if ACLs are not configured or are too permissive, an authenticated client may be able to access topics and groups they shouldn't.
            • Prerequisites: Authenticated access to the RocketMQ broker (even with limited privileges).
            • Steps:
              1. Authenticate to the RocketMQ broker.
              2. Attempt to subscribe to various topics, even those not explicitly authorized.
              3. If successful, consume messages from unauthorized topics.
            • Mitigation: Implement fine-grained ACLs that restrict client access to specific topics and groups based on the principle of least privilege. Regularly review and audit ACLs.
    • Compromised Broker:
      • OR Node:
        • Leaf Node: Exploit a vulnerability in the RocketMQ broker software (RCE). [CRITICAL]
          • Attack Vector Breakdown:
            • Description: The attacker exploits a remote code execution vulnerability in the RocketMQ broker to gain control of the broker process.
            • Prerequisites: Existence of an unpatched RCE vulnerability in the RocketMQ broker version being used. Knowledge of how to exploit the vulnerability.
            • Steps:
              1. Identify the RocketMQ broker version.
              2. Research known vulnerabilities for that version.
              3. Develop or obtain an exploit for the vulnerability.
              4. Send the exploit payload to the broker.
              5. Gain a shell or other form of control on the broker.
              6. Exfiltrate data directly from the broker's memory or storage.
            • Mitigation: Keep RocketMQ strictly up-to-date. Apply security patches immediately upon release. Conduct regular vulnerability scans and penetration testing. Implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) with rules to detect and block RCE exploit attempts.
        • Leaf Node: Compromise the underlying operating system of the broker. [CRITICAL]
          • Attack Vector Breakdown:
            • Description: The attacker exploits a vulnerability in the operating system running the RocketMQ broker to gain root or administrator access.
            • Prerequisites: Existence of an unpatched vulnerability in the operating system. Knowledge of how to exploit the vulnerability.
            • Steps:
              1. Identify the operating system and version.
              2. Research known vulnerabilities.
              3. Develop or obtain an exploit.
              4. Gain access to the system (e.g., through a compromised service, weak SSH credentials).
              5. Escalate privileges to root/administrator.
              6. Access RocketMQ data files or memory.
            • Mitigation: Harden the operating system. Implement strong access controls (e.g., SELinux, AppArmor). Use a host-based intrusion detection/prevention system (HIDS/HIPS). Regularly patch the operating system.

Attack Tree Path: Sub-tree 2: Service Disruption (DoS)

• Goal: Service Disruption (DoS)
  • OR Node:
    • Resource Exhaustion: [HIGH RISK]
      • AND Node:
        • Leaf Node: Flood the broker with a large number of messages.
          • Attack Vector Breakdown:
            • Description: The attacker sends a massive number of messages to the RocketMQ broker, overwhelming its capacity to process them.
            • Prerequisites: Ability to send messages to the broker (may require valid credentials, but often doesn't require high privileges).
            • Steps:
              1. Develop or obtain a tool to generate and send a high volume of messages.
              2. Configure the tool to target the RocketMQ broker.
              3. Launch the attack, sending a flood of messages.
            • Mitigation: Implement rate limiting and throttling on message production. Configure appropriate queue sizes and message TTLs. Monitor resource usage and set alerts for unusual activity.
        • Leaf Node: Flood the broker with a large number of connection requests.
          • Attack Vector Breakdown:
            • Description: The attacker opens a large number of connections to the RocketMQ broker, exhausting its connection pool and preventing legitimate clients from connecting.
            • Prerequisites: Network access to the broker.
            • Steps:
              1. Develop or obtain a tool to open many connections.
              2. Configure the tool to target the RocketMQ broker.
              3. Launch the attack, opening a flood of connections.
            • Mitigation: Configure connection limits and timeouts on the broker. Use a firewall to block malicious IP addresses.
    • NameServer Attack: [HIGH RISK]
      • OR Node:
        • Leaf Node: Flood the NameServer with requests.
          • Attack Vector Breakdown:
            • Description: The attacker sends a large number of requests to the NameServer, overwhelming its capacity and preventing it from serving broker registration and routing requests.
            • Prerequisites: Network access to the NameServer.
            • Steps:
              1. Develop or obtain a tool to generate and send a high volume of requests.
              2. Configure the tool to target the NameServer.
              3. Launch the attack.
            • Mitigation: Implement rate limiting and throttling on the NameServer. Use a firewall to protect the NameServer. Consider using multiple NameServers for redundancy.
        • Leaf Node: Exploit a vulnerability in the NameServer. [CRITICAL]
          • Attack Vector Breakdown:
            • Description: The attacker exploits a vulnerability (e.g., RCE, denial-of-service) in the NameServer to disrupt its operation.
            • Prerequisites: Existence of an unpatched vulnerability in the NameServer. Knowledge of how to exploit the vulnerability.
            • Steps: (Similar to broker RCE, but targeting the NameServer)
            • Mitigation: Keep the NameServer software strictly up-to-date. Apply security patches immediately. Conduct regular vulnerability scans and penetration testing.
    • Broker Attack:
      • OR Node:
        • Leaf Node: Exploit a vulnerability in the broker. [CRITICAL]
          • Attack Vector Breakdown: (Same as Broker RCE in Data Exfiltration)

Attack Tree Path: Sub-tree 3: Message Manipulation

• Goal: Message Manipulation
  • OR Node:
    • Unauthorized Message Production: [HIGH RISK]
      • AND Node:
        • Leaf Node: Weak or default credentials for RocketMQ clients. [CRITICAL]
          • Attack Vector Breakdown: (Same as in Data Exfiltration)
        • Leaf Node: Lack of proper authorization controls (ACLs). [CRITICAL]
          • Attack Vector Breakdown: (Same as in Data Exfiltration, but focused on producing unauthorized messages instead of consuming them)
    • Message Modification/Replay: [HIGH RISK]
      • AND Node:
        • Leaf Node: Lack of message integrity checks (digital signatures). [CRITICAL]
          • Attack Vector Breakdown:
            • Description: The attacker intercepts messages and modifies their content or replays them without detection because there are no mechanisms to verify message integrity.
            • Prerequisites: Ability to intercept messages (e.g., MitM attack, compromised broker).
            • Steps:
              1. Intercept a message.
              2. Modify the message content or store it for later replay.
              3. Send the modified or replayed message to the broker.
            • Mitigation: Implement message signing and verification using digital signatures (e.g., with a private/public key pair). The producing client signs the message, and the consuming client verifies the signature.
        • Leaf Node: MitM attack intercepts and modifies messages (requires no TLS).
          • Attack Vector Breakdown: (Same as MitM in Data Exfiltration)

Attack Tree Path: Sub-tree 4: Privilege Escalation

• Goal: Privilege Escalation
  • OR Node:
    • Exploit Broker Vulnerability:
      • Leaf Node: Exploit a vulnerability in the RocketMQ broker. [CRITICAL]
        • Attack Vector Breakdown: (Same as Broker RCE in Data Exfiltration)
    • Exploit NameServer Vulnerability:
      • Leaf Node: Exploit a vulnerability in the NameServer. [CRITICAL]
        • Attack Vector Breakdown: (Same as NameServer vulnerability in Service Disruption)
    • Compromise Underlying OS:
      • Leaf Node: Exploit a vulnerability in the operating system. [CRITICAL]
        • Attack Vector Breakdown: (Same as OS compromise in Data Exfiltration)
    • Configuration Errors:
      • Leaf Node: Misconfigured ACLs or permissions. [HIGH RISK]
        • Attack Vector Breakdown:
          • Description: The attacker leverages misconfigured ACLs or operating system permissions to gain access to resources or capabilities they should not have.
          • Prerequisites: Existing access to the system (possibly with limited privileges).
          • Steps:
            1. Enumerate existing ACLs and permissions.
            2. Identify misconfigurations that grant excessive privileges.
            3. Exploit the misconfiguration to gain access to restricted resources or execute unauthorized commands.
          • Mitigation: Regularly audit and review ACLs and permissions. Follow the principle of least privilege. Use automated tools to detect misconfigurations.

Attack Tree Path: Sub-tree 5: Code Execution

• Goal: Code Execution
  • OR Node:
    • Remote Code Execution (RCE) Vulnerability in Broker:
      • Leaf Node: Exploit a known or zero-day RCE vulnerability. [CRITICAL]
        • Attack Vector Breakdown: (Same as Broker RCE in Data Exfiltration)
    • Remote Code Execution (RCE) Vulnerability in NameServer:
      • Leaf Node: Exploit a known or zero-day RCE vulnerability. [CRITICAL]
        • Attack Vector Breakdown: (Same as NameServer vulnerability in Service Disruption, but with the goal of code execution)
    • Malicious Message Handling:
      • AND Node:
        • Leaf Node: Vulnerability in message processing logic (e.g., unsafe deserialization). [CRITICAL]
          • Attack Vector Breakdown:
            • Description: The attacker sends a specially crafted message that exploits a vulnerability in the application's message processing logic (e.g., a deserialization vulnerability) to achieve code execution.
            • Prerequisites: Existence of a vulnerability in the message processing code (e.g., using an unsafe deserialization library or method). Knowledge of how to craft an exploit payload.
            • Steps:
              1. Identify the vulnerable message processing component.
              2. Research known vulnerabilities or analyze the code for potential vulnerabilities.
              3. Craft a malicious message payload that triggers the vulnerability.
              4. Send the malicious message to the broker.
              5. Achieve code execution on the consuming application.
            • Mitigation: Avoid using unsafe deserialization methods. Use a safe serialization library (e.g., JSON with strict schema validation) and always validate the data before deserialization. Keep all libraries up-to-date. Conduct regular code reviews and security testing.