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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for apache/rocketmq

Threat: Message Tampering in Transit via MITM Attack

  • Description: An attacker performs a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack on the network connection between a producer/consumer and the broker, or between brokers. The attacker intercepts and modifies messages in transit, altering their content without detection. This is directly related to RocketMQ because it targets the RocketMQ communication protocol.
    • Impact:
      • Data corruption: Altered messages can lead to incorrect processing and data inconsistencies.
      • Injection of malicious code or commands (if message content is used to trigger actions).
      • Loss of data integrity.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: All communication channels: Producer-Broker (org.apache.rocketmq.remoting), Broker-Broker (org.apache.rocketmq.remoting), Broker-Consumer (org.apache.rocketmq.remoting). Specifically, any component using the RemotingCommand class for communication.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • TLS/SSL Encryption: Enforce TLS/SSL encryption for all communication channels within the RocketMQ cluster (producer-broker, broker-broker, broker-consumer). Use strong cipher suites and regularly update TLS certificates.
      • Certificate Pinning: Implement certificate pinning to prevent attackers from using forged certificates.
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate RocketMQ traffic on a dedicated network segment to reduce the attack surface (while this is a general network practice, it directly benefits RocketMQ security).

Threat: Broker Configuration Tampering via Unauthorized Access

  • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the RocketMQ broker's configuration files (e.g., broker.conf). The attacker modifies the configuration to disable security features (e.g., ACLs, TLS), change message routing rules, or introduce vulnerabilities. This is a direct threat to the RocketMQ broker's configuration.
    • Impact:
      • Security bypass: Disabling security features can expose the broker to other attacks.
      • Data loss or corruption: Altering message routing can lead to messages being lost or delivered to the wrong consumers.
      • Service disruption: Incorrect configuration can cause the broker to malfunction or crash.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Broker's configuration loading and management components (org.apache.rocketmq.broker.BrokerController, org.apache.rocketmq.common.BrokerConfig).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure Configuration Storage: Store configuration files securely, restricting access to authorized personnel only.
      • File Integrity Monitoring: Implement file integrity monitoring (FIM) to detect unauthorized changes to configuration files.
      • Configuration Management Tools: Use configuration management tools (e.g., Ansible, Chef, Puppet) to ensure consistent and secure configurations across all brokers.
      • Version Control: Store configuration files in a version control system (e.g., Git) to track changes and facilitate rollbacks.
      • Regular Audits: Regularly audit configuration files for unauthorized changes and security weaknesses.
      • Least Privilege: Run the broker process with the least privileged user account.

Threat: Exploitation of RocketMQ Vulnerability (e.g., CVE-2023-33246)

  • Description: An attacker exploits a known or zero-day vulnerability in the RocketMQ code (e.g., a remote code execution vulnerability like CVE-2023-33246). The attacker sends a specially crafted message or request to trigger the vulnerability, potentially gaining control of the broker. This is the most direct type of RocketMQ-specific threat.
    • Impact:
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE): The attacker can execute arbitrary code on the broker server.
      • Complete system compromise: The attacker can gain full control of the broker and potentially the entire RocketMQ cluster.
      • Data theft and manipulation.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Varies depending on the specific vulnerability. Could affect any component, including org.apache.rocketmq.remoting, org.apache.rocketmq.broker, org.apache.rocketmq.namesrv, or specific modules within those components.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Patch Management: Regularly update RocketMQ to the latest version to patch known vulnerabilities. Subscribe to RocketMQ security advisories and apply patches promptly.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly perform vulnerability scanning of the RocketMQ deployment to identify known vulnerabilities.
      • Penetration Testing: Conduct periodic penetration testing to identify and exploit potential vulnerabilities.
      • Input Validation: Implement robust input validation to prevent malicious messages or requests from triggering vulnerabilities.
      • Web Application Firewall (WAF): While not a direct mitigation for all RocketMQ vulnerabilities, a WAF can help protect against some exploits that target exposed HTTP endpoints (if any).
      • Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS): Deploy IDS/IPS to detect and potentially block malicious activity targeting RocketMQ.

Threat: Malicious Producer Impersonation via Credential Theft

  • Description: An attacker steals the credentials (access key, secret key, or token) of a legitimate producer application. The attacker then uses these stolen credentials to connect to the RocketMQ broker and send malicious messages, potentially masquerading as the legitimate producer. This directly targets RocketMQ's authentication mechanism.
    • Impact:
      • Injection of false data into the system.
      • Corruption of data integrity.
      • Potential triggering of unintended actions based on malicious messages.
      • Reputational damage if the impersonated producer is a trusted source.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: org.apache.rocketmq.client.producer.DefaultMQProducer (and any custom producer implementations using the RocketMQ client library), Broker's authentication and authorization mechanisms (ACL).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Password Policies: Enforce strong, unique passwords for producer accounts.
      • Credential Rotation: Regularly rotate producer credentials (access keys, secret keys).
      • Token-Based Authentication: Use short-lived, scoped tokens (e.g., JWT) instead of long-lived credentials.
      • Secure Credential Storage: Store credentials securely (e.g., using a secrets management system, environment variables, or encrypted configuration files). Never hardcode credentials in the application code.
      • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): If possible, implement MFA for producer access (though this is often challenging for automated systems).
      • Monitor Producer Activity: Implement monitoring and alerting for unusual producer behavior (e.g., high message volume, unusual message content, connections from unexpected IP addresses).

Threat: Unauthorized Consumer Subscription via Weak ACLs

  • Description: An attacker exploits weak or misconfigured Access Control Lists (ACLs) to subscribe to topics they are not authorized to access. The attacker can then receive messages intended for other consumers, potentially containing sensitive data. This directly targets RocketMQ's ACL mechanism.
    • Impact:
      • Data breach: Unauthorized access to sensitive information.
      • Violation of data privacy regulations.
      • Potential for competitive advantage if the attacker gains access to business-critical data.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Broker's ACL implementation (org.apache.rocketmq.acl), specifically the authorization checks within the consumer subscription logic (org.apache.rocketmq.broker.processor.ConsumerManageProcessor).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Implement strict ACLs, granting consumers only the minimum necessary permissions to access specific topics.
      • Regular ACL Review: Regularly review and audit ACL configurations to ensure they are up-to-date and correctly enforced.
      • Dynamic ACL Management: Consider using a dynamic ACL management system that can automatically adjust permissions based on changing roles and responsibilities.
      • Testing: Thoroughly test ACL configurations to ensure they prevent unauthorized access.

Threat: Denial of Service via Message Flood from Malicious Producer

  • Description: An attacker, either with compromised credentials or exploiting a vulnerability, sends a massive number of messages to the broker at a high rate. This overwhelms the broker's resources (CPU, memory, disk I/O, network bandwidth), preventing legitimate messages from being processed. This directly targets the core message handling of RocketMQ.
    • Impact:
      • Service outage: Legitimate producers and consumers are unable to send or receive messages.
      • Data loss: Messages may be dropped or delayed if the broker cannot keep up with the flood.
      • Financial losses due to service disruption.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: Broker's message handling components (org.apache.rocketmq.broker.processor.SendMessageProcessor, org.apache.rocketmq.store.CommitLog, org.apache.rocketmq.store.ConsumeQueue), potentially affecting all broker services.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting for producers, restricting the number of messages they can send per unit of time. This can be configured at the broker level or using a dedicated rate-limiting service.
      • Message Size Limits: Enforce limits on the maximum size of individual messages.
      • Flow Control: Utilize RocketMQ's built-in flow control mechanisms to manage message flow and prevent broker overload.
      • Resource Monitoring: Monitor broker resource utilization (CPU, memory, disk I/O, network bandwidth) and set up alerts for unusual activity.
      • Dedicated Resources: Consider deploying RocketMQ on dedicated hardware or virtual machines to ensure sufficient resources are available.
      • DDoS Protection: Implement DDoS protection mechanisms at the network level to mitigate large-scale attacks (while this is a general mitigation, it directly protects RocketMQ).

Threat: NameServer Spoofing via DNS Hijacking

  • Description: An attacker compromises the DNS resolution process (e.g., through DNS cache poisoning or hijacking a DNS server) to redirect RocketMQ clients (producers and consumers) to a rogue NameServer controlled by the attacker. This directly targets the NameServer component of RocketMQ.
    • Impact:
      • Redirection of clients to malicious brokers.
      • Interception and manipulation of messages.
      • Denial of service by preventing clients from connecting to legitimate brokers.
    • Affected RocketMQ Component: org.apache.rocketmq.namesrv.NamesrvController, and client-side NameServer address resolution logic (org.apache.rocketmq.client.ClientConfig).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Static NameServer Configuration: Configure producers and consumers with static NameServer addresses, avoiding reliance on DNS resolution.
      • DNSSEC: Implement DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) to ensure the integrity and authenticity of DNS responses. (While a general DNS security measure, it directly protects the NameServer lookup).
      • TLS/SSL for NameServer Communication: Use TLS/SSL to encrypt communication between clients and the NameServer, verifying the NameServer's certificate.
      • Certificate Pinning: Pin the NameServer's certificate in the client configuration to prevent MITM attacks.
      • Monitor DNS Records: Regularly monitor DNS records for the NameServer to detect any unauthorized changes.