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Attack Tree Analysis for apache/skywalking

Objective: Compromise Application via SkyWalking

Attack Tree Visualization

High-Risk Sub-tree:

  • Root Goal: Compromise Application via SkyWalking
    • [CRITICAL NODE] 1. Exploit SkyWalking Agent Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • [CRITICAL NODE] 1.1. Code Vulnerabilities in Agent
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 1.1.1. Buffer Overflow/Memory Corruption in Agent Code
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 1.1.2. Injection Vulnerabilities (e.g., Log Injection, Command Injection) in Agent
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 1.1.3. Deserialization Vulnerabilities in Agent (if applicable)
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.3. Agent Communication Channel Vulnerabilities
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 1.3.1. Unencrypted Communication between Agent and Collector (HTTP instead of gRPC/HTTPS)
    • [CRITICAL NODE] 2. Exploit SkyWalking Collector Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • [CRITICAL NODE] 2.1. Code Vulnerabilities in Collector
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 2.1.1. Injection Vulnerabilities in Collector (e.g., SQL Injection, NoSQL Injection, Command Injection)
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 2.1.2. Deserialization Vulnerabilities in Collector
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 2.1.3. Buffer Overflow/Memory Corruption in Collector Code
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 2.1.5. Vulnerabilities in Collector Dependencies (e.g., Libraries, Frameworks)
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] 2.2. Collector Configuration Vulnerabilities
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 2.2.1. Weak Collector Authentication/Authorization
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 2.2.2. Exposed Collector Management Interfaces/APIs
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] 2.3. Collector Communication Channel Vulnerabilities
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 2.3.1. Unencrypted Communication between Collector and Storage (e.g., Elasticsearch, Database)
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 2.3.2. Collector API Vulnerabilities (if exposed)
      1. Exploit SkyWalking UI Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] 3.1. Web Application Vulnerabilities in UI
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 3.1.1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerabilities
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 3.1.4. Authentication and Authorization Bypass Vulnerabilities
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 3.1.6. Vulnerabilities in UI Dependencies (e.g., JavaScript Libraries, Frameworks)
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] 3.3. UI Communication Channel Vulnerabilities
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 3.3.1. Unencrypted Communication between Browser and UI (HTTP instead of HTTPS)
    • [CRITICAL NODE] 4. Exploit SkyWalking Storage Vulnerabilities (e.g., Elasticsearch, H2) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • [CRITICAL NODE] 4.1. Storage System Vulnerabilities (Specific to chosen storage - e.g., Elasticsearch)
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 4.1.1. Known Vulnerabilities in Storage Software (CVEs)
        • [HIGH RISK PATH] 4.1.2. Misconfiguration of Storage System
          • [CRITICAL NODE] 4.1.2.1. Weak Authentication/Authorization for Storage Access
          • [CRITICAL NODE] 4.1.2.2. Exposed Storage Ports/Interfaces
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 4.1.3. Injection Vulnerabilities in Storage Queries (if applicable)
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] 4.2. Access Control Vulnerabilities to Stored Data
        • [CRITICAL NODE] 4.2.1. Unauthorized Access to SkyWalking Data in Storage

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit SkyWalking Agent Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]

Objective: Compromise the application server by exploiting vulnerabilities in the SkyWalking Agent running on it.

  • Attack Vectors:

    • 1.1. Code Vulnerabilities in Agent [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • 1.1.1. Buffer Overflow/Memory Corruption in Agent Code [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: Flaws in agent code (especially in native components or languages without memory safety) that allow writing beyond allocated memory buffers.
        • Exploitation: Attacker sends specially crafted data to the agent (e.g., through application requests or manipulated telemetry data) that triggers a buffer overflow. This can overwrite critical memory regions, leading to code execution.
        • Impact: Full control of the application server, application compromise, data breach, denial of service.
      • 1.1.2. Injection Vulnerabilities (e.g., Log Injection, Command Injection) in Agent [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: Agent code improperly handles input data, allowing an attacker to inject malicious code or commands. Log injection targets logging mechanisms, while command injection aims to execute system commands.
        • Exploitation:
          • Log Injection: Attacker crafts application requests or manipulates data to include malicious payloads that are logged by the agent. These logs, when processed by other systems, can lead to further vulnerabilities.
          • Command Injection: If the agent processes external input to execute system commands (e.g., through configuration or data processing), an attacker can inject malicious commands to be executed by the agent process.
        • Impact:
          • Log Injection: Log poisoning, potential for log analysis manipulation, indirect attacks on systems processing logs.
          • Command Injection: Code execution on the application server, application compromise, denial of service.
      • 1.1.3. Deserialization Vulnerabilities in Agent (if applicable) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: If the agent deserializes data from untrusted sources (e.g., configuration files, network communication), vulnerabilities in deserialization libraries or improper handling can allow code execution.
        • Exploitation: Attacker provides a malicious serialized object to the agent. When the agent deserializes this object, it triggers code execution due to flaws in the deserialization process.
        • Impact: Full control of the application server, application compromise, data breach, denial of service.

    • 1.3. Agent Communication Channel Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]:

      • Objective: Intercept or manipulate communication between the agent and the collector to gain information or disrupt monitoring.
      • 1.3.1. Unencrypted Communication between Agent and Collector (HTTP instead of gRPC/HTTPS) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: Using unencrypted protocols (like HTTP) for agent-collector communication exposes telemetry data in transit.
        • Exploitation: Attacker performs network sniffing or Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks to eavesdrop on the communication channel. They can capture telemetry data, potentially including sensitive application information, performance metrics, and internal system details.
        • Impact: Information disclosure of sensitive application data, insights into application behavior, potential for using gathered information for further attacks.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit SkyWalking Collector Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]

Objective: Compromise the SkyWalking Collector to manipulate monitoring data, cause denial of service, or gain access to the collector server.

  • Attack Vectors:

    • 2.1. Code Vulnerabilities in Collector [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • 2.1.1. Injection Vulnerabilities in Collector (e.g., SQL Injection, NoSQL Injection, Command Injection) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: Collector code improperly handles input data from agents or the UI, allowing injection of malicious code into database queries, system commands, or other processing logic.
        • Exploitation:
          • SQL/NoSQL Injection: Attacker crafts malicious telemetry data or UI requests that, when processed by the collector, result in the execution of attacker-controlled SQL or NoSQL queries against the storage database.
          • Command Injection: If the collector processes external input to execute system commands, an attacker can inject malicious commands.
        • Impact:
          • SQL/NoSQL Injection: Data breach of monitoring data, data manipulation, data corruption, potential for code execution on the database server (depending on database vulnerabilities).
          • Command Injection: Code execution on the collector server, collector compromise, denial of service, potential for lateral movement to other systems.
      • 2.1.2. Deserialization Vulnerabilities in Collector [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: If the collector deserializes data from untrusted sources (e.g., agents, UI, external APIs), vulnerabilities in deserialization libraries or improper handling can allow code execution.
        • Exploitation: Attacker provides a malicious serialized object to the collector. When the collector deserializes this object, it triggers code execution due to flaws in the deserialization process.
        • Impact: Full control of the collector server, collector compromise, data manipulation, denial of service, potential for wider system compromise.
      • 2.1.3. Buffer Overflow/Memory Corruption in Collector Code [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: Flaws in collector code (especially in native components) that allow writing beyond allocated memory buffers.
        • Exploitation: Attacker sends specially crafted data to the collector (e.g., through agent telemetry or UI requests) that triggers a buffer overflow. This can overwrite critical memory regions, leading to code execution.
        • Impact: Full control of the collector server, collector compromise, data manipulation, denial of service, potential for wider system compromise.
      • 2.1.5. Vulnerabilities in Collector Dependencies (e.g., Libraries, Frameworks) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: Collector relies on third-party libraries and frameworks that may contain known vulnerabilities (CVEs).
        • Exploitation: Attacker identifies and exploits known vulnerabilities in the collector's dependencies. Exploits are often publicly available for known CVEs.
        • Impact: Depends on the specific vulnerability in the dependency. Could range from code execution on the collector server, denial of service, to information disclosure.

    • 2.2. Collector Configuration Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]:

      • Objective: Gain unauthorized access to the collector or manipulate its behavior through configuration weaknesses.
      • 2.2.1. Weak Collector Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: Collector uses weak default credentials, easily guessable passwords, or lacks proper authentication and authorization mechanisms for administrative interfaces or APIs.
        • Exploitation: Attacker attempts to brute-force default credentials, exploit default access, or bypass weak authentication mechanisms to gain unauthorized access to the collector's management interfaces or APIs.
        • Impact: Unauthorized collector management, data manipulation, denial of service, potential for further system compromise.
      • 2.2.2. Exposed Collector Management Interfaces/APIs [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: Collector management interfaces or APIs are exposed to the public internet or internal networks without proper access controls.
        • Exploitation: Attacker discovers exposed management interfaces or APIs (e.g., through port scanning or web crawling). If these interfaces are not properly secured (see 2.2.1), the attacker can gain unauthorized control.
        • Impact: Unauthorized collector management, data manipulation, denial of service, potential for further system compromise.

    • 2.3. Collector Communication Channel Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]:

      • Objective: Intercept or manipulate communication related to the collector to gain information or disrupt monitoring.
      • 2.3.1. Unencrypted Communication between Collector and Storage (e.g., Elasticsearch, Database) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: Using unencrypted protocols for communication between the collector and the backend storage system (e.g., Elasticsearch, database) exposes telemetry data in transit.
        • Exploitation: Attacker performs network sniffing or MITM attacks to eavesdrop on the communication channel between the collector and storage. They can capture telemetry data being written to or read from storage, potentially including sensitive application information.
        • Impact: Information disclosure of sensitive application data stored in the monitoring system, potential data breach.
      • 2.3.2. Collector API Vulnerabilities (if exposed) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: If the collector exposes APIs for data retrieval or management, these APIs may have vulnerabilities like injection flaws, authentication bypasses, or authorization issues.
        • Exploitation: Attacker targets exposed collector APIs, attempting to exploit web application vulnerabilities (e.g., injection, authentication bypass) to gain unauthorized access to monitoring data or collector functionality.
        • Impact: Unauthorized access to monitoring data, data manipulation, denial of service, potential for collector compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit SkyWalking UI Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]

Objective: Compromise users accessing the SkyWalking UI or gain unauthorized access to the UI and its data.

  • Attack Vectors:

    • 3.1. Web Application Vulnerabilities in UI [HIGH RISK PATH]:

      • 3.1.1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: UI code improperly handles user-supplied input when displaying data, allowing injection of malicious JavaScript code into web pages viewed by other users.
        • Exploitation: Attacker injects malicious JavaScript code into the UI (e.g., through manipulated telemetry data displayed in the UI, or by exploiting other UI input points). When other users view pages containing this malicious code, their browsers execute the attacker's JavaScript.
        • Impact: Session hijacking of UI users, credential theft, information disclosure of monitoring data to unauthorized parties, defacement of the UI.
      • 3.1.4. Authentication and Authorization Bypass Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: Flaws in the UI's authentication or authorization mechanisms allow attackers to bypass login procedures or gain access to resources they are not authorized to view or modify.
        • Exploitation: Attacker identifies and exploits weaknesses in the UI's authentication or authorization logic to gain unauthorized access to the UI, potentially bypassing login or escalating privileges.
        • Impact: Unauthorized access to the SkyWalking UI, information disclosure of monitoring data, potential for UI manipulation or denial of service.
      • 3.1.6. Vulnerabilities in UI Dependencies (e.g., JavaScript Libraries, Frameworks) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: UI relies on third-party JavaScript libraries and frameworks that may contain known vulnerabilities (CVEs).
        • Exploitation: Attacker identifies and exploits known vulnerabilities in the UI's dependencies. Exploits are often publicly available for known CVEs in JavaScript libraries.
        • Impact: Depends on the specific vulnerability in the dependency. Could range from XSS vulnerabilities, denial of service, to potentially more severe impacts depending on the nature of the vulnerability.

    • 3.3. UI Communication Channel Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]:

      • Objective: Intercept or manipulate communication between the user's browser and the SkyWalking UI to gain information or compromise user sessions.
      • 3.3.1. Unencrypted Communication between Browser and UI (HTTP instead of HTTPS) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: Using unencrypted HTTP for communication between the browser and the UI exposes sensitive data in transit, including user credentials and session identifiers.
        • Exploitation: Attacker performs network sniffing or MITM attacks to eavesdrop on the communication channel between the user's browser and the UI. They can capture sensitive data like login credentials, session cookies, and monitoring data displayed in the UI.
        • Impact: Credential theft, session hijacking, unauthorized access to the SkyWalking UI, information disclosure of monitoring data.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit SkyWalking Storage Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]

Objective: Directly access or compromise the storage system used by SkyWalking to steal or manipulate telemetry data.

  • Attack Vectors:

    • 4.1. Storage System Vulnerabilities (Specific to chosen storage - e.g., Elasticsearch) [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • 4.1.1. Known Vulnerabilities in Storage Software (CVEs) [CRITICAL NODE]:

        • Vulnerability: The chosen storage system (e.g., Elasticsearch, H2) may have known software vulnerabilities (CVEs) in its core software.
        • Exploitation: Attacker identifies and exploits known vulnerabilities in the storage software. Exploits are often publicly available for known CVEs in popular storage systems.
        • Impact: Depends on the specific vulnerability in the storage software. Could range from data breach, data manipulation, denial of service of the storage system, to potentially code execution on the storage server.

      • 4.1.2. Misconfiguration of Storage System [HIGH RISK PATH]:

        • Objective: Gain unauthorized access to the storage system through misconfigurations.
        • 4.1.2.1. Weak Authentication/Authorization for Storage Access [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Vulnerability: Storage system uses weak default credentials, easily guessable passwords, or lacks proper authentication and authorization mechanisms for accessing the storage data.
          • Exploitation: Attacker attempts to brute-force default credentials, exploit default access, or bypass weak authentication mechanisms to gain unauthorized access to the storage system.
          • Impact: Unauthorized access to the storage system, data breach of telemetry data, data manipulation, denial of service of the storage system.
        • 4.1.2.2. Exposed Storage Ports/Interfaces [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Vulnerability: Storage system ports or interfaces are exposed to the public internet or internal networks without proper network access controls (firewalls, network segmentation).
          • Exploitation: Attacker discovers exposed storage ports or interfaces (e.g., through port scanning). If the storage system is not properly secured (see 4.1.2.1), the attacker can gain unauthorized access.
          • Impact: Unauthorized access to the storage system, data breach of telemetry data, denial of service of the storage system.

      • 4.1.3. Injection Vulnerabilities in Storage Queries (if applicable) [CRITICAL NODE]:

        • Vulnerability: If the collector or UI constructs queries to the storage system without proper input validation, it may be vulnerable to injection attacks (e.g., NoSQL injection in Elasticsearch).
        • Exploitation: Attacker crafts malicious telemetry data or UI requests that, when processed by the collector or UI, result in the execution of attacker-controlled queries against the storage system.
        • Impact: Data breach of monitoring data, data manipulation, data corruption, potential for denial of service of the storage system.

    • 4.2. Access Control Vulnerabilities to Stored Data [HIGH RISK PATH]:

      • Objective: Gain unauthorized access to the stored telemetry data through weak access controls within the storage system itself.
      • 4.2.1. Unauthorized Access to SkyWalking Data in Storage [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Vulnerability: Access control policies within the storage system are not properly configured, allowing unauthorized users or services to access SkyWalking telemetry data.
        • Exploitation: Attacker exploits weak access control policies within the storage system to directly access and retrieve SkyWalking telemetry data without proper authorization.
        • Impact: Data breach of telemetry data, potential for sensitive information exposure, reputational damage, regulatory fines.