mitigations.md

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for apache/skywalking

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Agent Authentication and Authorization

• Description:
  1. Enable Authentication in Collector: Configure the SkyWalking Collector's application.yml (or similar) to enable agent authentication. Set authentication.enabled: true and choose an authentication type (e.g., token).
  2. Generate Agent Tokens: Create unique authentication tokens within the SkyWalking Collector for each agent or service. This might involve using the Collector's API or configuration.
  3. Configure Agents with Tokens: Set the agent.authentication property in each agent's agent.config.yaml (or via environment variables) to the generated token.
  4. Enable Agent Authorization (If Supported and Needed): If your SkyWalking version supports agent authorization (role-based or service-based), configure it in the Collector to restrict agent actions based on roles or service names.
  5. Token Rotation: Implement a process to periodically rotate agent authentication tokens within SkyWalking's configuration and agent deployments.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Unauthorized Agent Data Injection (High Severity): Prevents malicious or rogue agents from sending fabricated or malicious data to the Collector, corrupting monitoring data.
  • Collector Resource Exhaustion by Unauthorized Agents (Medium Severity): Stops unauthorized agents from overwhelming the Collector with requests, leading to Denial of Service.
• Impact:
  • Unauthorized Agent Data Injection: High Risk Reduction
  • Collector Resource Exhaustion by Unauthorized Agents: Medium Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. Agent authentication using tokens is enabled in the Staging environment Collector.
• Missing Implementation: Agent authentication is not enabled in the Production environment. Agent authorization features (if available) are not configured in either environment. Token rotation is not automated.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Agent Configuration

• Description:
  1. Minimize Agent Features: Review agent.config.yaml and disable any agent features or plugins that are not strictly necessary for your monitoring needs.
  2. Secure Configuration File Storage: Store agent.config.yaml files with restricted file system permissions on the servers where agents are deployed.
  3. Externalize Agent Secrets: Avoid hardcoding sensitive credentials (like authentication tokens if not managed by SkyWalking's authentication) directly in agent.config.yaml. Use environment variables or secure configuration management systems to inject these secrets.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Exposure of Agent Secrets (Medium Severity): Hardcoded secrets in agent.config.yaml could be exposed if the agent host is compromised.
  • Agent Misconfiguration Exploitation (Low to Medium Severity): While less direct, overly permissive agent configurations could potentially be leveraged in some attack scenarios, though this is less of a direct SkyWalking vulnerability and more of a general system hardening issue.
• Impact:
  • Exposure of Agent Secrets: Medium Risk Reduction
  • Agent Misconfiguration Exploitation: Low to Medium Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. agent.config.yaml files are stored with restricted permissions.
• Missing Implementation: Secrets are still partially hardcoded in some agent configurations. External secret management for agent configurations is not fully implemented.

Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Update Agents

• Description:
  1. Monitor SkyWalking Releases: Subscribe to Apache SkyWalking project announcements and security advisories to stay informed about new agent releases and security patches.
  2. Establish Agent Update Process: Create a process for regularly updating SkyWalking agents to the latest versions.
  3. Prioritize Security Updates: Prioritize applying agent updates that address known security vulnerabilities.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Exploitation of Known Agent Vulnerabilities (High Severity): Outdated agents may contain publicly known security flaws that attackers could exploit to compromise agent hosts or potentially the SkyWalking infrastructure.
• Impact:
  • Exploitation of Known Agent Vulnerabilities: High Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. We have a manual process to check for agent updates during maintenance windows.
• Missing Implementation: Agent updates are not automated. A formal process for prioritizing and rapidly deploying security updates for agents is needed.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Collector Authentication and Authorization

• Description:
  1. Enable Collector UI Authentication: Configure authentication for the SkyWalking UI accessing the Collector. This is typically done in the Collector's application.yml by enabling authentication and configuring an authentication mechanism (e.g., basic auth, OAuth2 if supported).
  2. Implement Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) in Collector (If Supported): If SkyWalking Collector supports RBAC, configure it to define roles and permissions for users accessing the UI and potentially the Collector's API.
  3. Secure User Management: Implement secure user management practices for accounts accessing the SkyWalking Collector UI, including strong password policies and multi-factor authentication where possible (though SkyWalking's built-in UI auth might be limited).
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Unauthorized Access to Monitoring Data (High Severity): Prevents unauthorized users from accessing sensitive monitoring data displayed in the SkyWalking UI.
  • Data Manipulation via UI/API (Medium Severity): If the Collector API is exposed and not properly secured, unauthorized access could lead to data manipulation or configuration changes.
• Impact:
  • Unauthorized Access to Monitoring Data: High Risk Reduction
  • Data Manipulation via UI/API: Medium Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. Basic authentication is enabled for the Staging environment Collector UI.
• Missing Implementation: Authentication is not enabled for the Production Collector UI. RBAC is not implemented in either environment. More robust authentication mechanisms (like OAuth2 if supported or integration with an external identity provider) should be considered.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Collector Configuration

• Description:
  1. Minimize Collector Features: Review the Collector's application.yml and disable any unnecessary features, modules, or plugins that are not required for your monitoring setup.
  2. Secure Configuration File Storage: Protect the application.yml and other Collector configuration files with restricted file system permissions.
  3. Externalize Collector Secrets: Avoid hardcoding sensitive credentials (e.g., database passwords, authentication secrets) directly in application.yml. Use environment variables, secure vault systems, or configuration management tools to inject these secrets.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Exposure of Collector Secrets (Medium Severity): Hardcoded secrets in application.yml could be exposed if the Collector server is compromised.
  • Collector Misconfiguration Exploitation (Medium Severity): Insecure or overly permissive Collector configurations could potentially be exploited, although this is less direct and more related to general system hardening.
• Impact:
  • Exposure of Collector Secrets: Medium Risk Reduction
  • Collector Misconfiguration Exploitation: Medium Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. Collector configuration files are stored with restricted permissions.
• Missing Implementation: Secrets are still partially hardcoded in the Collector configuration. External secret management for Collector configurations is not fully implemented.

Mitigation Strategy: Input Validation and Sanitization at the Collector

• Description:
  1. Enable Collector Input Validation: Ensure that the SkyWalking Collector has input validation enabled for data received from agents. This is generally built into SkyWalking's data processing pipeline, but verify its effectiveness.
  2. Review Custom Collector Plugins (If Any): If you are using custom Collector plugins or extensions that process agent data, carefully review their code to ensure they perform proper input validation and sanitization to prevent injection attacks or data corruption.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Data Injection Attacks via Agents (Medium Severity): Prevents malicious agents from sending specially crafted data that could exploit vulnerabilities in the Collector's data processing logic.
  • Collector Instability due to Malformed Data (Low to Medium Severity): Input validation helps prevent the Collector from crashing or malfunctioning due to unexpected or malformed data from agents.
• Impact:
  • Data Injection Attacks via Agents: Medium Risk Reduction
  • Collector Instability due to Malformed Data: Low to Medium Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Assumed to be partially implemented by default SkyWalking Collector input validation.
• Missing Implementation: Explicit verification of input validation mechanisms within the SkyWalking Collector. Review and secure any custom Collector plugins.

Mitigation Strategy: Rate Limiting and DoS Protection for Collectors

• Description:
  1. Configure Rate Limiting (If Supported): Check if SkyWalking Collector offers built-in rate limiting capabilities for agent connections or data ingestion. If so, configure rate limits to prevent excessive requests from overwhelming the Collector.
  2. Network-Level Rate Limiting: Implement network-level rate limiting using firewalls or load balancers in front of the Collector to restrict the number of connections or requests from specific IP addresses or networks.
  3. Connection Limits: Configure the Collector's network settings to limit the maximum number of concurrent agent connections to prevent resource exhaustion.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks on Collector (Medium to High Severity): Prevents attackers from overwhelming the Collector with a flood of requests, making monitoring unavailable.
  • Resource Exhaustion (Medium Severity): Rate limiting helps protect Collector resources (CPU, memory, network bandwidth) from being exhausted by excessive agent traffic.
• Impact:
  • Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks on Collector: Medium to High Risk Reduction
  • Resource Exhaustion: Medium Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Not Implemented. Rate limiting is not currently configured at the SkyWalking Collector or network level.
• Missing Implementation: Implement rate limiting at the Collector level (if supported) or using network infrastructure. Configure connection limits on the Collector.

Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Update Collectors

• Description:
  1. Monitor SkyWalking Releases: Stay informed about new Collector releases and security patches from the Apache SkyWalking project.
  2. Establish Collector Update Process: Define a process for regularly updating SkyWalking Collectors to the latest versions.
  3. Prioritize Security Updates: Prioritize applying Collector updates that address known security vulnerabilities.
  4. Staged Rollouts for Collector Updates: Implement staged rollouts for Collector updates, starting with non-production environments.
  5. Rollback Plan: Have a rollback plan in place for Collector updates in case of issues.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Exploitation of Known Collector Vulnerabilities (High Severity): Outdated Collectors may contain known security vulnerabilities that attackers could exploit to compromise the Collector server or the monitoring infrastructure.
• Impact:
  • Exploitation of Known Collector Vulnerabilities: High Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. We have a manual process to check for Collector updates during maintenance windows.
• Missing Implementation: Collector updates are not automated. Staged rollouts and rollback plans are not formally defined. A process for rapidly deploying security updates is needed.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure UI Configuration

• Description:
  1. Enforce HTTPS for UI: Configure the web server serving the SkyWalking UI to enforce HTTPS for all connections. Ensure proper TLS/SSL certificate configuration.
  2. Disable Unnecessary UI Features: Review the UI configuration (if configurable separately from the Collector) and disable any features or plugins that are not required.
  3. Secure UI Configuration Files: Protect UI configuration files with restricted file system permissions.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Insecure UI Communication (Medium Severity): Without HTTPS, UI traffic (including potentially sensitive monitoring data and user credentials if basic auth is used) is vulnerable to eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks.
  • Exposure of UI Secrets (Low Severity): Less critical as UI typically has fewer secrets than Collector or Agents, but still good practice to secure configuration.
• Impact:
  • Insecure UI Communication: Medium Risk Reduction
  • Exposure of UI Secrets: Low Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. HTTPS is enabled for the Staging environment UI.
• Missing Implementation: HTTPS is not enforced for the Production UI. UI configuration hardening is not fully reviewed.

Mitigation Strategy: Content Security Policy (CSP)

• Description:
  1. Configure CSP Headers: Configure the web server serving the SkyWalking UI to send Content Security Policy (CSP) headers in HTTP responses.
  2. Define a Restrictive CSP: Create a CSP policy that restricts the sources from which the UI can load resources (scripts, stylesheets, images, etc.). Start with a restrictive policy and gradually relax it as needed, while still adhering to least privilege. Example: Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; (adjust based on UI needs).
  3. Test and Refine CSP: Thoroughly test the CSP policy to ensure it doesn't break UI functionality and refine it as needed to balance security and usability.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attacks (Medium to High Severity): CSP helps mitigate XSS vulnerabilities by limiting the sources from which the UI can load scripts and other resources, making it harder for attackers to inject malicious scripts.
  • Data Injection Attacks (Low to Medium Severity): CSP can also offer some defense against certain types of data injection attacks by controlling resource loading.
• Impact:
  • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attacks: Medium to High Risk Reduction
  • Data Injection Attacks: Low to Medium Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Not Implemented. CSP headers are not currently configured for the SkyWalking UI.
• Missing Implementation: Implement CSP headers in the web server configuration for the SkyWalking UI.

Mitigation Strategy: Security Headers

• Description:
  1. Configure Security Headers: Configure the web server serving the SkyWalking UI to send other relevant security headers in HTTP responses, such as:
     • X-Frame-Options: DENY or SAMEORIGIN (to prevent clickjacking)
     • X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff (to prevent MIME-sniffing attacks)
     • Referrer-Policy: no-referrer or strict-origin-when-cross-origin (to control referrer information)
     • Permissions-Policy (to control browser features)
     • Strict-Transport-Security (if HTTPS is enforced, to enforce HTTPS in browsers)
  2. Review and Adjust Headers: Review the purpose of each header and adjust their values based on your security requirements and UI functionality.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Clickjacking Attacks (Medium Severity): X-Frame-Options prevents embedding the UI in iframes on other sites, mitigating clickjacking.
  • MIME-Sniffing Attacks (Low Severity): X-Content-Type-Options prevents browsers from MIME-sniffing responses, reducing the risk of certain types of attacks.
  • Information Leakage via Referrer (Low Severity): Referrer-Policy controls referrer information, potentially reducing information leakage.
• Impact:
  • Clickjacking Attacks: Medium Risk Reduction
  • MIME-Sniffing Attacks: Low Risk Reduction
  • Information Leakage via Referrer: Low Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. Strict-Transport-Security might be enabled due to HTTPS configuration, but other security headers are likely not explicitly configured.
• Missing Implementation: Explicitly configure X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, and Permissions-Policy headers in the web server configuration for the SkyWalking UI.

Mitigation Strategy: Storage Access Control (SkyWalking Context)

• Description:
  1. Restrict Collector Storage Access: Configure the storage backend (e.g., Elasticsearch, database) to restrict access to only the SkyWalking Collector service account or IP address.
  2. Storage Authentication: Enable authentication for accessing the storage backend and ensure the SkyWalking Collector is configured with appropriate credentials to authenticate.
  3. Network Segmentation for Storage (If Separate): If the storage backend is deployed on a separate network, implement network segmentation and firewall rules to restrict access to only the Collector network.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Unauthorized Access to Monitoring Data in Storage (High Severity): Prevents unauthorized access to the raw monitoring data stored in the backend, protecting sensitive information.
  • Data Manipulation in Storage (Medium Severity): Restricting access reduces the risk of unauthorized modification or deletion of monitoring data in the storage backend.
• Impact:
  • Unauthorized Access to Monitoring Data in Storage: High Risk Reduction
  • Data Manipulation in Storage: Medium Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. Storage access is restricted to the Collector's VPC.
• Missing Implementation: Storage authentication is not fully enforced or reviewed. Finer-grained access control within the storage backend (e.g., database user permissions) might be missing.

Mitigation Strategy: Encryption at Rest and in Transit for Storage (SkyWalking Context)

• Description:
  1. Enable Storage Encryption at Rest: Configure the storage backend (e.g., Elasticsearch, database) to enable encryption at rest. This encrypts the data stored on disk.
  2. Enforce TLS/SSL for Collector-Storage Communication: Ensure that communication between the SkyWalking Collector and the storage backend is encrypted using TLS/SSL. Configure the Collector and storage client libraries to enforce TLS/SSL.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Data Breach if Storage Media is Compromised (High Severity): Encryption at rest protects data if the storage media is physically compromised or accessed by unauthorized parties.
  • Eavesdropping on Collector-Storage Communication (Medium Severity): TLS/SSL encryption prevents eavesdropping on the communication channel between the Collector and the storage backend.
• Impact:
  • Data Breach if Storage Media is Compromised: High Risk Reduction
  • Eavesdropping on Collector-Storage Communication: Medium Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. Encryption in transit (TLS/SSL) for Collector-Storage communication is likely enabled by default depending on storage backend configuration.
• Missing Implementation: Encryption at rest for the storage backend is not explicitly enabled or verified.

Mitigation Strategy: Enforce TLS/SSL for All SkyWalking Communication

• Description:
  1. Enable TLS/SSL for Agent-Collector Communication: Configure both SkyWalking Agents and Collectors to use TLS/SSL for communication. This typically involves configuring gRPC or HTTP/2 settings for TLS/SSL in both agent and collector configurations.
  2. Enable TLS/SSL for Collector-UI Communication: Ensure the web server serving the SkyWalking UI is configured to use HTTPS (TLS/SSL) as described in UI Security Mitigations.
  3. Enable TLS/SSL for Collector-Storage Communication: As described in Storage Security Mitigations, ensure TLS/SSL is enabled for communication between the Collector and the storage backend.
  4. Use Strong TLS/SSL Configurations: Use strong TLS/SSL cipher suites and protocols. Regularly update TLS/SSL certificates.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Eavesdropping on SkyWalking Communication Channels (Medium to High Severity): Without TLS/SSL, communication between agents, collectors, and UI is vulnerable to eavesdropping, potentially exposing sensitive monitoring data and even credentials.
  • Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks (Medium Severity): TLS/SSL prevents MITM attacks where attackers could intercept and manipulate SkyWalking communication.
• Impact:
  • Eavesdropping on SkyWalking Communication Channels: Medium to High Risk Reduction
  • Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks: Medium Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. HTTPS is enabled for Staging UI. TLS/SSL for Collector-Storage communication is likely enabled by default.
• Missing Implementation: TLS/SSL is not enforced for Agent-Collector communication in either environment. HTTPS is not enforced for Production UI. Explicit configuration review and hardening of TLS/SSL settings across all SkyWalking components is needed.

Mitigation Strategy: Mutual TLS (mTLS) for Agent-Collector Communication (Optional, for High Security)

• Description:
  1. Configure Collector for mTLS: Configure the SkyWalking Collector to require mutual TLS (mTLS) for agent connections. This involves configuring the Collector to verify client certificates presented by agents.
  2. Generate Agent Certificates: Generate unique TLS client certificates for each SkyWalking agent or group of agents.
  3. Configure Agents with Certificates: Configure each agent to present its client certificate during TLS handshake with the Collector.
  4. Certificate Management: Implement a secure certificate management system for generating, distributing, and rotating agent certificates.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Agent Spoofing (Medium Severity): mTLS provides stronger agent authentication, making it more difficult for attackers to impersonate legitimate agents.
  • Enhanced Agent-Collector Communication Security (High Severity): mTLS provides mutual authentication and encryption, further strengthening the security of the agent-collector communication channel.
• Impact:
  • Agent Spoofing: Medium Risk Reduction
  • Enhanced Agent-Collector Communication Security: High Risk Reduction
• Currently Implemented: Not Implemented. mTLS is not currently configured for Agent-Collector communication.
• Missing Implementation: Evaluate the need for mTLS based on security requirements. If needed, implement mTLS configuration for Agent-Collector communication, including certificate generation and management.