Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
99 lines (82 loc) · 7.63 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

99 lines (82 loc) · 7.63 KB

Threat Model Analysis for apache/solr

Threat: Solr Query Injection

  • Description: An attacker crafts malicious search queries by injecting special characters or commands into user-supplied input used in Solr queries. This allows bypassing intended search logic, accessing unauthorized data, or potentially executing commands on the Solr server. For example, using facet parameters to extract sensitive data or leveraging function queries for unintended actions.
  • Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized access to sensitive information, potential server compromise.
  • Affected Solr Component: Query Parser, Search Handler
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Thoroughly sanitize and validate all user input before incorporating it into Solr queries.
    • Use parameterized queries or query builder APIs to avoid direct string concatenation.
    • Implement robust authorization mechanisms within Solr, granting least privilege access.
    • Disable or restrict risky query parser features and functions if not required.
    • Conduct regular security audits of query construction logic and Solr configurations.

Threat: XML External Entity (XXE) Injection

  • Description: If Solr processes XML data, an attacker can inject malicious XML entities into XML documents. These entities can reference external resources, allowing the attacker to read local files on the Solr server, perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), or cause denial of service. This is possible if XML processing doesn't disable external entity resolution.
  • Impact: Confidentiality breach (reading local files), Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), Denial of Service (DoS).
  • Affected Solr Component: XML Parsers (Data Import Handler, Update Request Handlers, configuration parsing if XML is used).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Disable external entity resolution in XML parsers used by Solr.
    • Prefer JSON or other non-XML formats for data ingestion.
    • Validate XML input to ensure it conforms to expected schemas.
    • Keep Solr and XML processing libraries updated with security patches.

Threat: Velocity Template Injection (VTL)

  • Description: If VelocityResponseWriter is enabled and used, and user input is incorporated into Velocity templates without proper escaping, an attacker can inject malicious Velocity code. This code executes on the Solr server, potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE).
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), full server compromise, data breaches, denial of service.
  • Affected Solr Component: VelocityResponseWriter
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Disable VelocityResponseWriter if not essential. Use standard response writers like json or xml.
    • If VelocityResponseWriter is necessary, rigorously sanitize user input and properly encode output in templates.
    • Restrict functionality within Velocity templates to the minimum required.
    • Regularly audit Velocity templates for injection vulnerabilities.

Threat: Default Credentials and Weak Authentication

  • Description: Solr might not enforce strong authentication by default or have default administrative credentials. Attackers can exploit this to gain unauthorized access to the Solr Admin UI and potentially the server.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to Solr configuration, data manipulation, potential server takeover, data breaches.
  • Affected Solr Component: Authentication Modules, Admin UI
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable and configure strong authentication mechanisms in Solr (e.g., BasicAuth, Kerberos).
    • Change all default administrative usernames and passwords immediately.
    • Implement role-based access control (RBAC) and grant least privilege access.
    • Regularly audit authentication and authorization configurations.

Threat: Insufficient Authorization Controls

  • Description: Solr's authorization mechanisms, even if enabled, might be misconfigured or bypassed, allowing unauthorized access or modification of data. This can be due to misconfiguration of security.json or flaws in custom authorization plugins.
  • Impact: Unauthorized data access, data manipulation, privilege escalation, data breaches.
  • Affected Solr Component: Authorization Modules, security.json configuration
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Properly define and configure authorization rules in security.json or custom plugins to enforce least privilege.
    • Regularly review and test authorization configuration to ensure intended access control.
    • Enforce consistent authorization at both application and Solr levels.
    • Grant users and applications only minimum necessary permissions.

Threat: Exposed Admin Interface

  • Description: If the Solr Admin UI is exposed to the public internet without proper authentication and authorization, attackers can access it and gain control over the Solr instance.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to Solr configuration, data manipulation, potential server takeover, data breaches.
  • Affected Solr Component: Admin UI
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Restrict access to the Solr Admin UI to authorized users and networks using firewalls or network segmentation.
    • Enable strong authentication for accessing the Admin UI.
    • Consider disabling the Admin UI in production if it's not needed.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Third-Party Plugins

  • Description: Third-party Solr plugins might contain security vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit to compromise the Solr instance.
  • Impact: Plugin-specific vulnerabilities leading to various impacts, including RCE, data breaches, or DoS.
  • Affected Solr Component: Third-Party Plugins, Plugin Architecture
  • Risk Severity: Varies (can be Critical to High depending on the plugin and vulnerability)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Carefully evaluate the security of third-party plugins before use.
    • Choose plugins from reputable sources with active maintenance.
    • Keep plugins updated to the latest versions to patch vulnerabilities.
    • Only install and enable necessary plugins to minimize the attack surface.
    • Include plugins in regular security audits and vulnerability scanning.

Threat: Insecure Plugin Configuration

  • Description: Misconfiguring even secure plugins can introduce security vulnerabilities, especially plugins dealing with external data sources or authentication.
  • Impact: Plugin-specific misconfigurations leading to various impacts, potentially including data breaches or privilege escalation.
  • Affected Solr Component: Plugin Configuration, Specific Plugin
  • Risk Severity: Varies (can be High to Medium depending on the plugin and misconfiguration)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Follow secure configuration guidelines provided in plugin documentation.
    • Configure plugins with the principle of least privilege.
    • Regularly review and audit plugin configurations for security.
    • Thoroughly test and validate plugin configurations in a non-production environment before deploying to production.