Mitigation Strategy: Strict OGNL Expression Validation (Whitelist Approach)
-
Description:
- Identify All OGNL Usages: Thoroughly review all JSPs, action configurations (
struts.xml
), and any custom tag libraries to identify every instance where OGNL expressions are used. This includes implicit uses (e.g., within<s:property>
tags). - Define Allowed Expressions: For each identified OGNL usage, create a precise whitelist of exactly what is allowed. This should be as restrictive as possible. For example, instead of allowing
user.address.*
, allow onlyuser.address.street
,user.address.city
,user.address.zip
. - Implement Validation:
- Option A (Preferred): Custom
SecurityMemberAccess
: Create a custom implementation of thecom.opensymphony.xwork2.security.SecurityMemberAccess
interface. Override theisAccessible()
method to enforce your whitelist. This provides the most granular control. Register this custom implementation in yourstruts.xml
orstruts.properties
. - Option B (Less Preferred, but easier):
params
Interceptor: Use theparams
interceptor'sexcludeParams
andallowedMethods
parameters to restrict access. This is a blacklist approach, so it's less secure than a whitelist, but it can be a useful starting point. Combine this with Option A for best results. - Option C (Least Preferred): Hardcoded Checks: As a last resort, you could add hardcoded checks within your action classes to validate OGNL expressions before they are used. This is error-prone and difficult to maintain.
- Option A (Preferred): Custom
- Testing: Thoroughly test each OGNL usage with both valid and invalid inputs to ensure the whitelist is working correctly. Include negative tests (attempts to access disallowed properties or methods).
- Identify All OGNL Usages: Thoroughly review all JSPs, action configurations (
-
Threats Mitigated:
- OGNL Injection (Remote Code Execution - RCE): Severity: Critical. Allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the server.
- Data Exposure: Severity: High. Attackers could potentially access sensitive data not intended for display.
- Privilege Escalation: Severity: High. Attackers might be able to elevate their privileges within the application.
-
Impact:
- OGNL Injection (RCE): Risk reduced from Critical to Low (with a well-implemented whitelist).
- Data Exposure: Risk reduced from High to Low.
- Privilege Escalation: Risk reduced from High to Low.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Example:
params
interceptor configured instruts.xml
with a basicexcludeParams
list (blacklist approach). CustomSecurityMemberAccess
not implemented. Hardcoded checks inUserAction
for specific OGNL expressions.
- Example:
-
Missing Implementation:
- Critical: A comprehensive custom
SecurityMemberAccess
implementation is missing. This is the highest priority. - High: The
excludeParams
list instruts.xml
needs to be reviewed and expanded to be more comprehensive (even though it's a blacklist). - Medium: Hardcoded checks in action classes should be replaced with the
SecurityMemberAccess
implementation. - Low: A full audit of all OGNL usage points is needed to ensure no expressions are missed.
- Critical: A comprehensive custom
Mitigation Strategy: Restrict Class Loader Access
-
Description:
- Identify Potentially Dangerous Classes/Packages: Create a list of classes and packages that should never be accessible through Struts' class loading mechanisms. This includes classes related to system administration, reflection, networking, and file I/O.
- Configure
struts.excludedClasses
andstruts.excludedPackageNames
: In yourstruts.properties
orstruts.xml
file, use these properties to specify the classes and packages to exclude. This is a blacklist approach. - Testing: Attempt to access restricted classes through Struts (e.g., using OGNL expressions) to verify that the restrictions are working.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Arbitrary Class Loading (RCE): Severity: Critical. Attackers could instantiate arbitrary classes, potentially leading to remote code execution.
- Resource Access Violations: Severity: High. Attackers might gain access to files, network resources, or other system resources they shouldn't have access to.
-
Impact:
- Arbitrary Class Loading (RCE): Risk reduced from Critical to Medium (with a well-maintained blacklist).
- Resource Access Violations: Risk reduced from High to Medium.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Example: Basic
struts.excludedClasses
andstruts.excludedPackageNames
configuration instruts.properties
, but the list is incomplete.
- Example: Basic
-
Missing Implementation:
- High: The
struts.excludedClasses
andstruts.excludedPackageNames
lists need to be thoroughly reviewed and expanded. This should be an ongoing process as new potential attack vectors are discovered.
- High: The
Mitigation Strategy: Strict Parameter Filtering (Whitelist Approach)
-
Description:
- Identify All Action Methods: List all methods in your action classes that are intended to be invoked by user requests.
- Define Allowed Methods: Use the
params
interceptor'sallowedMethods
parameter instruts.xml
to explicitly list the allowed methods for each action. This is a whitelist approach. - Define Allowed Action Names (if applicable): If you use action names (e.g., in URLs), use the
allowedActionNames
parameter to restrict which action names are allowed. - Disable Dynamic Method Invocation (DMI): Set
struts.enable.DynamicMethodInvocation
tofalse
instruts.properties
to prevent attackers from invoking arbitrary methods. - Testing: Attempt to invoke disallowed methods or action names through URLs or form submissions to verify the restrictions.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Parameter Tampering (Method Invocation): Severity: High. Attackers could invoke unintended methods on your action classes.
- Dynamic Method Invocation (DMI) Attacks: Severity: High. Attackers could invoke arbitrary methods.
-
Impact:
- Parameter Tampering (Method Invocation): Risk reduced from High to Low.
- DMI Attacks: Risk reduced from High to None (if DMI is disabled).
-
Currently Implemented:
- Example:
struts.enable.DynamicMethodInvocation
is set tofalse
.allowedMethods
is not used.excludeParams
is used (blacklist), but not comprehensively.
- Example:
-
Missing Implementation:
- Critical: Implement
allowedMethods
instruts.xml
for all actions. This is the most important missing piece. - Medium: Review and improve the
excludeParams
configuration (even though it's a blacklist).
- Critical: Implement
Mitigation Strategy: Sanitize Redirect URLs and Avoid chain
Result
-
Description:
- Avoid
chain
: Do not use thechain
result type. UseredirectAction
orredirect
instead. - Identify Redirect Usages: Find all instances where
redirect
orredirectAction
are used. - Validate Redirect Targets:
- Option A (Preferred): Whitelist: If possible, maintain a whitelist of allowed redirect URLs or URL patterns within your Struts configuration or application logic. Only redirect to URLs that match the whitelist.
- Option B (Less Preferred): Sanitization: If a whitelist is not feasible, thoroughly sanitize any user-supplied data that is used to construct the redirect URL within your Struts action. Remove or escape any characters that could be used for open redirect attacks (e.g.,
//
,\
, etc.). This is less secure than a whitelist. - Option C (Avoid): Relative Redirects: Use relative redirects whenever possible. This reduces the attack surface.
- Testing: Attempt to inject malicious URLs into redirect parameters to verify that the validation/sanitization is working.
- Avoid
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Open Redirect: Severity: Medium. Attackers could redirect users to malicious websites.
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (in some cases): Severity: High. Open redirects can sometimes be used to inject malicious scripts.
-
Impact:
- Open Redirect: Risk reduced from Medium to Low (with a whitelist) or Medium-Low (with sanitization).
- XSS: Risk reduced indirectly (by preventing open redirects that could be used for XSS).
-
Currently Implemented:
- Example:
chain
result type is not used. Some basic sanitization of redirect URLs is performed, but no whitelist is used.
- Example:
-
Missing Implementation:
- High: Implement a whitelist of allowed redirect URLs if feasible, ideally within the Struts configuration.
- Medium: Improve the sanitization logic to be more robust and comprehensive.
Mitigation Strategy: Keep Struts Updated
-
Description:
- Subscribe to Security Announcements: Subscribe to the Apache Struts security mailing list and monitor other security advisories.
- Use Dependency Management: Use a tool like Maven or Gradle to manage Struts dependencies.
- Regular Updates: Establish a regular schedule for updating Struts to the latest stable version. Apply security patches immediately upon release.
- Testing: After updating Struts, thoroughly test the application to ensure that the update did not introduce any regressions.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- All Known Struts Vulnerabilities: Severity: Varies (from Low to Critical). This mitigates all vulnerabilities that have been publicly disclosed and patched.
-
Impact:
- All Known Struts Vulnerabilities: Risk reduced significantly (depending on the specific vulnerabilities patched). This is the single most important mitigation.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Example: Struts is updated periodically, but not immediately upon the release of security patches. Dependency management is used (Maven).
-
Missing Implementation:
- High: Establish a process for applying security patches immediately upon release.
- Medium: Improve the testing process after Struts updates to ensure comprehensive regression testing.