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Attack Tree Analysis for apache/zookeeper

Objective: Compromise Application via Zookeeper Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Root: Compromise Application via Zookeeper Exploitation
    ├── OR 1: Exploit Zookeeper Vulnerabilities
    │   └── AND *** 1.1: Exploit Known Zookeeper Vulnerability (CVE)
    │       └── *** 1.1.3: Execute Exploit against Zookeeper Instance **
    ├── OR *** 2: Exploit Zookeeper Misconfiguration **
    │   ├── OR *** 2.1: Exploit Unsecured Access Control **
    │   │   ├── OR *** 2.1.1: Identify Weak or Missing Authentication **
    │   │   │   ├── *** 2.1.1.1: Anonymous Access Enabled **
    │   │   │   └── *** 2.1.1.2: Default/Weak Credentials Used **
    │   │   ├── OR *** 2.1.2: Identify Insecure ACLs **
    │   │   │   ├── *** 2.1.2.1: World-Readable/Writable Nodes **
    │   │   │   └── *** 2.1.2.2: Overly Permissive ACLs for Critical Nodes **
    │   │   └── *** 2.1.3: Exploit Lack of Network Segmentation **
    │   │       └── *** 2.1.3.1: Zookeeper Accessible from Untrusted Network **
    │   ├── OR *** 2.2: Exploit Unencrypted Communication **
    │   │   ├── OR *** 2.2.1: Sniff Unencrypted Network Traffic **
    │   │   │   ├── *** 2.2.1.1: Capture Authentication Credentials **
    │   │   │   └── *** 2.2.1.2: Capture Sensitive Application Data in Transit **
    │   ├── OR 3: Exploit Zookeeper Protocol Weaknesses
    │   │   └── 3.1: Session Hijacking
    │   │       └── *** 3.1.1.1: Sniff Network Traffic (if unencrypted) **
    │   └── *** 3.2: Request Flooding/DoS via Protocol Exploitation **
    │       └── *** 3.2.1: Identify Resource-Intensive Zookeeper Request **
    │           └── *** 3.2.1.1: Exploit `create` or `setData` storms **

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Known Zookeeper Vulnerability (CVE):

High-Risk Path: Exploit Known Zookeeper Vulnerability (CVE) -> Execute Exploit against Zookeeper Instance

  • Critical Node: Execute Exploit against Zookeeper Instance
  • Attack Vector Breakdown:
    • Attackers identify publicly disclosed vulnerabilities (CVEs) affecting the deployed Zookeeper version.
    • They obtain or develop an exploit for the identified CVE.
    • The exploit is executed against the Zookeeper instance.
    • Potential Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the Zookeeper server, data manipulation, Denial of Service (DoS).
    • Mitigation: Regularly update Zookeeper to the latest patched version. Implement vulnerability scanning and patching processes.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Unsecured Access Control:

High-Risk Path: Exploit Zookeeper Misconfiguration -> Exploit Unsecured Access Control

  • Critical Node: Exploit Unsecured Access Control
  • Attack Vector Breakdown:
    • Identify Weak or Missing Authentication:
      • Anonymous Access Enabled: Zookeeper is configured to allow connections without any authentication.
        • Critical Node: Anonymous Access Enabled
        • Attack Vector Breakdown: Attackers can connect to Zookeeper without providing credentials and potentially perform actions based on ACLs, which might be misconfigured.
        • Mitigation: Disable anonymous access. Enable authentication using SASL mechanisms like Kerberos or Digest.
      • Default/Weak Credentials Used: Authentication is enabled, but default or easily guessable credentials are used.
        • Critical Node: Default/Weak Credentials Used
        • Attack Vector Breakdown: Attackers can brute-force or guess default/weak credentials to gain authenticated access to Zookeeper.
        • Mitigation: Change default credentials immediately upon deployment. Enforce strong password policies.
    • Identify Insecure ACLs:
      • World-Readable/Writable Nodes: Critical zNodes are configured with world-readable or world-writable permissions.
        • Critical Node: World-Readable/Writable Nodes
        • Attack Vector Breakdown: Any authenticated user (or anonymous if enabled) can read or modify sensitive data stored in these zNodes, leading to data breaches or application disruption.
        • Mitigation: Implement a least-privilege ACL model. Restrict access to zNodes based on roles and responsibilities. Regularly review and audit ACL configurations.
      • Overly Permissive ACLs for Critical Nodes: ACLs grant excessive permissions to users or groups that should not have access to critical zNodes.
        • Critical Node: Overly Permissive ACLs for Critical Nodes
        • Attack Vector Breakdown: Attackers can leverage compromised accounts or insider threats with overly broad permissions to access or manipulate critical data.
        • Mitigation: Implement a least-privilege ACL model. Grant only necessary permissions. Regularly review and audit ACL configurations, ensuring they align with the principle of least privilege.
    • Exploit Lack of Network Segmentation:
      • Zookeeper Accessible from Untrusted Network: Zookeeper is directly accessible from the internet or other untrusted networks.
        • Critical Node: Zookeeper Accessible from Untrusted Network
        • Attack Vector Breakdown: Exposing Zookeeper to untrusted networks significantly increases the attack surface, making it easier for attackers to discover and exploit vulnerabilities or misconfigurations.
        • Mitigation: Deploy Zookeeper in a dedicated, isolated network segment. Use firewalls to restrict access to Zookeeper ports only from authorized clients and servers within the application's infrastructure.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Unencrypted Communication:

High-Risk Path: Exploit Zookeeper Misconfiguration -> Exploit Unencrypted Communication -> Sniff Unencrypted Network Traffic

  • Critical Node: Exploit Unencrypted Communication, Sniff Unencrypted Network Traffic
  • Attack Vector Breakdown:
    • Capture Authentication Credentials: Zookeeper communication is unencrypted, and authentication credentials are transmitted in plaintext or easily reversible formats.
      • Critical Node: Capture Authentication Credentials
      • Attack Vector Breakdown: Attackers can sniff network traffic to capture authentication credentials (e.g., SASL tokens) and bypass authentication.
      • Mitigation: Enforce TLS/SSL encryption for all Zookeeper communication.
    • Capture Sensitive Application Data in Transit: Sensitive application data is stored in Zookeeper and transmitted unencrypted.
      • Critical Node: Capture Sensitive Application Data in Transit
      • Attack Vector Breakdown: Attackers can sniff network traffic to intercept sensitive application data being transmitted between clients and Zookeeper servers, leading to data breaches.
      • Mitigation: Enforce TLS/SSL encryption for all Zookeeper communication. Avoid storing highly sensitive data directly in Zookeeper if possible, or encrypt it at the application level before storing it in Zookeeper.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Session Hijacking via Sniffing Unencrypted Traffic:

High-Risk Path: Exploit Zookeeper Protocol Weaknesses -> Session Hijacking -> Capture Valid Session ID -> Sniff Network Traffic (if unencrypted)

  • Critical Node: Sniff Network Traffic (if unencrypted)
  • Attack Vector Breakdown:
    • Zookeeper communication is unencrypted, and session IDs are transmitted in plaintext.
    • Attackers sniff network traffic to capture valid Zookeeper session IDs.
    • Attackers use the captured session ID to impersonate a legitimate client and perform unauthorized actions.
    • Potential Impact: Unauthorized access to Zookeeper data and functionality, data manipulation, application disruption.
    • Mitigation: Enforce TLS/SSL encryption for all Zookeeper communication to protect session IDs in transit. Implement robust session management and consider session invalidation mechanisms.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Request Flooding/DoS via Protocol Exploitation (create or setData storms):

High-Risk Path: Exploit Zookeeper Protocol Weaknesses -> Request Flooding/DoS via Protocol Exploitation -> Identify Resource-Intensive Zookeeper Request -> Exploit create or setData storms

  • Critical Node: Exploit create or setData storms
  • Attack Vector Breakdown:
    • Attackers identify that flooding Zookeeper with a large number of create or setData requests can overwhelm the server resources.
    • They launch a flood of these requests from compromised clients or attacker-controlled machines.
    • This overwhelms the Zookeeper server, leading to resource exhaustion and Denial of Service (DoS).
    • Potential Impact: Application downtime, service disruption.
    • Mitigation: Implement rate limiting on client requests to Zookeeper, especially for create and setData operations. Monitor Zookeeper server performance and resource utilization. Implement DoS detection and prevention mechanisms.