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Attack Tree Analysis for apache/zookeeper

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access to, Modify, or Disrupt Application Data/Functionality via Zookeeper

Attack Tree Visualization

[Attacker's Goal]
    |
    ---------------------------------------------------------
    |                                                       |
[1. Unauthorized Access]                           [3. Disrupt Service]
    |
    -----------------
    |
[1.1 Weak/Default] [CN] [HR]
  Credentials
                                                -------------------------
                                                |                     |
                                            [3.1 DOS/DDOS] [CN] [HR]   [3.3 Configuration]
                                                |
                                                -----------------       -----------------
                                                |               |       |               |
                                            [3.1.1 Network] [3.1.2 Resource] [3.3.1 Missing] [CN][HR] [3.3.2 Insecure] [CN]
                                             Flooding     Exhaustion   Security       Deserial.
                                                                          Patches

Attack Tree Path: 1. Unauthorized Access to Zookeeper Data

  • 1.1 Weak/Default Credentials [CN] [HR]:
    • Description: The attacker attempts to connect to the Zookeeper service using default or easily guessable credentials (e.g., "admin/admin"). Many deployments, especially in development or testing environments, are left with default credentials, making this a common and easily exploitable vulnerability.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High - Grants full administrative access to the Zookeeper ensemble, allowing the attacker to read, modify, or delete any data.
    • Effort: Very Low
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy - If auditing is enabled, login attempts with default credentials will be logged. Failed login attempts may also be noticeable.
    • Mitigation:
      • Change default credentials immediately after installation.
      • Use strong, unique passwords for all Zookeeper users.
      • Enforce a strong password policy.
      • Consider using Kerberos or other strong authentication mechanisms.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Disrupt Zookeeper Service

  • 3.1 DOS/DDOS Zookeeper [CN] [HR]:

    • Description: The attacker attempts to make the Zookeeper service unavailable by overwhelming it with requests or consuming its resources. This can be achieved through various methods, including network flooding and resource exhaustion.

    • Likelihood: Medium

    • Impact: High - Disrupts all applications that rely on Zookeeper for coordination, service discovery, or configuration management. Can lead to complete application failure.

    • Effort: Low - With readily available tools and botnets, launching a DoS/DDoS attack requires minimal effort.

    • Skill Level: Intermediate

    • Detection Difficulty: Easy - Performance degradation, increased latency, and network monitoring tools will quickly reveal a DoS/DDoS attack.

    • Mitigation:

      • Implement rate limiting and connection limits.
      • Use a firewall to block malicious traffic.
      • Deploy Zookeeper in a distributed manner with sufficient resources to handle peak loads.
      • Consider using a DDoS mitigation service.
      • Monitor Zookeeper performance and resource usage.

    • 3.1.1 Network Flooding:

      • Description: The attacker sends a large volume of network traffic (e.g., TCP SYN floods, UDP floods) to the Zookeeper server, overwhelming its network interface and preventing legitimate clients from connecting.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy
      • Mitigation: Network firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems, and traffic shaping can mitigate network flooding attacks.

    • 3.1.2 Resource Exhaustion:

      • Description: The attacker sends requests designed to consume excessive server resources (CPU, memory, file descriptors), causing the Zookeeper service to become unresponsive or crash.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy
      • Mitigation: Configure resource limits, monitor resource usage, and implement appropriate timeouts.

    • 3.3 Configuration Errors

      • 3.3.1 Missing Security Patches [CN] [HR]:

        • Description: The Zookeeper deployment is running an outdated version with known vulnerabilities that have not been patched. Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access, modify data, or disrupt the service.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium to High (depends on the specific vulnerability)
        • Effort: Very Low - Attackers can often use publicly available exploit code.
        • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate (depending on the complexity of the exploit)
        • Detection Difficulty: Easy - Vulnerability scanners can identify unpatched software.
        • Mitigation:
          • Establish a robust patch management process.
          • Regularly update Zookeeper to the latest stable version.
          • Subscribe to Zookeeper security announcements.

      • 3.3.2 Insecure Deserialization of Configuration Options [CN]:

        • Description: Zookeeper is configured to deserialize data from untrusted sources, potentially allowing an attacker to inject malicious objects that lead to remote code execution (RCE). This is a highly impactful but less common vulnerability.
        • Likelihood: Very Low
        • Impact: Very High - Allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the Zookeeper server, potentially gaining complete control of the system.
        • Effort: High
        • Skill Level: Expert
        • Detection Difficulty: Hard - Requires specialized security tools and expertise to detect.
        • Mitigation:
          • Avoid deserializing data from untrusted sources.
          • If deserialization is necessary, use a whitelist approach to allow only known safe classes.
          • Implement robust input validation and sanitization.
          • Use a security manager to restrict the privileges of deserialized code.