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Attack Tree Analysis for apolloconfig/apollo

Objective: [G] Gain Unauthorized Access/Control via Apollo [CN]

Attack Tree Visualization

[G] Gain Unauthorized Access/Control via Apollo [CN] / |
/ |
[A1] Compromise [A2] Intercept/Modify [A3] Exploit Client-Side Apollo Server Itself Client-Server Comms Vulnerabilities/ [CN][HR] [HR] Misconfigurations [CN] | | | | | | | | ----------------- | | | | [A1.1] Exploit [A2.1] Man-in-the-Middle [A3.1] Inject [A3.2] Improper Known Vulns (MITM) Attack [HR] Malicious Config Validation of in Apollo | [HR] Config Data [CN] Server/Deps [HR] | | | | | | | [A1.2] Credential [A2.1.1] Compromise [A3.1.1] XSS [A3.2.1] Trust Stuffing/ Network Devices/ via Config Config from Brute-Force [HR] Certificates [CN] Injection [HR] Untrusted | Source [CN] [A1.3] Exploit | Misconfiguration [A3.2.1.1] No of Access Controls Signature/Hash [CN] Verification [CN] | [A1.3.1] Weak/ Default Admin Portal Password [CN] | [A1.2.1] Use Default/ Leaked Creds [CN]

Attack Tree Path: [G] Gain Unauthorized Access/Control via Apollo [CN]

  • Description: The attacker's ultimate objective is to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data or to control the application's behavior by manipulating the Apollo configuration. This is the root of the attack tree and represents the overall goal.
  • Why Critical: Success at this level represents a complete compromise of the application's configuration, leading to potentially severe consequences.

Attack Tree Path: [A1] Compromise Apollo Server Itself [CN][HR]

  • Description: The attacker directly targets the Apollo server, aiming to gain full control over it.
  • Why Critical & High-Risk: Direct server compromise grants complete control over all configurations, making it the most impactful attack vector.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • [A1.1] Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Apollo Server/Dependencies [HR]:
      • Description: The attacker leverages known vulnerabilities (e.g., CVEs) in the Apollo server software or its dependencies (database, OS, etc.).
      • Why High-Risk: Known vulnerabilities often have publicly available exploits, making them easier to leverage.
    • [A1.2] Credential Stuffing/Brute-Force [HR]:
      • Description: The attacker attempts to gain access to the Apollo server's administrative interface using stolen credentials or by guessing passwords.
      • Why High-Risk: A common and often successful attack, especially against weak or default credentials.
      • Sub-Vectors:
        • [A1.2.1] Use Default/Leaked Credentials [CN]:
          • Description: Exploiting default credentials or credentials obtained from data breaches.
          • Why Critical: Using default credentials is a severe security oversight, providing an easy entry point for attackers.
    • [A1.3] Exploit Misconfiguration of Access Controls [CN]:
      • Description: The attacker takes advantage of improperly configured access controls on the Apollo server.
      • Why Critical: Misconfigurations are common and can provide significant unauthorized access.
      • Sub-Vectors:
        • [A1.3.1] Weak/Default Admin Portal Password [CN]:
          • Description: A specific, critical misconfiguration where the administrative portal uses a weak or default password.
          • Why Critical: Directly exposes the administrative interface to unauthorized access.

Attack Tree Path: [A2] Intercept/Modify Client-Server Communication [HR]

  • Description: The attacker targets the communication channel between the Apollo client and server.
  • Why High-Risk: Successful interception allows for modification or theft of configuration data.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • [A2.1] Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack [HR]:
      • Description: The attacker intercepts and potentially modifies the communication between the client and server.
      • Why High-Risk: Grants complete control over the configuration data in transit.
      • Sub-Vectors:
        • [A2.1.1] Compromise Network Devices/Certificates [CN]:
          • Description: Gaining control over network infrastructure or compromising TLS certificates to perform the MITM attack.
          • Why Critical: A necessary step for a successful MITM attack.

Attack Tree Path: [A3] Exploit Client-Side Vulnerabilities/Misconfigurations [CN]

  • Description: The attacker targets weaknesses in how the application uses the Apollo client or handles the retrieved configuration.
  • Why Critical: Even with a secure server, client-side vulnerabilities can lead to compromise.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • [A3.1] Inject Malicious Config [HR]:
      • Description: The attacker tricks the application into loading a malicious configuration.
      • Why High-Risk: Can lead to various attacks, including code execution and data breaches.
      • Sub-Vectors:
        • [A3.1.1] XSS via Config Injection [HR]:
          • Description: The application renders configuration values directly into the UI without sanitization, allowing for XSS attacks.
          • Why High-Risk: A common and impactful web vulnerability.
    • [A3.2] Improper Validation of Config Data [CN]:
      • Description: The application fails to properly validate the configuration data received from Apollo.
      • Why Critical: A fundamental security flaw that opens the door to numerous attacks.
      • Sub-Vectors:
        • [A3.2.1] Trust Config from Untrusted Source [CN]:
          • Description: The application fetches configurations from an untrusted source.
          • Why Critical: Bypasses many security controls and allows an attacker to control the configuration.
          • Sub-Vectors:
            • [A3.2.1.1] No Signature/Hash Verification [CN]:
              • Description: The client does not verify the integrity of the fetched configuration.
              • Why Critical: Allows for undetected configuration tampering.