Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
98 lines (73 loc) · 8.06 KB

mitigations.md

File metadata and controls

98 lines (73 loc) · 8.06 KB

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for apolloconfig/apollo

Mitigation Strategy: Strong Authentication and Authorization for Apollo Portal/Admin

  • Description:

    1. Integrate with Identity Provider: Connect Apollo to your organization's existing identity provider (e.g., Active Directory, LDAP, Okta, Google Workspace). This centralizes user management and leverages existing security policies. Configure Apollo to use the identity provider for authentication.
    2. Enable Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Require all users accessing the Apollo Portal or Admin Service to use MFA. This adds a second factor of authentication. Configure MFA through your identity provider, and ensure Apollo enforces it.
    3. Define Granular Roles: Within Apollo, create specific roles with limited permissions. For example:
      • viewer: Can only view configurations.
      • editor: Can modify configurations within specific namespaces.
      • admin: Full administrative access (use sparingly).
    4. Assign Roles to Users: Assign users to the appropriate roles based on their responsibilities within Apollo. Avoid granting excessive permissions. Regularly review role assignments within the Apollo system.
    5. Disable default accounts: Disable or change default accounts and passwords in Apollo.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Unauthorized Access to Apollo Portal/Admin Service (Severity: Critical): Prevents attackers from gaining control of the Apollo configuration system itself.
    • Configuration Poisoning/Tampering (Severity: High): Reduces the risk of attackers injecting malicious configurations directly into Apollo.

  • Impact:

    • Unauthorized Access: Risk reduced significantly (e.g., 90-95%). MFA and strong authentication within Apollo make unauthorized access very difficult.
    • Configuration Poisoning: Risk reduced indirectly (e.g., 60-70%). Limits the attack surface for injecting malicious configurations via the Apollo interface.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Identity Provider Integration: Implemented with Okta.
    • MFA: Enabled for all administrative users via Okta, enforced by Apollo.
    • Granular Roles: Partially implemented. Basic "admin" and "editor" roles exist within Apollo.
    • Default accounts: Disabled.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Granular Roles: Need to define more specific roles within Apollo (e.g., "read-only viewer," "editor for namespace X"). Review and refine existing role permissions within the Apollo system.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Communication (HTTPS/TLS) for Apollo Services

  • Description:

    1. Enforce HTTPS: Configure all Apollo servers (Config Service, Portal, Admin Service) to only accept HTTPS connections. Reject all HTTP connections at the Apollo server level.
    2. Use Strong TLS Configuration: Configure the Apollo servers (or the reverse proxy specifically for Apollo) to use strong TLS cipher suites and protocols (e.g., TLS 1.3, avoid TLS 1.0/1.1). Disable weak ciphers. This is a configuration within the Apollo server setup.
    3. Obtain and Install TLS Certificates: Obtain valid TLS certificates from a trusted Certificate Authority (CA). Install the certificates on the Apollo servers themselves.
    4. Implement Configuration Versioning and Rollback:
      • Utilize Apollo's built-in versioning capabilities.
      • Implement a robust rollback process that can be executed quickly and reliably using Apollo's features.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Configuration Poisoning/Tampering (Severity: High): Prevents attackers from modifying configurations in transit to/from Apollo.
    • Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks (Severity: High): HTTPS with strong TLS configuration on the Apollo servers prevents interception.
    • Exposure of Sensitive Data (Severity: High): HTTPS encrypts configuration data in transit to/from Apollo.

  • Impact:

    • Configuration Poisoning: Risk reduced significantly (e.g., 80-90%) for attacks targeting the Apollo communication channels.
    • MITM Attacks: Risk reduced significantly (e.g., 90-95%) against the Apollo services.
    • Exposure of Sensitive Data: Risk reduced significantly (e.g., 80-90%) in transit to/from Apollo.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • HTTPS: Enforced for all Apollo services.
    • TLS Configuration: Uses TLS 1.2 and 1.3. Weak ciphers are disabled on the Apollo servers.
    • TLS Certificates: Valid certificates are installed and regularly renewed on the Apollo servers.
    • Configuration Versioning and Rollback: Implemented using Apollo's built-in features.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • None. All Apollo-specific aspects of this mitigation are implemented.

Mitigation Strategy: Denial of Service Protection for Apollo Config Service

  • Description:

    1. Implement Rate Limiting (Apollo-Specific): If Apollo Config Service has built-in rate limiting capabilities, configure them. This would involve setting limits on requests within the Apollo configuration itself. If not built-in, this would need to be handled externally (and thus wouldn't be in this Apollo-specific list).
    2. Implement Monitoring and Alerting (Apollo-Specific): Utilize any built-in monitoring and alerting features within Apollo itself to track the performance and availability of the Config Service. Configure alerts for high request rates, error rates, or service unavailability as reported by Apollo.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Denial of Service (DoS) against Apollo Config Service (Severity: Medium): Reduces the impact of DoS attacks targeting the Apollo Config Service directly.

  • Impact:

    • DoS: Risk reduction depends on the specific capabilities of Apollo's built-in features. If robust rate limiting is available and configured, the reduction could be significant (e.g., 60-70%). If only basic monitoring is available, the reduction is lower (e.g., 20-30%, primarily for detection).

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Monitoring and Alerting: Basic monitoring is in place within Apollo, with alerts for service unavailability.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Rate Limiting (Apollo-Specific): Need to investigate whether Apollo Config Service has built-in rate limiting capabilities. If so, configure them. If not, this mitigation is handled externally.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Handling of Sensitive Data (Apollo Integration)

  • Description:

    1. Choose a Secrets Management Solution: Select a secrets management solution (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager).
    2. Configure Apollo Integration: Configure Apollo to retrieve secrets from the chosen secrets management solution. This typically involves using environment variables or a dedicated Apollo plugin designed for this purpose. This is the key Apollo-specific step.
    3. Encrypt database at rest: Ensure that the database used by Apollo to store configurations is encrypted at rest.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Exposure of Sensitive Data in Configurations (Severity: Critical): Prevents sensitive data from being stored directly in Apollo configurations.

  • Impact:

    • Exposure of Sensitive Data: Risk reduced dramatically (e.g., 95-99%) within the context of Apollo. Secrets are not stored in plain text within Apollo.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Secrets Management Solution: Using AWS Secrets Manager.
    • Database encryption: Implemented.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Apollo Integration: Need to fully configure Apollo to retrieve secrets from AWS Secrets Manager using a supported method (environment variables or a dedicated plugin). This is the critical Apollo-specific missing piece.