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Threat Model Analysis for apolloconfig/apollo

Threat: Rogue Apollo Server Impersonation

  • Description: An attacker sets up a fake Apollo server and tricks the client application into connecting to it. This is achieved through network attacks (DNS spoofing, ARP poisoning) or by compromising network infrastructure to redirect traffic. The attacker's server provides malicious configuration data.
  • Impact: The client application receives and applies incorrect configurations, potentially leading to data breaches, service disruption, or complete system compromise. The attacker could inject malicious settings, disable security features, or redirect traffic.
  • Affected Apollo Component: Apollo Client (connection logic, server endpoint configuration), Network communication layer.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict TLS Verification: Apollo Client must enforce strict TLS certificate validation: validity, revocation (OCSP stapling/CRLs), and trusted CA.
    • Certificate/Public Key Pinning: Implement certificate or public key pinning, carefully managing it to avoid outages.
    • Secure DNS Resolution: Use DNSSEC, DoH, or DoT.
    • Hardened Client Configuration: Store the Apollo server endpoint in a secure, read-only location. Prevent user settings from overriding it.

Threat: Unauthorized Configuration Modification (In Transit)

  • Description: An attacker intercepts communication between the Apollo client and server (Man-in-the-Middle) and modifies configuration data. The attacker doesn't control the server, but intercepts network traffic.
  • Impact: The client receives and applies incorrect configurations, leading to potential data breaches, service disruption, or system compromise. Subtle changes are harder to detect.
  • Affected Apollo Component: Network communication layer between Apollo Client and Apollo Server.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce TLS (HTTPS): Use TLS (HTTPS) for all communication. Do not allow unencrypted connections.
    • Strong Cipher Suites: Configure TLS to use only strong, modern cipher suites. Disable weak/deprecated ciphers and protocols (SSLv3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1).
    • HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS): Use HSTS headers on the Apollo server.

Threat: Unauthorized Configuration Modification (At Rest - Server)

  • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the Apollo server's database or storage and directly modifies configuration data. This could be through exploiting vulnerabilities in the Apollo server, database, or OS.
  • Impact: All clients fetching configuration receive malicious or incorrect data, potentially affecting many applications and users. The impact is widespread and persistent.
  • Affected Apollo Component: Apollo Server (Admin Service, Config Service), Database (e.g., MySQL), underlying storage.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Server Hardening: Harden the Apollo server's OS and software. Patch regularly, disable unnecessary services, configure strong firewalls.
    • Database Security: Secure the database per vendor recommendations. Use strong passwords, encryption at rest, restrict access.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant only necessary permissions to the Apollo server's database user. Avoid root/administrator.
    • Intrusion Detection/Prevention: Implement IDS/IPS to monitor and block malicious activity.
    • Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits.

Threat: Client-Side Configuration Tampering (Targeting Apollo Client)

  • Description: An attacker modifies the Apollo client library itself or its direct configuration on a compromised client machine. This allows overriding the server endpoint, disabling security checks, or influencing the client's interaction with Apollo. This is distinct from general application tampering.
  • Impact: The compromised Apollo client fetches configuration from a malicious source or ignores security settings, leading to potential data breaches or system compromise, specifically related to how configuration is obtained.
  • Affected Apollo Component: Apollo Client library, Client-side configuration files directly related to Apollo.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Dependency Management: Use a secure package manager and verify the integrity of the Apollo client library (checksums/signatures).
    • Read-Only Configuration (Apollo-Specific): Store the Apollo client's own configuration (server address, etc.) in a read-only location.
    • Tamper Detection (Apollo Client): Implement mechanisms to detect tampering with the Apollo client library or its configuration files.

Threat: Sensitive Data Exposure in Configuration (Stored in Apollo)

  • Description: Configuration data stored within Apollo contains sensitive information (API keys, credentials) that is not properly protected. Access to the Apollo configuration exposes these secrets.
  • Impact: Exposure of sensitive data leads to unauthorized access to other systems, data breaches, and reputational damage.
  • Affected Apollo Component: Apollo Server (Config Service), Database, Apollo Client (if caching sensitive data from Apollo).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secrets Management: Do not store secrets directly in Apollo. Use a secrets management solution (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault) and integrate with Apollo using placeholders.
    • Encryption at Rest (Database): Encrypt the database used by Apollo.
    • Least Privilege (Client Access to Apollo): Clients only access namespaces/configurations they need.
    • Avoid Logging Secrets (by Apollo): Configure Apollo client/server to avoid logging sensitive data.

Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) Against Apollo Server

  • Description: An attacker floods the Apollo server with requests, making it unavailable to legitimate clients. This could be a DDoS attack.
  • Impact: Client applications cannot fetch configuration updates, leading to service disruption or degraded functionality. Applications might use outdated/default configurations.
  • Affected Apollo Component: Apollo Server (Config Service, Admin Service), Network infrastructure.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on the Apollo server.
    • Resource Limits: Configure resource limits (CPU, memory, connections) on the Apollo server.
    • DDoS Protection: Use a DDoS protection service (Cloudflare, AWS Shield).
    • High Availability/Scalability: Deploy Apollo in a highly available/scalable configuration.

Threat: Unauthorized Access to Apollo Portal

  • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the Apollo portal (web UI) via stolen credentials, social engineering, or portal vulnerabilities.
  • Impact: The attacker can modify configurations, view sensitive data, and disrupt services. Similar impact to unauthorized configuration modification.
  • Affected Apollo Component: Apollo Portal (web UI), Authentication and Authorization mechanisms.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Authentication: Enforce strong passwords and multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all portal users.
    • Regular Security Updates: Keep the Apollo portal software updated with security patches.
    • Web Application Firewall (WAF): Use a WAF to protect the portal.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant users only necessary permissions within the portal.
    • Secure Session Management: Implement secure session management (short timeouts, secure cookies).