Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
37 lines (30 loc) · 5.13 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

37 lines (30 loc) · 5.13 KB

Threat Model Analysis for baseflow/photoview

Threat: Malicious Library Substitution (Supply Chain Attack)

  • Description: An attacker compromises the distribution channel (e.g., CDN, npm registry) and replaces the legitimate photoview library with a modified version containing malicious code. The attacker could inject code to steal user data, redirect users to phishing sites, or perform other malicious actions directly within the context of the photoview library's execution.
  • Impact: Complete compromise of the application's client-side security where photoview is used. The attacker gains control over photoview's functionality, potentially leading to data theft, session hijacking, or further exploitation through actions triggered by the library.
  • Affected Component: The entire photoview library (all modules and functions).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Subresource Integrity (SRI): Include the integrity attribute in the <script> tag that loads photoview. This ensures the browser verifies the library's hash before executing it.
    • Use a Trusted Package Manager: Use npm or yarn with lockfiles (package-lock.json or yarn.lock) to ensure consistent and verifiable dependencies.
    • Regularly Audit Dependencies: Use tools like npm audit or yarn audit to identify known vulnerabilities in your dependencies, including photoview.
    • Consider Self-Hosting: If the risk is deemed very high, host a verified copy of the photoview library on your own server instead of relying on a CDN.

Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) via Large Image

  • Description: An attacker provides an extremely large image (in terms of file size or dimensions) directly to photoview. This causes photoview to consume excessive memory or CPU resources during image loading and rendering, leading to browser crashes or unresponsiveness. The attacker could repeatedly trigger this to make the application unusable specifically where photoview is used.
  • Impact: Denial of service for the user, specifically impacting the functionality provided by photoview. The application becomes unresponsive when attempting to display the malicious image using photoview, preventing legitimate users from interacting with the image viewer.
  • Affected Component: PhotoView constructor, update method, and internal image loading and rendering logic.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Server-Side Image Validation: Implement strict limits on image file size and dimensions before sending the image to the client and photoview. Reject images that exceed these limits. This is the primary defense.
    • Server-Side Image Resizing: Resize and optimize images on the server-side to reduce their size before sending them to the client and photoview.
    • Client-Side Size Checks (Less Reliable): As a secondary defense, implement JavaScript checks before passing data to photoview to limit the size of images. However, rely primarily on server-side validation.
    • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on image uploads or requests to prevent attackers from flooding the server with malicious images intended for photoview.

Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) via Malformed Image

  • Description: An attacker crafts a specially designed image file that, while appearing valid, exploits a vulnerability in photoview's own image parsing or rendering logic. This causes photoview to enter an unstable state, leading to excessive resource consumption, crashes, or potentially even arbitrary code execution (though less likely, this would be a critical vulnerability within photoview).
  • Impact: Denial of service, specifically targeting photoview. This leads to browser crashes or unresponsiveness when photoview attempts to process the malicious image. In a worst-case scenario (and less likely), it could lead to code execution within the context of photoview.
  • Affected Component: Image parsing and rendering logic within photoview (potentially related to specific image formats or codecs handled by photoview).
  • Risk Severity: High (potentially Critical if code execution is possible)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep photoview Updated: Regularly update to the latest version of photoview to benefit from security patches that address any discovered vulnerabilities in its image handling. This is crucial.
    • Server-Side Image Validation: Use a robust image processing library on the server-side to validate the integrity of images and detect any malformed data before sending them to the client and photoview. This acts as a filter before photoview processes the image.
    • Fuzz Testing (for Developers of photoview): Perform fuzz testing on photoview's image parsing and rendering code to identify potential vulnerabilities. This is a proactive measure for the library maintainers.