Attack Surface: Insecure Data Storage in SharedPreferences
- Description: Storing sensitive data in SharedPreferences without encryption exposes it to unauthorized access.
- How androidutilcode contributes:
SPUtils
withinandroidutilcode
simplifies SharedPreferences usage. This ease of use can inadvertently encourage developers to store sensitive data in SharedPreferences without implementing necessary encryption, asSPUtils
itself doesn't enforce or provide default encryption. - Example: An application uses
SPUtils
to store user authentication tokens in plaintext. An attacker gains root access to the device and can easily read the SharedPreferences file, extracting the tokens and compromising user accounts. - Impact: Unauthorized access to user accounts, data breaches, identity theft, and compromise of sensitive user information.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Encryption: Always encrypt sensitive data before storing it in SharedPreferences. Utilize Android Keystore for secure key management and robust encryption/decryption.
- Minimize Sensitive Data Storage: Avoid storing highly sensitive data in SharedPreferences if possible. Explore more secure storage options like encrypted databases or server-side storage for critical information.
- Secure Backups: Implement secure backup strategies that either exclude sensitive SharedPreferences data or ensure it is encrypted within backups to prevent exposure during backup and restore processes.
Attack Surface: Command Injection Vulnerabilities via ShellUtils
- Description: Using
ShellUtils
to execute shell commands constructed from untrusted input without proper sanitization creates a critical command injection vulnerability. - How androidutilcode contributes:
ShellUtils
inandroidutilcode
provides straightforward methods for executing shell commands. If developers utilize these methods to run commands built using user-supplied input or data from untrusted sources, they directly introduce a pathway for command injection attacks. - Example: An application uses
ShellUtils.execCmd()
to execute a command that includes a filename provided by the user. An attacker injects malicious shell commands within the filename input, such as; rm -rf / ;
, leading to arbitrary code execution with the application's privileges, potentially wiping device data. - Impact: Arbitrary code execution on the device, privilege escalation, complete device compromise, data theft, denial of service, and potential for malware installation.
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Avoid ShellUtils with Untrusted Input (Strongly Recommended): Absolutely avoid using
ShellUtils
to execute commands that incorporate user input or data from any untrusted source. This is the most effective mitigation. - Strict Input Sanitization and Validation (If ShellUtils is Unavoidable): If shell command execution with external input is absolutely unavoidable, rigorously validate and sanitize all input used in command construction. Employ whitelisting of allowed characters and commands, and escape all special shell characters. This is complex and error-prone, so avoidance is highly preferred.
- Parameterized Commands or Safer Alternatives: Explore and utilize parameterized commands or safer alternatives to shell execution provided by the Android SDK or other secure libraries whenever possible. These methods often prevent command injection by design.
- Principle of Least Privilege: Minimize the privileges under which shell commands are executed. If possible, execute commands with the least necessary privileges to limit the impact of potential vulnerabilities.
- Avoid ShellUtils with Untrusted Input (Strongly Recommended): Absolutely avoid using
Attack Surface: Path Traversal Vulnerabilities via FileUtils
- Description: Constructing file paths using user-controlled input without thorough validation when using file utility functions can lead to path traversal vulnerabilities.
- How androidutilcode contributes:
FileUtils
inandroidutilcode
offers various file operation utilities. If developers useFileUtils
methods with file paths that are directly derived from user input or untrusted sources without implementing robust validation, they can inadvertently create path traversal vulnerabilities. - Example: An application uses
FileUtils.readFile2String()
with a file path provided directly by the user. An attacker provides a malicious path like../../../../../../etc/passwd
, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive system files outside the application's intended file access scope. - Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive application data, system files, configuration files, or other user data residing on the device's file system.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Strict Input Validation and Sanitization: Rigorous validation and sanitization of all file paths used with
FileUtils
is crucial, especially when paths originate from user input or untrusted sources. Implement whitelisting of allowed characters and path components. - Use Absolute or Canonical Paths: Utilize absolute paths or resolve paths to their canonical form to eliminate relative path traversal vulnerabilities. Resolve user-provided path fragments against a known safe base directory.
- Restrict File Access Permissions: Implement and enforce strict file access permissions to limit access to files and directories to only authorized application components, minimizing the impact of potential path traversal exploits.
- Principle of Least Privilege for File Operations: Operate on files with the minimum necessary permissions required for the intended functionality to reduce the potential damage from a path traversal vulnerability.
- Strict Input Validation and Sanitization: Rigorous validation and sanitization of all file paths used with