attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for blankj/androidutilcode

Objective: Compromise application using androidutilcode by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the project itself, focusing on misuse and inherent risks introduced by the library.

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application Using androidutilcode **[CRITICAL NODE]**
├───[AND] Exploit Misuse of androidutilcode Functions **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   ├───[OR] Exploit Insecure Data Handling **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   ├───[AND] Exploit Insecure Storage using CacheUtils/SPUtils **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   ├───[OR] Read Sensitive Data from Cache **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   │   ├───[AND] Cache data not encrypted **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   │   │   └───[ACTION] Access cache directory (e.g., via rooted device, ADB backup) **[HIGH-RISK ACTION]**
│   │   │   ├───[OR] Read Sensitive Data from SharedPreferences **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   │   ├───[AND] SharedPreferences data not encrypted **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   │   │   └───[ACTION] Access SharedPreferences file (e.g., via rooted device, ADB backup) **[HIGH-RISK ACTION]**
│   │   ├───[AND] Exploit Insecure Logging using LogUtils **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   ├───[AND] Sensitive data logged in plaintext **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   │   └───[ACTION] Access application logs (e.g., via ADB logcat, device logs if accessible) **[HIGH-RISK ACTION]**
│   │   ├───[AND] Exploit Insecure File Handling using FileUtils
│   │   │   ├───[OR] Path Traversal Vulnerability **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   │   ├───[AND] User-controlled input used in file paths without sanitization **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   │   │   └───[ACTION] Craft malicious file path to access files outside intended directory **[HIGH-RISK ACTION]**
│   ├───[OR] Exploit Insecure Network Communication using NetworkUtils **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   ├───[AND] Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   ├───[AND] Application uses NetworkUtils to make HTTP requests (not HTTPS) **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   │   └───[ACTION] Intercept network traffic and eavesdrop or modify data **[HIGH-RISK ACTION]**
│   │   │   ├───[AND] Application uses NetworkUtils with insufficient SSL/TLS verification **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   │   └───[ACTION] Perform MITM attack by bypassing certificate pinning or weak SSL configuration **[HIGH-RISK ACTION]**
│   │   ├───[AND] Data Injection via Network Requests **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   ├───[AND] Application uses NetworkUtils to send data without proper input validation **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   │   └───[ACTION] Inject malicious data into network requests to manipulate server-side logic or application behavior **[HIGH-RISK ACTION]**
│   ├───[OR] Exploit Insecure System Interaction using ShellUtils/ProcessUtils
│   │   ├───[AND] Command Injection Vulnerability **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   ├───[AND] Application uses ShellUtils/ProcessUtils to execute shell commands with user-controlled input **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   │   └───[ACTION] Inject malicious shell commands to execute arbitrary code on the device **[HIGH-RISK ACTION]**

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Insecure Data Handling [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vector: Developers misuse CacheUtils and SPUtils to store sensitive data without encryption or with weak encryption.

• Critical Nodes within this path:
  • Exploit Insecure Storage using CacheUtils/SPUtils [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Read Sensitive Data from Cache [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Cache data not encrypted [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Read Sensitive Data from SharedPreferences [CRITICAL NODE]
  • SharedPreferences data not encrypted [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Exploit Insecure Logging using LogUtils [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Sensitive data logged in plaintext [CRITICAL NODE]
• High-Risk Actions:
  • Access cache directory (e.g., via rooted device, ADB backup) [HIGH-RISK ACTION]
    • Attack Description: Attacker gains physical access to the device (rooted or not) or uses ADB backup to extract application data from the cache directory. If sensitive data is stored unencrypted in the cache, it becomes accessible.
    • Impact: Information Disclosure of sensitive data stored in cache.
  • Access SharedPreferences file (e.g., via rooted device, ADB backup) [HIGH-RISK ACTION]
    • Attack Description: Similar to cache access, attacker gains access to the SharedPreferences file, typically through physical device access or ADB backup. Unencrypted sensitive data in SharedPreferences is then compromised.
    • Impact: Information Disclosure of sensitive data stored in SharedPreferences.
  • Access application logs (e.g., via ADB logcat, device logs if accessible) [HIGH-RISK ACTION]
    • Attack Description: Attacker accesses application logs via ADB logcat, device logs (if accessible), or by retrieving log files if stored insecurely. If developers have logged sensitive data in plaintext using LogUtils, this data is exposed.
    • Impact: Information Disclosure of sensitive data logged in plaintext.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Insecure File Handling using FileUtils [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vector: Developers use FileUtils in a way that allows path traversal vulnerabilities due to insufficient input sanitization.

• Critical Nodes within this path:
  • Path Traversal Vulnerability [CRITICAL NODE]
  • User-controlled input used in file paths without sanitization [CRITICAL NODE]
• High-Risk Actions:
  • Craft malicious file path to access files outside intended directory [HIGH-RISK ACTION]
    • Attack Description: Attacker provides malicious input to file path parameters used with FileUtils functions. By crafting paths like ../../sensitive_file, the attacker can bypass intended directory restrictions and access files outside the application's designated area.
    • Impact: Information Disclosure of sensitive files accessible through path traversal. Potential for further attacks if write access is also gained.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Insecure Network Communication using NetworkUtils [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vector: Developers use NetworkUtils to make insecure network requests, leading to MITM and data injection vulnerabilities.

• Critical Nodes within this path:
  • Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Application uses NetworkUtils to make HTTP requests (not HTTPS) [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Application uses NetworkUtils with insufficient SSL/TLS verification [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Data Injection via Network Requests [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Application uses NetworkUtils to send data without proper input validation [CRITICAL NODE]
• High-Risk Actions:
  • Intercept network traffic and eavesdrop or modify data [HIGH-RISK ACTION]
    • Attack Description: If the application uses HTTP instead of HTTPS for network communication via NetworkUtils, an attacker on the same network (e.g., public Wi-Fi) can intercept the unencrypted traffic. This allows eavesdropping on sensitive data and potentially modifying data in transit.
    • Impact: Information Disclosure of data transmitted over HTTP. Data manipulation, potentially leading to account compromise or other malicious actions.
  • Perform MITM attack by bypassing certificate pinning or weak SSL configuration [HIGH-RISK ACTION]
    • Attack Description: Even if HTTPS is used, if the application has weak SSL/TLS verification (e.g., no certificate pinning, allowing weak ciphers), an attacker can perform a MITM attack by presenting a fraudulent certificate. This allows them to decrypt and modify the supposedly secure communication.
    • Impact: Information Disclosure of data transmitted over HTTPS. Data manipulation, potentially leading to account compromise or other malicious actions.
  • Inject malicious data into network requests to manipulate server-side logic or application behavior [HIGH-RISK ACTION]
    • Attack Description: If the application uses NetworkUtils to send data to a server without proper client-side input validation, an attacker can inject malicious data into the request parameters. This malicious data can then be processed by the server, potentially leading to server-side vulnerabilities, data manipulation, or unintended application behavior.
    • Impact: Data manipulation on the server-side. Potential for server-side vulnerabilities exploitation. Account takeover or other malicious actions depending on the server-side logic.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Insecure System Interaction using ShellUtils/ProcessUtils [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vector: Developers misuse ShellUtils and ProcessUtils by executing shell commands with user-controlled input, leading to command injection vulnerabilities.

• Critical Nodes within this path:
  • Command Injection Vulnerability [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Application uses ShellUtils/ProcessUtils to execute shell commands with user-controlled input [CRITICAL NODE]
• High-Risk Actions:
  • Inject malicious shell commands to execute arbitrary code on the device [HIGH-RISK ACTION]
    • Attack Description: If the application uses ShellUtils or ProcessUtils to execute shell commands and incorporates user-controlled input into these commands without proper sanitization, an attacker can inject malicious shell commands. These injected commands will be executed with the application's privileges, potentially allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the device.
    • Impact: Complete Device Compromise. Arbitrary code execution on the device, leading to data theft, malware installation, denial of service, and other severe consequences.