Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access/Disrupt Application via androidutilcode (Focusing on High-Risk Exploits)
Attacker's Goal:
Gain Unauthorized Access/Disrupt Application via androidutilcode
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1. Exploit Utility Function 2. Leverage Misconfigured
Vulnerabilities Permissions/Settings
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1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3
File Shell Overly Insec Weak
Utils Cmds Permiss -ure Crypto
Utils -ive Stor- -graphy
Perms -age
Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Utility Function Vulnerabilities
* 1.1 File Utilities (FileUtils) - [HIGH RISK] - Path Traversal {CRITICAL}
* Accessing sensitive files (databases, shared prefs) {CRITICAL}
* Overwriting application files {CRITICAL}
* 1.2 Shell Command Utilities (ShellUtils) - [HIGH RISK] - Command Injection {CRITICAL}
* Executing arbitrary commands with application privileges {CRITICAL}
* Gaining root access (if app has root) {CRITICAL}
Attack Tree Path: 2. Leverage Misconfigured Permissions/Settings
* 2.1 Overly Permissive Permissions - [HIGH RISK] (Enabler for other attacks)
* Facilitates exploitation of other vulnerabilities (e.g., file access)
* 2.2 Insecure Storage - [HIGH RISK]
* Reading unencrypted sensitive data (passwords, API keys) from SharedPreferences {CRITICAL}
* Reading unencrypted data from external storage {CRITICAL}
* 2.3 Weak Cryptography Implementation - [HIGH RISK]
* Decrypting sensitive data due to weak keys/algorithms {CRITICAL}
* Bypassing authentication/authorization {CRITICAL}
Attack Tree Path: 1.1 File Utilities (FileUtils) - Path Traversal
* **Description:** The attacker crafts malicious file paths (e.g., using `../../` sequences) to access files outside the intended directory. This is possible if the application uses `FileUtils` methods with user-supplied input without proper sanitization.
* **Likelihood:** Medium to High
* **Impact:** High to Very High
* **Effort:** Low to Medium
* **Skill Level:** Novice to Intermediate
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium to Hard
* **Example Attack:**
1. Application uses `FileUtils.readFileToString(userInputPath)`.
2. Attacker provides `userInputPath = "../../../../data/data/com.example.app/databases/sensitive.db"`.
3. Application reads and potentially exposes the contents of `sensitive.db`.
* **Mitigation:**
* Strictly validate and sanitize user-supplied file paths.
* Use `getCanonicalPath()` to resolve symbolic links and ensure the path is within the allowed directory.
* Avoid relative paths based on user input.
* Use the principle of least privilege for file access.
Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Shell Command Utilities (ShellUtils) - Command Injection
* **Description:** The attacker injects malicious shell commands into user input that is then used by `ShellUtils` to execute commands. This allows the attacker to run arbitrary commands on the device.
* **Likelihood:** Low to Medium
* **Impact:** Very High
* **Effort:** Low
* **Skill Level:** Intermediate
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium to Hard
* **Example Attack:**
1. Application uses `ShellUtils.execCmd("ls " + userInput, false)`.
2. Attacker provides `userInput = "; rm -rf /data/data/com.example.app/*;"`.
3. Application executes the injected `rm` command, potentially deleting critical data.
* **Mitigation:**
* *Avoid* using `ShellUtils` with user-supplied input whenever possible.
* If unavoidable, use extreme caution and implement robust input sanitization and validation.
* Use `ProcessBuilder` with separate arguments instead of concatenating strings.
* Prefer built-in Android APIs over shell commands.
Attack Tree Path: 2.1 Overly Permissive Permissions
* **Description:** The application requests more permissions than it needs (e.g., `READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE` when it only needs to access a specific file). This expands the attack surface.
* **Likelihood:** High
* **Impact:** Medium to High (Enabler)
* **Effort:** Very Low
* **Skill Level:** Novice
* **Detection Difficulty:** Very Easy
* **Example:** Application requests `WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE` but only needs to read a single configuration file. An attacker exploiting a separate vulnerability can now write arbitrary files to external storage.
* **Mitigation:**
* Request only the *minimum* necessary permissions.
* Use the principle of least privilege.
* Regularly review and justify each permission request.
* Use scoped storage where possible.
Attack Tree Path: 2.2 Insecure Storage
* **Description:** Sensitive data (passwords, API keys, personal information) is stored without encryption using `SPUtils` (SharedPreferences) or other storage mechanisms.
* **Likelihood:** Medium to High
* **Impact:** High to Very High
* **Effort:** Low to Medium
* **Skill Level:** Intermediate
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium
* **Example:** Application stores the user's password in plain text in SharedPreferences. An attacker with device access or another app with read access to shared preferences can retrieve the password.
* **Mitigation:**
* *Always* encrypt sensitive data before storing it.
* Use the Android Keystore system for storing cryptographic keys.
* Consider using `EncryptedSharedPreferences`.
Attack Tree Path: 2.3 Weak Cryptography Implementation
* **Description:** The application uses weak cryptographic algorithms, insecure modes of operation, hardcoded keys, or predictable random number generators when using `EncryptUtils` or other crypto-related functions.
* **Likelihood:** Medium
* **Impact:** High to Very High
* **Effort:** Medium to High
* **Skill Level:** Advanced
* **Detection Difficulty:** Hard to Very Hard
* **Example:** Application uses `EncryptUtils` with a hardcoded key and DES encryption. An attacker can easily decrypt the data.
* **Mitigation:**
* Follow cryptographic best practices.
* Use strong algorithms (e.g., AES-256 with GCM).
* Use secure key management (Android Keystore).
* Avoid hardcoding keys.
* Use a secure random number generator.
* Regularly review and update cryptographic implementations.