attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for camunda/camunda-bpm-platform

Objective: To gain unauthorized control over business processes and/or data managed by the Camunda BPM Platform, leading to financial fraud, data exfiltration, or operational disruption.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                 |  Gain Unauthorized Control over Processes/Data     |
                                 +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                                  |
      +-----------------------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------------+
      |                             |                             |

+---------+---------+ +---------+---------+ +---------+---------+ | Exploit Engine | | Compromise | | Abuse External | | Vulnerabilities | | Admin Console | | Task Integration | +---------+---------+ +---------+---------+ +---------+---------+ | | | +---------+---------+ +---------+---------+ +---------+---------+ | CVEs (Known) | | Weak/Default | | Inject Malicious| | (e.g., Deserial- | | Credentials | | Scripts/Code | | ization, XSS) | +---------+---------+ +---------+---------+ +---------+---------+ | Social | | Data Exfiltration| | Misconfiguration| | Engineering | | via External | | (Unrestricted | | (Phishing | | Task | | Scripting) | | Admin) | +---------+---------+ +---------+---------+ +---------+---------+

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Engine Vulnerabilities

• Critical Node: The Camunda Engine itself. This is the core processing unit, and vulnerabilities here have the widest impact.

  • High-Risk Path: CVEs (Known):

    • Description: Exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities (CVEs) in the Camunda engine or its dependencies. This often involves using readily available exploit code.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on patching frequency)
    • Impact: High to Very High (Can lead to full control, remote code execution)
    • Effort: Low to Medium (Exploits may be publicly available)
    • Skill Level: Script Kiddie to Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium (Signature-based detection, vulnerability scanners)
    • Mitigation:
      • Regularly update Camunda to the latest stable version.
      • Monitor the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and Camunda's security advisories.
      • Perform vulnerability scanning.

  • High-Risk Path: Misconfiguration (Unrestricted Scripting):

    • Description: Exploiting misconfigurations that allow unrestricted execution of scripts (Java, Groovy, JavaScript) within the Camunda engine. This allows attackers to inject and run malicious code.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (Code execution, data manipulation, privilege escalation)
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Beginner to Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires code review, monitoring script execution)
    • Mitigation:
      • Enable Camunda's script security features (e.g., scripting.enabled).
      • Use a whitelist approach for allowed scripts.
      • Code review all scripts.
      • Avoid inline scripts; use external, version-controlled scripts.
      • Disable scripting if not needed.
      • Strict Input Validation.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Compromise Admin Console

• Critical Node: The Admin Console. This is the primary management interface, and compromise grants extensive control.

  • High-Risk Path: Weak/Default Credentials:

    • Description: Gaining access to the Admin Console by using default credentials or easily guessable passwords.
    • Likelihood: Medium (If defaults aren't changed)
    • Impact: High (Full administrative access)
    • Effort: Very Low
    • Skill Level: Script Kiddie
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Failed login attempts)
    • Mitigation:
      • Change default passwords immediately after installation.
      • Enforce strong password policies.
      • Consider multi-factor authentication (MFA).
      • Limit access to the Admin Console (IP whitelisting).

  • High-Risk Path: Social Engineering (Phishing Admin):

    • Description: Tricking an administrator into revealing their credentials through phishing or other social engineering techniques.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on user awareness)
    • Impact: High (Full administrative access)
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Beginner to Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires user reporting, email analysis)
    • Mitigation:
      • Provide security awareness training to administrators.
      • Implement email security measures (anti-phishing filters).

Attack Tree Path: 3. Abuse External Task Integration

• Critical Node: External Task Workers and their communication with the engine. These are often less secured than the core engine.

• Critical Node: Scripting Mechanisms.

  • High-Risk Path: Inject Malicious Scripts/Code:

    • Description: Injecting malicious code into scripts used by external task workers. This allows for code execution on the worker and potentially the engine.
    • Likelihood: Medium (If scripting is not restricted)
    • Impact: High (Code execution on external worker, potential engine compromise)
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Beginner to Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires code review, monitoring external worker behavior)
    • Mitigation:
      • Follow secure scripting guidelines (as with embedded scripts).
      • Use secure communication (HTTPS).
      • Authenticate external task workers.
      • Strict Input Validation.

  • High-Risk Path: Data Exfiltration via External Task:

    • Description: Using an external task to send sensitive data from the Camunda engine to an attacker-controlled external system.
    • Likelihood: Low to Medium (Depends on network restrictions and monitoring)
    • Impact: High (Data breach)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Requires network traffic analysis, data loss prevention)
    • Mitigation:
      • Monitor network traffic from external task workers.
      • Restrict network access of external task workers.
      • Audit data sent to/from external task workers.
      • Use encrypted communication.