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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for conductor-oss/conductor

Attack Surface: 1. Unauthenticated API Access

  • Description: Lack of or weak authentication mechanisms for Conductor API endpoints allows unauthorized access.
  • Conductor Contribution: Conductor exposes numerous API endpoints for workflow management, task definition, and system administration. If these are not properly secured, they become directly accessible attack vectors specific to Conductor's functionality.
  • Example: An attacker accesses the /api/workflow endpoint without authentication and starts, terminates, or modifies workflows, leading to business process disruption orchestrated by Conductor.
  • Impact: Data breaches, workflow disruption, system compromise, unauthorized data manipulation within Conductor workflows and data.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement strong authentication: Enforce authentication for all Conductor API endpoints using industry-standard protocols like OAuth 2.0, JWT, or API keys.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Implement role-based access control (RBAC) within Conductor to restrict API access based on user roles and permissions defined for Conductor operations.
    • Regularly review and update authentication mechanisms: Ensure authentication methods used for Conductor API are up-to-date and resistant to known vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: 2. API Input Validation Vulnerabilities (Injection Attacks)

  • Description: Insufficient validation of inputs to Conductor API endpoints allows attackers to inject malicious payloads.
  • Conductor Contribution: Conductor API accepts complex inputs like workflow definitions, task definitions, task inputs, and search queries. These inputs, if not properly sanitized by Conductor, can be exploited for injection attacks targeting Conductor's processing logic.
  • Example: An attacker injects malicious code into a workflow definition via the /api/workflow/definition endpoint. When this workflow is executed by Conductor, the malicious code is processed by task workers or the Conductor server, leading to command execution within the Conductor ecosystem.
  • Impact: Code execution within Conductor environment, data manipulation in workflows, denial of service of Conductor services, privilege escalation within Conductor system.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Input Validation: Implement robust input validation on all Conductor API endpoints, validating data type, format, length, and allowed characters specifically for Conductor's expected inputs.
    • Output Encoding: Encode outputs generated by Conductor to prevent injection when data is rendered or processed by Conductor components.
    • Parameterized Queries/Prepared Statements: Use parameterized queries or prepared statements when Conductor interacts with databases to prevent SQL/NoSQL injection related to Conductor's data persistence.
    • Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Regularly audit Conductor code and conduct penetration testing to identify and fix input validation vulnerabilities in Conductor's API and input handling.

Attack Surface: 3. Unvalidated Workflow/Task Definitions

  • Description: Lack of validation for workflow and task definitions allows injection of malicious logic or tasks into Conductor's core workflow engine.
  • Conductor Contribution: Conductor relies on workflow and task definitions to orchestrate processes. If these definitions are not validated by Conductor upon creation or update, malicious definitions can be introduced directly into Conductor's workflow management system.
  • Example: An attacker creates a task definition within Conductor that executes a system command to delete critical files on a task worker. When this task is scheduled and executed by Conductor as part of a workflow, it causes significant damage orchestrated by Conductor's workflow engine.
  • Impact: Code execution within task workers managed by Conductor, privilege escalation within the Conductor-managed environment, workflow disruption orchestrated by Conductor, data loss due to malicious tasks defined in Conductor.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Schema Validation: Implement schema validation for workflow and task definitions within Conductor to ensure they conform to expected structures and data types enforced by Conductor.
    • Code Review for Custom Tasks: If custom task types are allowed in Conductor, implement rigorous code review processes to identify and prevent malicious logic within custom task definitions managed by Conductor.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Definition Management: Restrict who can create and modify workflow and task definitions within Conductor to authorized personnel responsible for Conductor workflow design.
    • Workflow Definition Versioning and Auditing: Implement versioning and auditing for workflow and task definitions within Conductor to track changes and facilitate rollback if needed within Conductor's workflow management.

Attack Surface: 4. Task Worker Impersonation/Spoofing

  • Description: Lack of proper authentication for task workers allows unauthorized entities to register as workers and execute tasks within the Conductor ecosystem.
  • Conductor Contribution: Conductor relies on task workers to execute tasks. If worker registration and authentication are weak in Conductor, attackers can impersonate workers and interact with Conductor's task scheduling and execution mechanisms.
  • Example: An attacker registers a malicious task worker that claims to be a legitimate worker within Conductor. This malicious worker receives tasks from Conductor and executes arbitrary code or steals sensitive data intended for legitimate workers within the Conductor workflow.
  • Impact: Workflow disruption within Conductor, unauthorized actions executed by malicious workers in Conductor workflows, data corruption within Conductor-managed tasks, code execution on worker environments interacting with Conductor.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Mutual Authentication: Implement mutual authentication between Conductor server and task workers (e.g., using TLS client certificates or API keys) to verify worker identity to Conductor and vice versa.
    • Worker Registration Validation: Implement mechanisms within Conductor to validate worker registration requests and ensure only authorized workers can connect to Conductor.
    • Secure Worker Communication Channels: Encrypt communication channels between Conductor server and task workers (e.g., using TLS/HTTPS) to protect data exchanged within the Conductor task execution framework.
    • Worker Identity Management: Implement a robust worker identity management system within Conductor to track and manage authorized task workers interacting with the Conductor server.