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Threat Model Analysis for conductor-oss/conductor

Threat: Sensitive Data Exposure in Workflow and Task Definitions

  • Description: An attacker might gain unauthorized access to the Conductor persistence layer or Conductor APIs due to weak access controls. They could then read workflow and task definitions, extracting sensitive information like API keys, credentials, or internal configuration details embedded within these definitions. This is a direct threat from how Conductor stores and manages workflow definitions.
    • Impact: Confidentiality breach leading to potential compromise of external services or internal systems if exposed credentials are used maliciously. Significant reputational damage and legal repercussions due to sensitive data exposure.
    • Affected Conductor Component: Persistence Layer (Database, Storage), Workflow Definition API, Task Definition API
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers/Users: Avoid embedding sensitive data directly in workflow and task definitions. Utilize secure secrets management systems (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager) and reference secrets indirectly. Implement robust input validation and sanitization for workflow and task definitions to prevent injection vulnerabilities.
      • Infrastructure/Operations: Implement strong access control to the Conductor persistence layer and APIs. Encrypt sensitive data at rest in the persistence layer. Regularly audit access logs and configurations.

Threat: Sensitive Data Leakage in Task Input/Output

  • Description: An attacker who gains unauthorized access to the Conductor persistence layer, task execution logs, or intercepts network traffic between Conductor components could read task input and output data. This data, managed and stored by Conductor, might contain sensitive information processed by workflows, such as PII, financial data, or proprietary business information.
    • Impact: Confidentiality breach, privacy violations, potential regulatory fines, severe reputational damage, and misuse of leaked sensitive information.
    • Affected Conductor Component: Persistence Layer (Task Execution Data), Task Queues, Worker Communication Channels, Task Logs
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers/Users: Minimize processing of sensitive data within workflows if possible. Encrypt sensitive task input and output data before passing it to tasks and when storing it. Implement data masking or anonymization techniques for sensitive data within workflows and logs.
      • Infrastructure/Operations: Encrypt task data at rest in the persistence layer and in transit between Conductor components (e.g., using TLS). Implement strict access control to task execution logs and data within Conductor. Regularly review and purge sensitive data from logs and persistence layer according to data retention policies.

Threat: Unauthorized Access to Workflow and Task Data

  • Description: An attacker could exploit weak or misconfigured authentication and authorization mechanisms in Conductor APIs or UI, which are core to Conductor's operation. This could allow them to view, modify, or delete workflow definitions, execution history, task details, and associated data without proper permissions.
    • Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized modification of critical workflows leading to significant business logic disruption, denial of service by deleting essential workflows, and potential escalation of privileges within the Conductor system and potentially connected systems.
    • Affected Conductor Component: API Gateway, Authorization Module, Workflow Management API, Task Management API, UI
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers/Users: Utilize Conductor's built-in authorization features robustly or integrate with strong external authorization services (e.g., OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, RBAC). Enforce the principle of least privilege rigorously when granting access to Conductor resources. Regularly review and audit access control configurations.
      • Infrastructure/Operations: Implement strong multi-factor authentication mechanisms for Conductor APIs and UI (e.g., API keys, JWT, mutual TLS). Securely configure Conductor's authorization settings and regularly test them. Implement intrusion detection and prevention systems to monitor for unauthorized access attempts. Regularly monitor access logs for suspicious activity and security breaches.

Threat: Malicious Task Execution by Workers

  • Description: An attacker could compromise a worker node or develop a malicious worker application that interacts with Conductor. This compromised or malicious worker, designed to execute tasks defined by Conductor, could then perform harmful actions, such as exfiltrating highly sensitive data from internal systems, launching severe attacks on other services, or critically disrupting core workflow execution by returning incorrect results or causing system-wide errors.
    • Impact: Catastrophic data breaches, widespread lateral movement within the network, denial of service to critical systems, corruption of vital workflow results leading to business failures, and potential complete compromise of the Conductor platform itself if workers are granted excessive and unnecessary privileges.
    • Affected Conductor Component: Worker Service, Task Execution Engine
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers/Users: Implement rigorous input validation and output sanitization within task worker code to prevent injection vulnerabilities and ensure critical data integrity. Strictly adhere to the principle of least privilege when designing worker applications, limiting their access to the absolute minimum necessary resources. Conduct mandatory and frequent security code reviews and penetration testing of worker code for vulnerabilities.
      • Infrastructure/Operations: Implement hardened and highly secured worker infrastructure and operating systems with continuous patching and monitoring. Enforce strong mutual authentication and authorization for all workers connecting to Conductor. Implement complete isolation of worker environments using robust containerization or virtual machines with strict network segmentation. Implement comprehensive and real-time monitoring and logging of all worker activity with automated anomaly detection and alerting. Regularly and automatically patch and update worker software and all dependencies.