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Attack Tree Analysis for conductor-oss/conductor

Objective: Gain unauthorized control over workflows and/or exfiltrate sensitive data processed by Conductor workflows.

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Gain unauthorized control over workflows and/or exfiltrate sensitive data processed by Conductor workflows. ├── 1. Compromise Conductor Server │ ├── 1.1 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Conductor Server Code [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Remote Code Execution (RCE) in Server API [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.2 Exploit vulnerabilities in input validation for API requests (e.g., crafted JSON/YAML payloads). │ │ ├── 1.1.2 Authentication Bypass │ │ │ └── 1.1.2.2 Bypass authentication due to misconfigured authorization rules (e.g., overly permissive access). [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └── 1.1.3 Denial of Service (DoS) │ │ │ └── 1.1.3.1 Flood the server with workflow execution requests. │ ├── 1.2 Compromise Underlying Infrastructure │ │ ├── 1.2.1 Gain access to the server hosting Conductor (e.g., via SSH, cloud provider console). [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └── 1.2.2 Compromise the database used by Conductor (e.g., Elasticsearch, Dynomite, Redis). [CRITICAL NODE] ├── 2. Compromise Conductor Workers │ ├── 2.1 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Worker Code [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 2.1.1 RCE in Worker Tasks [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └── 2.1.1.1 Exploit vulnerabilities in the code implementing specific worker tasks (e.g., shell command execution, unsafe library usage). │ │ └── 2.1.2 Data Exfiltration from Worker │ │ └── 2.1.2.1 Worker task code leaks sensitive data processed during workflow execution (e.g., logging secrets, sending data to unauthorized endpoints). [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 2.2 Compromise Worker Host │ │ └── 2.2.1 Gain access to the server/container running the worker (e.g., via SSH, container escape). [CRITICAL NODE] └── 3. Manipulate Workflow Definitions ├── 3.1 Unauthorized Workflow Creation/Modification [HIGH RISK] │ └── 3.1.1 Bypass access controls on the Conductor API to create or modify workflow definitions. [CRITICAL NODE] └── 3.2 Inject Malicious Tasks └── 3.2.1 Add tasks to a workflow that perform unauthorized actions (e.g., data exfiltration, system command execution). [CRITICAL NODE] └── 4. Exploit Misconfigurations [HIGH RISK] ├── 4.1 Weak Authentication/Authorization │ ├── 4.1.1 Use of default or easily guessable credentials for Conductor components. [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── 4.1.2 Overly permissive access control lists (ACLs) allowing unauthorized users to access or modify workflows. [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Conductor Server

  • 1. Compromise Conductor Server

    • 1.1 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Conductor Server Code [HIGH RISK]

      • 1.1.1 Remote Code Execution (RCE) in Server API [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Description: An attacker exploits vulnerabilities in the Conductor server's API to execute arbitrary code on the server.
        • Attack Vector:
          • 1.1.1.2 Exploit vulnerabilities in input validation for API requests: The attacker sends specially crafted requests (e.g., containing malicious JSON or YAML payloads) to the API that are not properly validated, leading to code execution.
      • 1.1.2 Authentication Bypass
        • Attack Vector: * 1.1.2.2 Bypass authentication due to misconfigured authorization rules [CRITICAL NODE]: The attacker leverages overly permissive access control settings to gain access to Conductor resources without proper authentication. This could involve exploiting default roles, misconfigured ACLs, or other authorization flaws.
      • 1.1.3 Denial of Service (DoS)
        • Attack Vector: * 1.1.3.1 Flood the server with workflow execution requests: The attacker overwhelms the Conductor server with a large number of workflow execution requests, causing it to become unresponsive or crash.

    • 1.2 Compromise Underlying Infrastructure

      • 1.2.1 Gain access to the server hosting Conductor [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Description: An attacker gains direct access to the server (physical or virtual) running the Conductor server software.
        • Attack Vector: This could involve exploiting vulnerabilities in the operating system, SSH, or cloud provider console, or using stolen credentials.
      • 1.2.2 Compromise the database used by Conductor [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the database used by Conductor to store workflow definitions, execution data, and other information.
        • Attack Vector: This could involve exploiting database vulnerabilities, using weak database credentials, or exploiting misconfigured network access controls.

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Conductor Workers

  • 2. Compromise Conductor Workers

    • 2.1 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Worker Code [HIGH RISK]

      • 2.1.1 RCE in Worker Tasks [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Description: An attacker exploits vulnerabilities in the code implementing worker tasks to execute arbitrary code on the worker host.
        • Attack Vector:
          • 2.1.1.1 Exploit vulnerabilities in the code implementing specific worker tasks: The attacker leverages vulnerabilities in the custom code written for worker tasks (e.g., unsafe use of shell commands, improper input handling) to achieve code execution.
      • 2.1.2 Data Exfiltration from Worker
        • Attack Vector:
          • 2.1.2.1 Worker task code leaks sensitive data [CRITICAL NODE]: The worker task code itself contains flaws that cause it to leak sensitive data processed during workflow execution. This could involve logging secrets, sending data to unauthorized external endpoints, or writing sensitive data to insecure locations.

    • 2.2 Compromise Worker Host

      • 2.2.1 Gain access to the server/container running the worker [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Description: An attacker gains direct access to the host (server or container) running the Conductor worker.
        • Attack Vector: This could involve exploiting vulnerabilities in the host operating system, container runtime, or using stolen credentials.

Attack Tree Path: Manipulate Workflow Definitions

  • 3. Manipulate Workflow Definitions

    • 3.1 Unauthorized Workflow Creation/Modification [HIGH RISK]

      • 3.1.1 Bypass access controls on the Conductor API [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Description: An attacker bypasses the Conductor API's access controls to create new workflows or modify existing ones.
        • Attack Vector: This could involve exploiting authentication or authorization vulnerabilities, or leveraging stolen credentials.

    • 3.2 Inject Malicious Tasks

      • 3.2.1 Add tasks to a workflow that perform unauthorized actions [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Description: An attacker adds malicious tasks to a workflow definition that perform actions like data exfiltration, system command execution, or other unauthorized activities.
        • Attack Vector: This requires the attacker to have gained the ability to modify workflow definitions (e.g., through 3.1.1).

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Misconfigurations

  • 4. Exploit Misconfigurations [HIGH RISK]

    • 4.1 Weak Authentication/Authorization
      • 4.1.1 Use of default or easily guessable credentials [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Description: An attacker gains access to Conductor components by using default credentials or easily guessable passwords.
        • Attack Vector: This is a common attack vector that relies on administrators failing to change default settings.
      • 4.1.2 Overly permissive access control lists (ACLs) [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to Conductor resources due to overly permissive ACLs.
        • Attack Vector: This involves exploiting misconfigured access control settings that grant users or components more privileges than necessary.