attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for dromara/hutool

Objective: Compromise Application using Hutool Library

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application using Hutool ├── AND: Exploit Hutool Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── OR: Exploit Input Handling Vulnerabilities in Hutool [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── AND: Path Traversal via Hutool IO Utilities [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├── AND: Deserialization Vulnerabilities via Hutool Serialization Utilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── AND: XML External Entity (XXE) Injection via Hutool XML Parsing [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├── AND: HTTP Request Smuggling/Injection via Hutool HTTP Client [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├── AND: Command Injection via Hutool Runtime Utilities (if used unsafely) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── AND: Application Logic Flaws Exacerbated by Hutool Usage [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── OR: Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Hutool (if any exist) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Exploit Hutool Vulnerabilities

• Description: This is the overarching critical node representing the attacker's primary goal of exploiting any weakness or vulnerability within the Hutool library itself to compromise the application. It encompasses all potential attack vectors that originate from Hutool's functionalities.
• Attack Vectors: This node is a parent to all subsequent attack vectors listed below, including input handling vulnerabilities, deserialization issues, command injection, and exploitation of known vulnerabilities.
• Mitigation:
  • Regularly update Hutool library to the latest version to patch known vulnerabilities.
  • Implement secure coding practices when using Hutool functionalities, especially those dealing with external input or system interactions.
  • Conduct thorough security testing and code reviews focusing on Hutool usage.

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Input Handling Vulnerabilities in Hutool

• Description: This critical node highlights the risk of vulnerabilities arising from improper handling of user-supplied input when it is processed or used by Hutool functionalities. If user input is not correctly validated and sanitized before being used with Hutool, it can lead to various attacks.
• Attack Vectors:
  • Path Traversal: Manipulating file paths to access unauthorized files.
  • Deserialization Vulnerabilities: Injecting malicious serialized data.
  • XML/YAML Parsing Issues: Exploiting vulnerabilities in XML or YAML parsing through malicious input.
  • HTTP Request Injection: Injecting malicious content into HTTP requests constructed using Hutool.
  • Command Injection: Injecting malicious commands if user input is used in command execution.
• Mitigation:
  • Implement strict input validation and sanitization for all user-provided data before using it with Hutool functions.
  • Use parameterized or safe APIs provided by Hutool where available to avoid direct manipulation of sensitive operations with user input.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege and avoid using user input directly in operations like file access, deserialization, or command execution.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: Path Traversal via Hutool IO Utilities

• Description: Attackers can exploit Hutool's IO utilities (like FileUtil, ResourceUtil) by manipulating input file paths to access files or directories outside of the intended application scope.
• Attack Vector:
  • Injecting path traversal sequences (e.g., ../, ..\) into filenames or paths provided to Hutool's file or resource access methods.
• Example:
  • An application uses FileUtil.readString(userInputFilename) where userInputFilename is directly taken from user input without validation. An attacker could provide ../../../etc/passwd as userInputFilename to read the system's password file.
• Impact:
  • Unauthorized access to sensitive files and directories.
  • Information disclosure of confidential data.
• Mitigation:
  • Thoroughly validate and sanitize all user-provided file paths before using them with Hutool IO methods.
  • Implement allowlists of permitted file paths or extensions to restrict access to only authorized files.
  • Enforce proper access control mechanisms to limit file system access based on user roles and permissions.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path & Critical Node: Deserialization Vulnerabilities via Hutool Serialization Utilities

• Description: Hutool's SerializeUtil and potentially JSONUtil (if used for deserialization) can be vulnerable to deserialization attacks if they are used to deserialize untrusted data. This can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE).
• Attack Vector:
  • Providing malicious serialized Java objects or crafted JSON payloads to Hutool's deserialization functions (e.g., SerializeUtil.deserialize, JSONUtil.toBean).
  • These payloads are designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the deserialization process, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution on the server.
• Example:
  • An application deserializes data received from an external source using SerializeUtil.deserialize(untrustedData). An attacker could craft untrustedData to contain a serialized object that, upon deserialization, executes malicious code.
• Impact:
  • Remote Code Execution (RCE) - allowing the attacker to gain full control of the application server.
  • Denial of Service (DoS) - potentially crashing the application through malicious payloads.
• Mitigation:
  • Avoid deserializing untrusted data using Hutool's serialization utilities if possible.
  • If deserialization is absolutely necessary, implement extremely strict input validation and consider using safer serialization formats or libraries that are less prone to deserialization vulnerabilities.
  • Regularly update Hutool and the underlying serialization libraries to patch any known deserialization vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: XML External Entity (XXE) Injection via Hutool XML Parsing

• Description: If the application uses Hutool's XMLUtil to parse XML data, it might be vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) injection attacks, especially if processing untrusted XML input.
• Attack Vector:
  • Injecting malicious XML payloads that contain external entity definitions into XML data parsed by Hutool's XMLUtil.
  • These external entities can be used to read local files on the server, perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), or cause Denial of Service (DoS).
• Example:
  • An application parses XML data from user input using XMLUtil.parseXml(userInputXML). An attacker could provide userInputXML containing an XXE payload like:

    <!DOCTYPE root [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]>
    <root>&xxe;</root>

    This could allow the attacker to read the /etc/passwd file.
• Impact:
  • Information disclosure - reading local files on the server.
  • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) - making requests to internal or external systems from the server.
  • Denial of Service (DoS) - potentially causing parsing errors or resource exhaustion.
• Mitigation:
  • Disable external entity processing in Hutool's XML parsing configuration if possible. Check Hutool documentation for configuration options related to XML parsing.
  • Sanitize XML input before parsing to remove or neutralize any potentially malicious external entity definitions.
  • Consider using secure XML parsing libraries that have built-in protection against XXE vulnerabilities and are configured to disable external entity processing by default.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: HTTP Request Smuggling/Injection via Hutool HTTP Client

• Description: When using Hutool's HttpUtil to make HTTP requests, improper construction of requests, especially with user-controlled input, can lead to HTTP request smuggling or injection vulnerabilities on the target server.
• Attack Vector:
  • Manipulating HTTP request parameters, headers, or the request body when using HttpUtil to send requests.
  • This can involve injecting malicious headers, manipulating request methods, or crafting requests that exploit ambiguities in how servers parse HTTP requests.
• Example:
  • An application constructs an HTTP request using HttpUtil and includes user input in headers without proper encoding or validation. An attacker could inject malicious headers like Transfer-Encoding: chunked to perform HTTP request smuggling.
• Impact:
  • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) - making requests to unintended targets.
  • Bypassing security controls - circumventing authentication or authorization mechanisms.
  • Data manipulation - potentially altering data on the target server.
• Mitigation:
  • Carefully construct HTTP requests using Hutool's HttpUtil, avoiding direct concatenation of user input into headers or request bodies.
  • Use parameterized requests or safe API methods provided by Hutool's HttpUtil where possible to prevent injection.
  • Validate and sanitize user input before incorporating it into HTTP requests to prevent malicious injection.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path & Critical Node: Command Injection via Hutool Runtime Utilities

• Description: If the application uses Hutool's RuntimeUtil (or similar utilities for executing system commands) and incorporates user-controlled input into the commands, it becomes highly vulnerable to command injection attacks.
• Attack Vector:
  • Injecting malicious commands into arguments passed to Hutool's RuntimeUtil.exec or similar methods that execute external system commands.
  • Attackers can leverage this to execute arbitrary commands on the server operating system.
• Example:
  • An application uses RuntimeUtil.exec("ping " + userInputHostname) where userInputHostname is taken from user input. An attacker could provide userInputHostname as ; malicious_command to execute malicious_command after the ping command.
• Impact:
  • Remote Code Execution (RCE) - allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the server.
  • Full system compromise - potentially gaining complete control over the server and its data.
• Mitigation:
  • Strongly avoid using RuntimeUtil.exec or similar methods with user-controlled input. This is the most effective mitigation.
  • If external command execution is absolutely necessary, use parameterized commands or safe APIs that prevent command injection.
  • Implement extremely strict input validation and sanitization for any input that is used in command execution, even if parameterized commands are used. Consider using allowlists for allowed command arguments.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path & Critical Node: Application Logic Flaws Exacerbated by Hutool Usage

• Description: This highlights that vulnerabilities can arise not directly from Hutool itself, but from how developers use Hutool in their application logic. Even if Hutool is secure, misuse or insecure application design can create vulnerabilities that are made worse or easier to exploit by the use of Hutool.
• Attack Vector:
  • Varies widely depending on the specific application logic. It involves insecure coding practices in the application that are amplified or facilitated by the use of Hutool functionalities.
  • This could include using Hutool's string manipulation functions to build insecure SQL queries (leading to SQL injection, though generally out of scope for Hutool-specific threats, but illustrative of misuse), generating filenames without proper sanitization (leading to path traversal), or other insecure combinations of application logic and Hutool usage.
• Example:
  • An application uses Hutool's StrUtil.format() to construct a SQL query based on user input without proper escaping, leading to SQL injection. While SQL injection is a general web vulnerability, the misuse of StrUtil in this context exacerbates the problem.
• Impact:
  • Impact is highly dependent on the specific application logic flaw. It can range from information disclosure to Remote Code Execution, depending on the vulnerability created by the application's misuse of Hutool.
• Mitigation:
  • Focus on secure coding practices throughout the application development lifecycle.
  • Thoroughly test application logic that uses Hutool to identify and address any potential vulnerabilities arising from misuse.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege and defense in depth in application design to minimize the impact of potential application logic flaws.
  • Conduct regular code reviews and security audits to identify and rectify insecure application logic patterns.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path & Critical Node: Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Hutool

• Description: This path represents the risk of attackers exploiting publicly disclosed vulnerabilities (CVEs) that might exist in specific versions of the Hutool library.
• Attack Vector:
  • Identifying the specific version of Hutool used by the application.
  • Checking public vulnerability databases (like CVE databases, security advisories) for known vulnerabilities affecting that Hutool version.
  • Leveraging publicly available exploits or developing custom exploits to target these known vulnerabilities.
• Example:
  • If a known Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability is discovered in Hutool version X.Y.Z, and an application is still using this vulnerable version, an attacker can exploit this CVE to gain RCE on the application server.
• Impact:
  • Impact depends on the specific vulnerability being exploited. It can range from Remote Code Execution (RCE) to information disclosure, Denial of Service (DoS), or other forms of compromise.
• Mitigation:
  • Regularly monitor Hutool's security advisories and vulnerability databases.
  • Keep the Hutool library updated to the latest stable version. This is the most critical mitigation to patch known vulnerabilities.
  • Implement a vulnerability management process for all third-party libraries used in the application, including Hutool, to ensure timely patching and updates.
  • Use dependency scanning tools to automatically detect outdated and vulnerable versions of Hutool and other libraries.