attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for dromara/hutool

Objective: To achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) or significant Data Exfiltration on an application leveraging Hutool, by exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations specifically within Hutool's functionalities.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      +-------------------------------------------------+
                                      |  Attacker Goal: RCE or Data Exfiltration via Hutool |
                                      +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                        |
          +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
          |                                                                                |
+-------------------------+                                                 +-------------------------+
|  1. Exploit Hutool     |                                                 |  2. Exploit Hutool     |
|     Serialization      |                                                 |     Utility Functions   |
|     Vulnerabilities    |                                                 |     (Mis)use           |
+-------------------------+                                                 +-------------------------+
          |                                                                                 |
+---------------------+                                                 +---------------------+
| ***1.1  Insecure***   |                                                 | 2.1  Abuse         |
|  ***Deserialization***|                                                 |      `HttpUtil`    |
|  ***of Untrusted***   |                                                 |      for SSRF      |
|  ***Data via***       |                                                 |      or Data       |
|  ***`SerializeUtil`***|                                                 |      Leakage      |
+---------------------+                                                 +---------------------+
          |                                                                                 |
+---------+---------+                                                 +---------+---------+
|1.1.1    |1.1.2    |                                                 |2.1.1    |2.1.2    |
|Craft    |Find     |                                                 |Craft    |Use      |
|Malicious|Existing |                                                 |Malicious|`HttpUtil`|
|Payload  |Gadget   |                                                 |Request  |to Access |
| [HIGH RISK]|Chain    |                                                 |         |Internal  |
|         | [HIGH RISK]|                                                 |         |Resources |
+---------+---------+                                                 +---------+---------+
                                                                          | [HIGH RISK]      |
                                                                          +---------------------+

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Hutool Serialization Vulnerabilities (High-Risk Path)

• Critical Node: 1.1 Insecure Deserialization of Untrusted Data via SerializeUtil

  • Description: This is the core vulnerability. If the application uses SerializeUtil (or related functions like deserialize) to process serialized data from an untrusted source (e.g., user input, a network request, an external API), it is highly susceptible to a Java deserialization attack.
  • Likelihood: High (if untrusted data is deserialized)
  • Impact: Very High (Remote Code Execution is almost certain)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

• Attack Step: 1.1.1 Craft Malicious Payload

  • Description: The attacker creates a specially crafted serialized object. This object contains a "gadget chain" – a sequence of Java classes that, when deserialized by the vulnerable application, will execute arbitrary code on the server.
  • Likelihood: High (given the vulnerability exists)
  • Impact: Very High (RCE)
  • Effort: Medium (Tools like ysoserial can automate payload generation)
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard (Payloads can be obfuscated)

• Attack Step: 1.1.2 Find Existing Gadget Chain

  • Description: The attacker researches and identifies a suitable gadget chain. This chain must be compatible with the libraries present in the application's classpath (including Hutool and its dependencies). Publicly available resources and tools like ysoserial list many known gadget chains.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on the application's classpath)
  • Impact: Very High (RCE)
  • Effort: Low (Many pre-built gadget chains are available)
  • Skill Level: Beginner - Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Hutool Utility Functions (Mis)use (High-Risk Path)

• Attack Step: 2.1 Abuse HttpUtil for SSRF or Data Leakage

  • Description: The attacker exploits the application's use of Hutool's HttpUtil to make unauthorized requests to internal or external resources. This is often achieved by manipulating input parameters that control the target URL of the HTTP request.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on how HttpUtil is used and input validation)
  • Impact: Medium - High (Data leakage, access to internal resources, potentially RCE)
  • Effort: Low - Medium
  • Skill Level: Beginner - Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

• Attack Step: 2.1.1 Craft Malicious Request

  • Description: The attacker crafts input that, when processed by the application, causes HttpUtil to make a request to a URL of the attacker's choosing. This could be an internal IP address, a sensitive internal endpoint, or an external server controlled by the attacker.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium - High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Beginner
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

• Attack Step: 2.1.2 Use HttpUtil to Access Internal Resources

  • Description: The attacker successfully uses the manipulated HttpUtil call to access internal resources that should not be accessible from the outside. This could include internal databases, file systems, or other services.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on network configuration and internal service security)
  • Impact: High (Potential for data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or RCE)
  • Effort: Low - Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium