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Attack Tree Analysis for elastic/logstash

Objective: Exfiltrate sensitive data processed by Logstash, disrupt the application's logging and monitoring capabilities, or gain unauthorized access to the application or underlying infrastructure via Logstash.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                     |  Compromise Application via Logstash Exploitation  |
                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                                ^
                                                |
         +--------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------+
         |                                |                                |                                |
+---------------------+        +---------------------+        +---------------------+        +---------------------+
| Data Exfiltration  |        |  Denial of Service  |        |  Code Execution     |        |  Configuration Abuse|
+---------------------+        +---------------------+        +---------------------+        +---------------------+
         ^                                ^                                ^                                ^
         |                                |                                |                                |
+--------+--------+            +--------+--------+            +--------+--------+            +--------+--------+
| Input  |        |            | Input  |        |            | Input  |        |            | Input  |        |
|Plugins |        |            |Plugins |        |            |Plugins |        |            |Plugins |        |
+--------+--------+            +--------+--------+            +--------+--------+            +--------+--------+
         ^                                ^                                ^                                ^
         |                                |                                |                                |
+---+----+                        +---+----+                        +---+----+                        +---+----+
|[CN]|    |                        |   |[CN]|                        |[CN]|    |                        |[CN]|    |
+---+----+                        +---+----+                        +---+----+                        +---+----+
         ^                                ^
         |
+--------+                        +--------+
| Output |                        | Output |
|Plugins |                        |Plugins |
+--------+                        +--------+
         ^                                ^
         |
     +---+----+                    +---+----+
     |   |[CN]|                    |   |[CN]|
     +---+----+                    +---+----+

Attack Tree Path: 1. Data Exfiltration

  • High-Risk Path 1 [HR]: Misconfigured Input Plugin -> Data Exfiltration

    • Critical Node [CN]: Misconfigured Input Plugin
      • Description: An attacker exploits a misconfiguration in an input plugin, such as overly permissive file access in a file input plugin, allowing access to sensitive files outside the intended scope. Or, an attacker could exploit a misconfiguration in a network-based input plugin (e.g., beats, syslog) to receive data from unauthorized sources or with insufficient authentication.
      • Likelihood: Medium to High
      • Impact: High to Very High
      • Effort: Low to Medium
      • Skill Level: Script Kiddie to Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Follow the principle of least privilege.
        • Ensure input plugins are configured to access only the necessary files and resources.
        • Regularly review and audit input plugin configurations.
        • Use configuration management tools to enforce secure configurations.
        • Implement strong authentication and authorization for network-based input plugins.

  • High-Risk Path 2 [HR]: Vulnerable Input Plugin -> Data Exfiltration

    • Critical Node [CN]: Vulnerable Input Plugin
      • Description: An attacker exploits a known or zero-day vulnerability in a specific input plugin. This could allow reading arbitrary files, injecting malicious data, or even achieving remote code execution (though RCE is categorized separately).
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High to Very High
      • Effort: Medium to High
      • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
      • Mitigation:
        • Regularly audit and update all input plugins.
        • Implement strict input validation and sanitization within the application before data reaches Logstash.
        • Use a vulnerability scanner to identify known issues in plugins.
        • Consider using minimal, well-vetted plugins.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Denial of Service

  • High-Risk Path 3 [HR]: Input Plugin Resource Exhaustion -> Denial of Service

    • Critical Node [CN]: Input Plugin Resource Exhaustion
      • Description: An attacker sends a flood of data to an input plugin, exceeding Logstash's capacity to process it. This could be a large volume of legitimate-looking data or specially crafted data designed to consume excessive resources.
      • Likelihood: Medium to High
      • Impact: Medium to High
      • Effort: Low to Medium
      • Skill Level: Script Kiddie to Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement rate limiting and throttling on input sources.
        • Configure Logstash with sufficient resources (CPU, memory, disk space).
        • Use a queuing mechanism (e.g., Kafka, Redis) to buffer data.

  • High-Risk Path 4 [HR]: Slow or Unresponsive Output -> Denial of Service

    • Critical Node [CN]: Slow or Unresponsive Output
      • Description: If the output destination (e.g., Elasticsearch) is slow or unresponsive, Logstash's output queue can fill up, leading to backpressure and potentially causing Logstash to crash or become unresponsive.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Medium to High
      • Effort: Very Low
      • Skill Level: Script Kiddie
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy
      • Mitigation:
        • Ensure the output destination has sufficient resources and is properly configured.
        • Implement monitoring for the output destination's health and performance.
        • Configure Logstash with appropriate backpressure handling mechanisms.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Code Execution

  • Critical Node [CN]: Vulnerable Input Plugin (RCE)

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in an input plugin that allows for remote code execution (RCE). This is the most direct path to gaining full control.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: High to Very High
    • Skill Level: Advanced to Expert
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard to Very Hard
    • Mitigation:
      • Prioritize auditing and updating input plugins.
      • Focus on plugins that handle complex data formats or network protocols.
      • Use a vulnerability scanner.

  • Critical Node [CN]: Vulnerable Filter Plugin (RCE)

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in a filter plugin that allows for RCE (e.g., a vulnerability in a ruby filter).
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: High to Very High
    • Skill Level: Advanced to Expert
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard to Very Hard
    • Mitigation:
      • Regularly audit and update all filter plugins.
      • Avoid using the ruby filter unless absolutely necessary.
      • Carefully review and sanitize any user-supplied code if using ruby filter.
      • Consider using a sandboxed environment for executing Ruby code.

  • Critical Node [CN]: Vulnerable Output Plugin (RCE)

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in an output plugin that allows for RCE.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: High to Very High
    • Skill Level: Advanced to Expert
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard to Very Hard
    • Mitigation:
      • Regularly audit and update all output plugins.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Configuration Abuse

  • High-Risk Path 5 [HR]: Unauthorized Access to Configuration Files -> Configuration Abuse

    • Critical Node [CN]: Unauthorized Access to Configuration Files
      • Description: An attacker gains access to Logstash's configuration files (e.g., logstash.yml, pipeline configuration files) through weak file permissions, exposed network shares, or other vulnerabilities. They can then modify the configuration to redirect data, disable logging, or cause other disruptions.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low to Medium
      • Skill Level: Script Kiddie to Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement strict access controls on Logstash configuration files.
        • Use a secure configuration management system.
        • Regularly audit file permissions.

  • High-Risk Path 6 [HR]: Input/Filter/Output Plugin Misconfiguration -> Configuration Abuse

    • Critical Node [CN]: Input/Filter/Output Plugin Misconfiguration
      • Description: An attacker leverages a misconfiguration in any of the plugins (input, filter, or output) to achieve a malicious goal. This is a broad category encompassing various misconfigurations beyond just those leading to data exfiltration (covered in High-Risk Path 1). Examples include disabling security features, routing data to incorrect destinations, or causing instability.
      • Likelihood: Medium to High
      • Impact: Medium to Very High
      • Effort: Low to Medium
      • Skill Level: Script Kiddie to Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Regularly audit configurations.
        • Use configuration as code.
        • Implement change management processes.
        • Follow the principle of least privilege.