Mitigation Strategy: Enforce TLS and Client Authentication for Beats Input (Logstash Configuration)
-
Description:
- Logstash Configuration: Within the Logstash configuration file (e.g.,
beats.conf
in/etc/logstash/conf.d/
), configure thebeats
input plugin as follows:ssl => true
: Enable SSL/TLS encryption.ssl_certificate => "/path/to/logstash_server.crt"
: Specify the path to the Logstash server's certificate file.ssl_key => "/path/to/logstash_server.key"
: Specify the path to the Logstash server's private key file.ssl_certificate_authorities => ["/path/to/ca.crt"]
: Specify the path to the Certificate Authority (CA) certificate file used to sign the client certificates.ssl_verify_mode => "force_peer"
: Require client certificate authentication. This is crucial. Do not usepeer
ornone
.
- Restart Logstash: After making these changes, restart the Logstash service to apply the new configuration.
- Verify in Logs: Check the Logstash logs for any SSL-related errors during startup or when Beats agents connect.
- Logstash Configuration: Within the Logstash configuration file (e.g.,
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Data Injection (Severity: High): Ensures only authorized Beats agents with valid, CA-signed certificates can send data.
- Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks (Severity: High): TLS encryption prevents interception and modification of data.
- Data Eavesdropping (Severity: High): TLS encryption prevents unauthorized reading of data.
-
Impact:
- Unauthorized Data Injection: Risk reduced significantly (90-95%).
- Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks: Risk eliminated (100%).
- Data Eavesdropping: Risk eliminated (100%).
-
Currently Implemented:
- Fully implemented with all required settings in the
beats
input configuration.
- Fully implemented with all required settings in the
-
Missing Implementation:
- None.
Mitigation Strategy: Plugin Vetting and Regular Updates (Logstash Plugin Management)
-
Description:
- Prioritize Official Plugins: Use the
logstash-plugin list
command to review installed plugins. Prioritize those from Elastic. - Community Plugin Review (Before Installation): Before installing a community plugin using
logstash-plugin install <plugin_name>
, thoroughly review its source code (available on GitHub or other repositories) for security vulnerabilities. Look for:- Insecure deserialization.
- Command injection.
- Regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) vulnerabilities.
- Insecure use of external libraries.
- Regular Updates: Use the
logstash-plugin update
command regularly (ideally automated with a script) to update all installed plugins to their latest versions. This command updates all plugins unless a specific plugin is specified. - Check for updates: Use command
logstash-plugin list --verbose | grep -i update
to check if there are any updates available.
- Prioritize Official Plugins: Use the
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Vulnerabilities in Logstash Plugins (Severity: High): Reduces the risk of exploiting known and unknown vulnerabilities.
- Code Execution (Severity: Critical): Mitigates the risk of arbitrary code execution.
- Denial of Service (DoS) (Severity: High): Reduces DoS risks from plugin vulnerabilities.
-
Impact:
- Vulnerabilities in Logstash Plugins: Risk reduced significantly (70-80%).
- Code Execution: Risk reduced significantly (60-70%).
- Denial of Service (DoS): Risk reduced moderately (50-60%).
-
Currently Implemented:
- A script runs weekly to execute
logstash-plugin update
.
- A script runs weekly to execute
-
Missing Implementation:
- Formal code review process for community plugins before installation is missing.
Mitigation Strategy: Regular Expression Security (ReDoS Prevention within Filters)
-
Description:
- Audit Existing Filters: Examine all Logstash filter configurations (e.g.,
grok.conf
,mutate.conf
) that use regular expressions. Identify any potentially vulnerable patterns. grok
Timeout: Within thegrok
filter configuration, always set thetimeout_millis
option to a reasonable value (e.g., 1000 milliseconds). This prevents a single malicious input from consuming excessive CPU time due to a poorly designed regex. Example:grok { match => { "message" => "%{MY_PATTERN}" } timeout_millis => 1000 }
- Simplify and Test: Rewrite any complex or potentially vulnerable regular expressions to be simpler and less prone to backtracking. Test thoroughly with various inputs, including edge cases.
- Consider
dissect
: If a regular expression is too complex to secure, consider using thedissect
filter instead, which is generally more performant and less vulnerable to ReDoS.
- Audit Existing Filters: Examine all Logstash filter configurations (e.g.,
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) (Severity: High): Prevents DoS attacks caused by crafted input strings.
-
Impact:
- Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS): Risk reduced significantly (80-90%).
-
Currently Implemented:
timeout_millis
is set for allgrok
filters.
-
Missing Implementation:
- A comprehensive audit of all regular expressions for ReDoS vulnerabilities has not been performed.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Logstash Configuration Files (Environment Variables)
-
Description:
- Identify Secrets: Review all Logstash configuration files and identify any sensitive information, such as passwords, API keys, or other credentials.
- Replace with Environment Variables: Replace the hardcoded secrets with environment variable references using the
${VAR_NAME}
syntax within the Logstash configuration files. For example, replacepassword => "mysecretpassword"
withpassword => "${LOGSTASH_PASSWORD}"
. - Set Environment Variables: Set the corresponding environment variables before starting Logstash. This can be done in the systemd service file (using
Environment=
), in a shell script that starts Logstash, or through other system-level mechanisms. Do not store the secrets in the Logstash configuration files themselves. - Restart Logstash: Restart Logstash to apply the changes.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Credential Exposure (Severity: Critical): Prevents attackers from obtaining credentials if they gain access to the configuration files.
-
Impact:
- Credential Exposure: Risk reduced significantly.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially implemented; some secrets are still hardcoded.
-
Missing Implementation:
- A complete migration of all secrets to environment variables is needed.
Mitigation Strategy: Enforce TLS for Output Connections (Logstash Configuration)
-
Description:
- Review Output Configurations: Examine all Logstash output configurations (e.g.,
elasticsearch.conf
,kafka.conf
). - Enable TLS: For each output plugin that supports TLS, enable it by setting the appropriate options (usually
ssl
ortls
) totrue
. Consult the specific plugin documentation for the exact syntax. For example, for Elasticsearch:output { elasticsearch { hosts => ["https://my-es-cluster:9200"] ssl => true cacert => "/path/to/ca.crt" # ... other settings ... } }
- Provide Certificates: Specify the paths to the necessary certificate files (CA certificate, client certificate, client key) as required by the output plugin.
- Restart Logstash: Restart Logstash to apply the changes.
- Review Output Configurations: Examine all Logstash output configurations (e.g.,
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks (Severity: High): Prevents interception and modification of data sent to outputs.
- Data Eavesdropping (Severity: High): Prevents unauthorized reading of data sent to outputs.
-
Impact:
- Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks: Risk eliminated (100%).
- Data Eavesdropping: Risk eliminated (100%).
-
Currently Implemented:
- TLS is enabled for the Elasticsearch output.
-
Missing Implementation:
- TLS needs to be enabled for all other output plugins that support it.
Mitigation Strategy: Configure and Use Persistent Queues (Logstash Queuing)
-
Description:
- Choose a Queue Type: In your Logstash configuration, configure a persistent queue. The
persisted
queue type is recommended for production environments. Thefile
queue type is also an option. Avoid thememory
queue type for production if data loss is unacceptable. - Configure Queue Settings: Within the Logstash configuration file (typically in the main
logstash.yml
or a separate configuration file), set the following:queue.type: persisted # Or 'file' queue.max_bytes: 4gb # Adjust as needed based on available disk space and expected volume path.queue: "/path/to/queue/data" # Specify a directory for queue data (persisted queue only) queue.checkpoint.writes: 1024 # Adjust as needed
queue.type
: Specifies the queue type (persisted
,file
, ormemory
).queue.max_bytes
: Limits the maximum size of the queue. This is crucial to prevent disk space exhaustion.path.queue
: (Forpersisted
queue) Specifies the directory where the queue data will be stored. Ensure this directory has sufficient disk space and is accessible by the Logstash user.queue.checkpoint.writes
: Defines how often to force a checkpoint.
- Restart Logstash: Restart Logstash to apply the new queue configuration.
- Monitor Queue: Use monitoring tools to track the queue size and ensure it's not growing unbounded.
- Choose a Queue Type: In your Logstash configuration, configure a persistent queue. The
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Data Loss During Outages (Severity: High): Persistent queues prevent data loss if Logstash restarts or crashes.
- Denial of Service (DoS) (Severity: Medium): Provides some buffering against sudden spikes in input data, although it's not a primary DoS mitigation.
-
Impact:
- Data Loss During Outages: Risk reduced significantly (80-90%).
- Denial of Service (DoS): Risk reduced slightly (20-30%).
-
Currently Implemented:
- The
persisted
queue is configured with amax_bytes
limit.
- The
-
Missing Implementation:
- None.