attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for google/guice

Attack Surface: Malicious Module Injection

• Description: Attackers inject malicious Guice modules into the application during module loading.
• Guice Contribution: Guice's module loading mechanism, especially if it relies on dynamic paths or external configuration, can be exploited to load attacker-controlled modules.
• Example: An application reads module paths from a configuration file that is modifiable by an attacker. The attacker changes the path to point to a malicious module hosted on their server. Upon application startup, Guice loads and executes the malicious module.
• Impact: Critical. Full application compromise, arbitrary code execution, data theft, denial of service.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Static Module Loading: Prefer statically defining modules within the application code rather than relying on dynamic loading.
  • Input Validation: If dynamic loading is necessary, strictly validate and sanitize module paths and configurations. Whitelist allowed module locations.
  • Secure Configuration Management: Securely store and manage configuration files, restricting write access to authorized personnel/processes.
  • Code Review: Regularly review module loading logic and configuration handling for potential vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Module Overriding and Manipulation

• Description: Attackers modify or override existing Guice modules after application deployment, replacing legitimate modules with malicious ones.
• Guice Contribution: Guice's design allows for module overriding and configuration updates, which, if not properly secured, can be abused.
• Example: An application allows administrators to update Guice modules via a web interface or configuration management system. If this interface is vulnerable or lacks proper authentication, an attacker could gain access and replace a legitimate module with a malicious one.
• Impact: Critical. Full application compromise, arbitrary code execution, data theft, denial of service.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Restrict Configuration Access: Implement strong authentication and authorization for any mechanism that allows module configuration changes.
  • Immutable Infrastructure: Favor immutable infrastructure where application components, including modules, are deployed as immutable units, reducing the possibility of post-deployment modification.
  • Integrity Checks: Implement integrity checks (e.g., checksums, digital signatures) for modules to detect tampering.
  • Audit Logging: Log all module configuration changes for auditing and incident response.

Attack Surface: Binding to Vulnerable or Malicious Classes

• Description: Guice bindings are configured to inject vulnerable or intentionally malicious classes.
• Guice Contribution: Guice's binding mechanism relies on developer-defined configurations. Misconfigurations or bindings pointing to untrusted code can introduce vulnerabilities.
• Example: A developer, unaware of a vulnerability in a specific library version, creates a binding that injects a class from that vulnerable library. An attacker exploits the vulnerability through the injected class. Alternatively, a malicious insider could intentionally create bindings to backdoored classes.
• Impact: High. Depending on the vulnerability in the bound class, impact can range from data breaches to arbitrary code execution.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Binding Audits: Regularly audit Guice bindings to ensure they point to trusted and secure implementations.
  • Dependency Scanning: Use dependency scanning tools to identify known vulnerabilities in libraries used by the application, including those targeted by Guice bindings.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Design bindings to be as specific and restrictive as possible, minimizing the scope of injected dependencies.
  • Secure Coding Practices: Follow secure coding practices when developing classes that are intended to be injected by Guice.

Attack Surface: Unintended or Overly Broad Bindings

• Description: Overly broad or permissive Guice bindings allow for the injection of unexpected or malicious implementations.
• Guice Contribution: Guice's flexibility in binding can lead to overly generic bindings if not carefully managed, opening doors for unintended class injections.
• Example: An interface PaymentProcessor is bound without specifying a concrete implementation class, relying on classpath scanning or default binding. An attacker places a malicious class implementing PaymentProcessor on the classpath. Guice might inadvertently inject this malicious implementation instead of the intended one.
• Impact: High. Impact depends on the functionality of the interface and the capabilities of the malicious implementation. Could lead to data manipulation, unauthorized actions, or denial of service.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Specific Bindings: Define bindings as narrowly and specifically as possible. Use concrete types instead of interfaces when appropriate.
  • Binding Annotations: Utilize binding annotations (@Named, @Qualifier) to further refine binding targets and prevent unintended injections.
  • Classpath Control: Carefully manage the application's classpath to prevent the inclusion of untrusted or unexpected classes.
  • Testing and Validation: Thoroughly test Guice configurations to ensure bindings behave as expected and prevent unintended injections.