Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
83 lines (71 loc) · 7.97 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

83 lines (71 loc) · 7.97 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for google/guice

Objective: Gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, or cause denial of service within the application by exploiting Guice-specific vulnerabilities, focusing on high-risk areas.

Attack Tree Visualization

High-Risk Attack Sub-Tree: Compromise Application via Guice Exploitation (High-Risk Paths & Critical Nodes)
├───[AND] Exploit Dependency Injection Mechanism [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR] 1. Inject Malicious Dependency [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND] 1.1 Identify Injectable Points [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├───[OR] 1.1.1 Public Constructors/Methods [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├───[OR] 1.1.2 Field Injection [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[AND] 1.3 Supply Malicious Implementation [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │       └───[OR] 1.3.2 Leverage Existing Vulnerable Dependency (if injectable) [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[OR] 2. Abuse Scopes and Lifecycle Management [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───[AND] 2.1 Exploit Scope Misconfiguration [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[OR] 2.1.1 Access Request-Scoped Objects from Singleton (if improperly configured)
├───[OR] 3. Exploit Provider Logic Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───[AND] 3.1 Identify Custom Providers [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[AND] 3.2 Analyze Provider Code for Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[OR] 3.2.1 Logic Errors in Provider [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[OR] 3.2.2 Insecure Data Handling in Provider [CRITICAL NODE]
└───[OR] 6. Exploit Misconfiguration of Guice Features [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    └───[AND] 6.1 Incorrect Scope Definitions [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Dependency Injection Mechanism [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Why High-Risk: Dependency Injection is the core of Guice. Compromising this mechanism allows attackers to fundamentally alter the application's behavior.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 1. Inject Malicious Dependency [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Description: The attacker aims to replace legitimate dependencies with malicious ones, gaining control over application components.
      • 1.1 Identify Injectable Points [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Description: Attackers must first identify where Guice performs injection.
        • 1.1.1 Public Constructors/Methods [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Attack Vector: Classes with @Inject annotated public constructors or methods are prime targets. Attackers can attempt to inject malicious implementations at these points.
          • Risk: High likelihood due to common usage of constructor and method injection. High impact - code execution.
        • 1.1.2 Field Injection [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Attack Vector: Fields annotated with @Inject are also direct injection points. Similar to constructors/methods, these are easily identifiable and exploitable.
          • Risk: High likelihood due to common usage of field injection. High impact - code execution.
      • 1.3 Supply Malicious Implementation [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Description: Once injection points are identified, the attacker needs to provide the malicious code.
        • 1.3.2 Leverage Existing Vulnerable Dependency (if injectable) [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Attack Vector: Instead of crafting entirely new malicious classes, attackers can exploit existing vulnerable libraries already included in the application. By manipulating bindings, they can force Guice to inject a vulnerable component in a critical context, triggering the vulnerability.
          • Risk: Medium likelihood (depends on presence of vulnerable dependencies and injectability). High impact - depends on the vulnerability, potentially code execution or data breach.

Attack Tree Path: Abuse Scopes and Lifecycle Management [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Why High-Risk: Incorrect scope configurations are common developer mistakes and can lead to subtle but significant security vulnerabilities, particularly data leaks and state management issues.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 2.1 Exploit Scope Misconfiguration [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Description: Attackers exploit incorrect scope definitions to gain unintended access to objects or manipulate application state.
      • 2.1.1 Access Request-Scoped Objects from Singleton (if improperly configured):
        • Attack Vector: If a singleton-scoped object incorrectly holds a reference to a request-scoped object, it can lead to shared state across requests. Attackers can exploit this to access data intended to be isolated within a single request, potentially leading to data leaks or session hijacking.
        • Risk: Medium likelihood (common misconfiguration). Medium impact - data leaks, shared state issues.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Provider Logic Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Why High-Risk: Custom providers often contain complex logic and are written by application developers, making them more prone to vulnerabilities compared to Guice's core framework. Exploiting provider logic can lead to various security issues depending on the provider's function.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 3.1 Identify Custom Providers [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Description: The first step is to identify @Provides methods in Guice modules, which represent custom provider logic.
      • Attack Vector: Code review and configuration analysis to locate @Provides annotated methods.
      • Risk: High likelihood of success in identifying custom providers if they exist.
    • 3.2 Analyze Provider Code for Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]::
      • Description: Once providers are identified, the attacker analyzes their code for weaknesses.
      • 3.2.1 Logic Errors in Provider [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Providers might contain logical flaws in their object creation or configuration logic. Attackers can exploit these flaws to manipulate the created objects or trigger unintended behavior.
        • Risk: Medium likelihood (depends on provider complexity). High impact - depends on provider function, potentially code execution or data manipulation.
      • 3.2.2 Insecure Data Handling in Provider [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Providers might handle sensitive data insecurely, such as logging secrets, storing credentials in memory without proper protection, or failing to sanitize data retrieved from external sources. Attackers can exploit these insecure practices to gain access to sensitive information or inject malicious data.
        • Risk: Medium likelihood (common coding mistake). Medium-High impact - data leaks, confidentiality breach.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Misconfiguration of Guice Features [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Why High-Risk: Misconfigurations, especially related to scopes, are common and can have significant security implications. Overly permissive configurations can increase the attack surface.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 6.1 Incorrect Scope Definitions [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Description: As discussed in path 2, incorrect scope definitions are a major source of vulnerabilities.
      • Attack Vector: Specifically, using scopes inappropriately, such as singleton scope for stateful objects or request scope for shared resources, can lead to data leaks, shared state issues, and other vulnerabilities.
      • Risk: Medium likelihood (common developer mistake). Medium impact - data leaks, shared state issues.