Threat: Malicious Module Injection
Threat: Malicious Module Injection
Description: An attacker could inject a malicious Guice module into the application if module loading is dynamically controlled by external configuration or user input. By manipulating the configuration, the attacker can point to a module they control. When loaded by Guice, this malicious module can override existing bindings and inject malicious implementations of dependencies. This allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code, steal data, or disrupt application functionality by controlling injected components.
Impact: Critical. Full application compromise, arbitrary code execution, data breach, denial of service.
Affected Guice Component: Module loading mechanism, Guice.createInjector(), Modules.override().
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
- Strictly control the source of Guice modules.
- Avoid dynamic module loading based on external or user-provided input.
- Implement strong input validation and sanitization if module paths are derived from external input.
- Use secure configuration management to protect module loading configurations.
- Code review module configurations and loading logic.
- Employ whitelisting of allowed modules if dynamic loading is absolutely necessary.
Threat: Binding Overriding Vulnerability
Threat: Binding Overriding Vulnerability
Description: An attacker might exploit uncontrolled module loading order or lack of explicit bindings. By introducing a module that is loaded later or by exploiting ambiguous binding configurations, the attacker could intentionally or unintentionally override critical bindings defined in earlier modules. This can replace legitimate components with malicious ones, leading to security bypasses, unexpected behavior, or injection of malicious code.
Impact: High. Potential security bypasses, injection of malicious components, unexpected application behavior, data corruption.
Affected Guice Component: Module loading order, Binding resolution, Modules.override().
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
- Carefully manage and define the order of module loading.
- Use explicit bindings to clearly define dependencies and prevent unintended overrides.
- Implement comprehensive unit and integration tests to verify binding configurations and prevent unintended overrides.
- Use
Modules.override()with extreme caution and thorough testing. - Employ static analysis tools to detect potential binding conflicts.
Threat: Insecure Binding Configuration
Threat: Insecure Binding Configuration
Description: An attacker could exploit insecurely configured bindings. If bindings are configured to retrieve sensitive information (like API keys, database credentials, or secrets) from insecure sources or if these secrets are hardcoded within binding configurations or provider implementations, an attacker gaining access to the configuration or code could extract these secrets. This could lead to unauthorized access to external systems or data breaches.
Impact: High. Exposure of sensitive information (credentials, secrets), unauthorized access to external systems, data breach.
Affected Guice Component: Binding configuration, Provider implementations, bind(), toProvider(), @Provides methods.
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
- Review all binding configurations for security best practices.
- Externalize sensitive configuration data using secure methods (environment variables, secure configuration servers, encrypted files).
- Avoid hardcoding sensitive information in binding configurations or provider implementations.
- Use secure credential management practices and avoid storing credentials directly in code repositories.
- Implement access control to configuration files and systems.
Threat: Injection of Untrusted Dependencies
Description: If the application design allows dynamic dependency resolution based on external input (e.g., class names provided by users or read from external sources without validation), an attacker could manipulate this input to inject and instantiate untrusted or malicious classes. This could lead to arbitrary code execution if the injected class contains malicious code or exploits vulnerabilities in the application.
Impact: Critical. Arbitrary code execution, full application compromise, data breach, denial of service.
Affected Guice Component: Dynamic dependency resolution logic (if implemented in application code), Class.forName(), reflection mechanisms used for dynamic instantiation.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
- Avoid dynamic dependency resolution based on untrusted input.
- If dynamic dependency resolution is necessary, use strict whitelisting of allowed classes.
- Implement robust input validation and sanitization for any external input used in dependency resolution.
- Ensure all classes and dependencies used in the application are from trusted sources and are vetted for security vulnerabilities.
- Apply principle of least privilege to application components to limit the impact of potential compromises.
Threat: Provider Logic Vulnerabilities
Threat: Provider Logic Vulnerabilities
Description: Providers are responsible for creating instances of dependencies. If the logic within a provider is vulnerable (e.g., it performs insecure operations, accesses sensitive resources without proper authorization, is susceptible to injection attacks itself, or contains logic errors), an attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities. For example, a provider might incorrectly validate user input, leading to injection vulnerabilities, or it might leak sensitive information during object creation.
Impact: High to Critical. Depending on the vulnerability in the provider logic, impacts can range from data leakage and unauthorized access to arbitrary code execution and application compromise.
Affected Guice Component: Provider implementations, @Provides methods, Provider interface implementations.
Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the specific vulnerability)
Mitigation Strategies:
- Thoroughly review and test the logic within all providers for security vulnerabilities.
- Ensure providers follow secure coding practices and avoid performing insecure operations.
- Implement proper input validation and sanitization within providers if they handle external input.
- Apply the principle of least privilege to providers, granting them only necessary permissions.
- Conduct security code reviews of provider implementations.
Threat: Improper Scope Usage Leading to Data Leakage or Concurrency Issues
Description: Incorrectly using Guice scopes (e.g., using @Singleton when @RequestScoped is appropriate, or mismanaging custom scopes) can lead to unintended sharing of state between requests or users. This can result in data leakage if sensitive user-specific data is shared across requests, or concurrency issues if shared state is not properly synchronized in a multi-threaded environment. An attacker might exploit this by sending concurrent requests or by observing data intended for other users.
Impact: Medium to High. Data leakage, data corruption, concurrency issues, potential for unauthorized access to data.
Affected Guice Component: Scope management, @Singleton, @RequestScoped, @SessionScoped, custom scopes.
Risk Severity: High (in scenarios with sensitive data and high concurrency)
Mitigation Strategies:
- Carefully choose the appropriate scope for each dependency based on its intended lifecycle and usage.
- Thoroughly understand the implications of each scope.
- Implement unit and integration tests to verify scope behavior, especially in multi-threaded environments.
- Avoid using overly broad scopes when narrower scopes are sufficient.
- Conduct code reviews to ensure correct scope usage.