Objective: Compromise application using EventBus by exploiting its weaknesses.
Root: Compromise Application via EventBus Exploitation [CRITICAL] ├── 1. Exploit Vulnerable Event Handler [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.1. Trigger Code Execution via Handler Vulnerability [CRITICAL] [HR] │ │ ├── 1.1.2. Injection Vulnerability in Handler (e.g., SQLi, Command Injection if handler interacts with external systems) [HR] │ │ ├── 1.1.3. Logic Flaws in Handler leading to unintended actions [HR] ├── 2. Exploit Event Injection/Spoofing [CRITICAL] [HR] │ ├── 2.1. Inject Malicious Events [HR] │ │ ├── 2.1.1. Post Crafted Events from Malicious Component [HR] │ │ │ ├── 2.1.1.1. Compromise a component with posting privileges [HR] ├── 3. Exploit Lack of Access Control in EventBus [CRITICAL] [HR] │ ├── 3.1. Unauthorized Event Subscription [HR] │ │ ├── 3.1.1. Register malicious subscriber to intercept sensitive events [HR] │ └── 3.2. Unauthorized Event Posting [HR] │ │ ├── 3.2.1. Post events without proper authorization checks (if intended to be restricted) [HR] ├── 4. Exploit Sticky Events Misuse [CRITICAL] │ ├── 4.1. Inject Malicious Sticky Events [HR] │ │ ├── 4.1.1. Post malicious sticky event that affects future subscribers [HR] └── 5. Exploit Threading Issues (Less directly EventBus, but relevant in context) ├── 5.1. Race Conditions in Event Handlers due to Threading [HR] │ ├── 5.1.1. Data corruption due to concurrent access in handlers [HR]
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2. Injection Vulnerability in Handler (e.g., SQLi, Command Injection if handler interacts with external systems) [HR]
Attack Vector: An attacker crafts a malicious event containing data designed to exploit injection vulnerabilities within an event handler. If the handler uses event data to construct database queries (SQL Injection), system commands (Command Injection), or other interpreted code without proper sanitization, the attacker can inject malicious code that will be executed by the handler.
- Example: An event handler receives user input from an event and uses it directly in an SQL query without parameterization. An attacker can inject SQL code within the user input to manipulate the query and potentially access or modify database data.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3. Logic Flaws in Handler leading to unintended actions [HR]
Attack Vector: Attackers analyze the logic of event handlers to identify flaws or unexpected behaviors. By sending specific sequences or types of events, they can trigger these logic flaws to cause unintended actions within the application. This could involve bypassing security checks, manipulating application state in unauthorized ways, or causing denial of service.
- Example: An event handler is designed to process orders. A logic flaw might allow an attacker to send a crafted event that bypasses payment verification steps, leading to an order being processed without payment.
Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.1. Compromise a component with posting privileges [HR]
Attack Vector: The attacker first compromises a component within the application that has the ability to post events to the EventBus. This initial compromise can be achieved through various means, such as exploiting vulnerabilities in that component itself (e.g., web application vulnerabilities, insecure dependencies, etc.). Once the component is compromised, the attacker can use its event posting capabilities to inject malicious events into the EventBus.
- Example: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in a user profile service component. This service has legitimate reasons to post events related to user profile updates. Once compromised, the attacker uses this service to post malicious events that trigger vulnerabilities in other parts of the application that subscribe to user profile events.
Attack Tree Path: 3.1.1. Register malicious subscriber to intercept sensitive events [HR]
Attack Vector: An attacker, having gained some level of access within the application (or exploiting a vulnerability to inject code), registers a malicious event subscriber. This subscriber is designed to intercept events that contain sensitive information that it should not have access to. Because EventBus, by default, doesn't have access control, any component can potentially subscribe to any event type.
- Example: An attacker injects a malicious component into the application. This component registers as a subscriber to events related to user authentication or financial transactions. The malicious subscriber then logs or exfiltrates the sensitive data contained within these intercepted events.
Attack Tree Path: 3.2.1. Post events without proper authorization checks (if intended to be restricted) [HR]
Attack Vector: An attacker finds a way to post events to the EventBus without going through intended authorization checks. This could be due to missing authorization logic in the application code that handles event posting, or by directly accessing the EventBus posting mechanism if it's not properly secured. By posting unauthorized events, the attacker can trigger actions or functionalities that they should not be able to access, potentially bypassing security controls or manipulating application behavior.
- Example: An event is intended to be posted only by an administrator component to trigger a system-wide configuration change. An attacker finds a way to bypass the administrator component and directly post this event, effectively gaining administrative privileges over the system configuration through the EventBus.
Attack Tree Path: 4.1.1. Post malicious sticky event that affects future subscribers [HR]
Attack Vector: An attacker posts a malicious sticky event to the EventBus. Sticky events are retained and delivered to any components that subscribe after the event is posted. This means the malicious sticky event can affect components that are registered later, potentially causing delayed and widespread impact. The malicious event could contain data designed to exploit vulnerabilities in future subscribers or to manipulate their behavior.
- Example: An attacker posts a malicious sticky event containing configuration data that is intended to be consumed by newly initialized components. When new components subscribe to this event type upon startup, they receive the malicious configuration data, leading to them being misconfigured or compromised from the start.
Attack Tree Path: 5.1.1. Data corruption due to concurrent access in handlers [HR]
Attack Vector: EventBus often delivers events to handlers on different threads. If event handlers are not designed to be thread-safe and they access shared resources (e.g., shared variables, data structures, files, databases) without proper synchronization, race conditions can occur. In a race condition, multiple threads might access and modify the shared resource concurrently in an uncontrolled manner, leading to data corruption, inconsistent application state, and potentially exploitable logic errors.
- Example: Multiple event handlers concurrently update a shared counter variable without proper locking mechanisms. Due to the race condition, the counter might not be incremented correctly, leading to incorrect application logic that relies on this counter, potentially causing financial discrepancies or other business logic errors.