attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for hibernate/hibernate-orm

Objective: Unauthorized Data Access/Modification/Exfiltration or DoS via Hibernate ORM

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Unauthorized Data Access/Modification/Exfiltration or DoS via Hibernate ORM
├── 1.  HQL Injection (Similar to SQL Injection, but using Hibernate Query Language) [HIGH RISK]
│   ├── 1.1  Unsanitized User Input in HQL Queries [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.1.1  Direct String Concatenation in `createQuery()` [HIGH RISK]
│   │   └── 1.1.3  Using Native SQL Queries without Proper Validation (if native SQL is used within Hibernate) [HIGH RISK]
├── 2.  Second-Level Cache Poisoning
│   └── 2.2  Exploiting Deserialization Vulnerabilities in Cache Providers (e.g., Ehcache, Infinispan) [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]
├── 4.  Entity Mapping Vulnerabilities
│   └── 4.2  Insecure Deserialization in Entity Load (if custom deserialization logic is used) [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]
└── 5.  Exploiting Hibernate-Specific CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) [HIGH RISK]
    ├── 5.1  Research Known CVEs for hibernate-orm
    └── 5.2  Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Hibernate Dependencies [HIGH RISK]

Attack Tree Path: 1. HQL Injection [HIGH RISK]

• Description: Similar to SQL injection, HQL injection occurs when attacker-controlled data is incorporated into Hibernate Query Language (HQL) queries without proper sanitization or parameterization. This allows attackers to modify the query's logic, potentially accessing, modifying, or deleting data they shouldn't have access to.
• Sub-Paths:
  • 1.1 Unsanitized User Input in HQL Queries [HIGH RISK]
    • Description: The root cause of most HQL injection vulnerabilities. If user input is directly used to construct HQL queries, an attacker can inject malicious HQL code.
    • 1.1.1 Direct String Concatenation in createQuery() [HIGH RISK]
      • Description: The most common and dangerous form of HQL injection. Developers directly concatenate user input strings with HQL query strings.
      • Example: String hql = "FROM User u WHERE u.username = '" + userInput + "'"; Query query = session.createQuery(hql);
      • Exploit: An attacker could provide input like ' OR '1'='1, resulting in the query FROM User u WHERE u.username = '' OR '1'='1', which would return all users.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • 1.1.3 Using Native SQL Queries without Proper Validation [HIGH RISK]
      • Description: While Hibernate encourages HQL, it also allows the use of native SQL queries. If these queries are constructed using unsanitized user input, they are vulnerable to traditional SQL injection.
      • Example: String sql = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '" + userInput + "'"; Query query = session.createNativeQuery(sql);
      • Exploit: Similar to HQL injection, but using SQL syntax. An attacker could inject ' OR 1=1 -- to retrieve all users.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 2. Second-Level Cache Poisoning

• Sub-Paths:
  • 2.2 Exploiting Deserialization Vulnerabilities in Cache Providers (e.g., Ehcache, Infinispan) [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]
    • Description: Hibernate's second-level cache can use external providers like Ehcache or Infinispan. If these providers have deserialization vulnerabilities, an attacker can inject malicious serialized objects into the cache. When these objects are deserialized, they can execute arbitrary code on the server (RCE).
    • Exploit: This requires finding a known or zero-day vulnerability in the specific cache provider and crafting a malicious serialized payload.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: High (RCE)
    • Effort: High
    • Skill Level: High
    • Detection Difficulty: High

Attack Tree Path: 4. Entity Mapping Vulnerabilities

• Sub-Paths:
  • 4.2 Insecure Deserialization in Entity Load (if custom deserialization logic is used) [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]
    • Description: If the application implements custom deserialization logic for Hibernate entities (e.g., overriding readObject), and this logic is not secure, it can be vulnerable to deserialization attacks.
    • Exploit: Similar to 2.2, but the vulnerable code is within the application's entity classes rather than the cache provider. An attacker would need to find a way to influence the data being deserialized.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: High (RCE)
    • Effort: High
    • Skill Level: High
    • Detection Difficulty: High

Attack Tree Path: 5. Exploiting Hibernate-Specific CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) [HIGH RISK]

• Description: This involves exploiting known vulnerabilities in specific versions of Hibernate ORM or its dependencies.
  • Sub-Paths:
    • 5.1 Research Known CVEs for hibernate-orm
      • Description: Attackers actively search for published CVEs related to Hibernate. If the application uses a vulnerable version, the attacker can use publicly available exploit code or information.
      • Exploit: Varies depending on the specific CVE. Could range from information disclosure to RCE.
      • Likelihood: Low-Medium (depends on patching frequency)
      • Impact: High (depends on the CVE)
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: High
      • Detection Difficulty: High
    • 5.2 Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Hibernate Dependencies [HIGH RISK]
      • Description: Hibernate relies on other libraries (e.g., for logging, XML parsing). Vulnerabilities in these dependencies can be exploited, even if Hibernate itself is secure.
      • Exploit: Varies depending on the vulnerable dependency.
      • Likelihood: Low-Medium (depends on patching frequency and the dependencies used)
      • Impact: High (depends on the vulnerability)
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: High
      • Detection Difficulty: High