threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for hibernate/hibernate-orm

Threat: HQL Injection

• Description: An attacker crafts malicious input that, when incorporated into an HQL query, alters the query's logic. The attacker might add conditions to bypass security checks, retrieve unauthorized data, modify data, or even execute arbitrary database commands (if the database user has sufficient privileges). This is analogous to SQL injection but targets HQL.
• Impact:
  • Data breach (unauthorized data retrieval).
  • Data modification (unauthorized updates or deletions).
  • Potential for complete database compromise (if database user privileges are excessive).
  • Denial of service (by crafting queries that consume excessive resources).
• Affected Hibernate-ORM Component:
  • org.hibernate.query.Query (and its implementations) when used with string concatenation for HQL.
  • Session.createQuery() when used with string concatenation.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Parameterized Queries (Mandatory): Always use setParameter() to bind user-supplied values to HQL queries. Never directly concatenate user input into the HQL string.
  • Input Validation: Validate all user input before it's even considered for use in a query. Check data type, length, format, and allowed values.
  • Criteria API (Strongly Recommended): Prefer the Criteria API for dynamically constructed queries, as it's less prone to injection vulnerabilities due to its object-oriented nature (though still requires parameterized values).
  • Least Privilege (Database User): Ensure the database user Hibernate connects with has the absolute minimum necessary privileges.

Threat: Criteria API Injection

• Description: Although generally safer than HQL, the Criteria API can still be vulnerable to injection if misused. An attacker might manipulate input used to construct Predicate objects or other parts of the Criteria query, leading to unauthorized data access or modification.
• Impact:
  • Data breach (unauthorized data retrieval).
  • Data modification (unauthorized updates or deletions).
  • Denial of service.
• Affected Hibernate-ORM Component:
  • org.hibernate.Criteria and related classes (e.g., Restrictions, Projections).
  • Session.createCriteria()
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Parameterized Values (Mandatory): Use setParameter() within Criteria API calls to bind user-supplied values. Do not construct Predicate objects directly from untrusted input without proper escaping/parameterization.
  • Input Validation: Rigorous input validation is crucial, even with the Criteria API.
  • Whitelist Approach for Dynamic Queries: If building dynamic WHERE clauses or other parts of the query based on user input, use a whitelist to restrict the allowed operations and parameters.

Threat: Second-Level Cache Poisoning

• Description: An attacker gains the ability to modify data stored in Hibernate's second-level cache. This could be through a separate, less secure application sharing the same cache, or by exploiting vulnerabilities that allow direct manipulation of the cache. The attacker injects malicious data that will then be loaded by the legitimate application.
• Impact:
  • Data corruption (application uses incorrect/malicious data).
  • Potential for code execution (if the cached data is used in a way that leads to deserialization vulnerabilities).
  • Denial of service (by filling the cache with garbage data).
• Affected Hibernate-ORM Component:
  • Second-Level Cache implementations (e.g., Ehcache, Infinispan).
  • org.hibernate.cache.spi.RegionFactory and related interfaces.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Cache Isolation: If using a shared cache, ensure strong isolation between applications. Use separate cache regions or dedicated cache servers.
  • Cache Key Validation: If cache keys are derived from user input, validate the input thoroughly to prevent attackers from accessing or manipulating arbitrary cache entries.
  • Disable Second-Level Cache (If Not Essential): If the performance benefits are not critical, disable the second-level cache to reduce the attack surface.
  • Signed/Encrypted Cache Data (Advanced): Consider signing or encrypting the data stored in the cache to prevent tampering (this adds significant complexity).

Threat: Bypassing Entity-Level Security

• Description: An attacker manipulates Hibernate's internal state or queries to bypass security checks defined at the entity level (e.g., object-level permissions). This might involve directly modifying entity properties after they've been loaded, or crafting queries that circumvent access control logic.
• Impact:
  • Unauthorized access to data.
  • Unauthorized modification of data.
• Affected Hibernate-ORM Component:
  • Hibernate's entity management and persistence mechanisms.
  • Interceptors and event listeners (if security logic is implemented there).
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Strict Entity Validation (Pre-Persistence): Implement robust validation before entities are persisted or updated. Don't rely solely on Hibernate's built-in validation. Use Bean Validation extensively.
  • Secure Session Management: Ensure the Hibernate Session is properly scoped and tied to the authenticated user. Prevent session hijacking.
  • Read-Only Entities: Mark entities as immutable (@Immutable) if they should not be modified.
  • Defensive Copying: Create defensive copies of entities to prevent unintended modifications.
  • Access Control Logic (Beyond Hibernate): Implement access control logic outside of Hibernate entities, such as in service layer methods or using a security framework (e.g., Spring Security).

Threat: Using Hibernate with Excessive Database Privileges

• Description: The application uses a database user account with privileges beyond what is strictly necessary for Hibernate to function. If an attacker compromises the application (e.g., through HQL injection), they gain those excessive privileges, potentially allowing them to perform actions like dropping tables, creating users, or accessing data outside the application's intended scope.
• Impact:
  • Complete database compromise.
  • Data breach.
  • Data loss.
• Affected Hibernate-ORM Component:
  • Database connection configuration (JDBC URL, username, password).
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Least Privilege (Database User): The database user that Hibernate connects with should have the absolute minimum necessary privileges. Grant only SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE privileges on the specific tables and columns required by the application. Avoid GRANT ALL.
  • Separate Database Users: Consider using separate database users for different parts of the application, with each user having only the privileges required for its specific tasks.
  • Regular Privilege Audits: Periodically review and audit the privileges granted to database users to ensure they are still appropriate.