attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for jenkinsci/jenkins

Objective: Compromise Application via Jenkins

Attack Tree Visualization

• Compromise Application via Jenkins [CRITICAL NODE]
  • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Compromise Jenkins Instance [CRITICAL NODE]
    • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Jenkins Software Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
      • AND - Identify Known Jenkins Vulnerability (CVE)
        • [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Unpatched Jenkins Instance
    • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Brute Force/Credential Stuffing Jenkins Login [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Weak Password Policy
    • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Unsecured Jenkins API [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Missing Authentication/Authorization Checks
    • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Social Engineering/Phishing Jenkins Admins
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Gain Admin Credentials
  • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Pipeline Manipulation [CRITICAL NODE]
    • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Compromise Source Code Repository (Used by Jenkins) [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Steal VCS Credentials
    • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Manipulate Jenkinsfile/Pipeline Definition [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Gain Access to Jenkins Configuration
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Insufficient Pipeline Security
    • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Inject Malicious Code during Build Process [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Compromise Build Dependencies (e.g., Dependency Confusion)
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Inject Malicious Scripts in Pipeline
  • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Jenkins Plugins [CRITICAL NODE]
    • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Identify Vulnerable Jenkins Plugin [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Known Plugin Vulnerability (CVE)
  • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Jenkins Credentials/Secrets Management [CRITICAL NODE]
    • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Retrieve Stored Credentials in Jenkins [CRITICAL NODE]
    • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Weak Credential Management Practices [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Credentials Stored in Pipeline Scripts (plaintext)
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Overly Permissive Credential Access Control
  • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Jenkins Misconfigurations [CRITICAL NODE]
    • OR - Insecure Security Settings [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Weak Authentication Mechanisms
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Overly Permissive Authorization Matrix
    • OR - [HIGH RISK PATH] Exposed Sensitive Information [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Publicly Accessible Jenkins Instance (without proper hardening)
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] Information Disclosure via Jenkins API/Endpoints

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Jenkins Instance [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vectors: * Exploit Jenkins Software Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]: * Exploit Unpatched Jenkins Instance [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Attackers target known vulnerabilities (CVEs) in outdated Jenkins core versions. Publicly available exploits make this attack easy to execute if patching is delayed. * Mitigation: Implement a rigorous patch management process for Jenkins. Regularly update to the latest stable version and subscribe to security advisories. Use vulnerability scanners to identify unpatched instances. * Brute Force/Credential Stuffing Jenkins Login [CRITICAL NODE]: * Weak Password Policy [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Attackers attempt to guess passwords or use credential stuffing attacks (using leaked credentials from other breaches) against Jenkins login pages. Weak password policies make brute-forcing feasible. * Mitigation: Enforce strong password policies (complexity, length, rotation). Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all Jenkins users, especially administrators. Implement account lockout and rate limiting for login attempts. * Exploit Unsecured Jenkins API [CRITICAL NODE]: * Missing Authentication/Authorization Checks [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Attackers exploit Jenkins API endpoints that lack proper authentication or authorization. This allows unauthorized access to Jenkins functionalities, potentially leading to command execution, data extraction, or configuration changes. * Mitigation: Enforce authentication and authorization for all Jenkins API endpoints. Use API tokens with appropriate permissions. Implement Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) for API access. Monitor API activity for anomalies. * Social Engineering/Phishing Jenkins Admins: * Gain Admin Credentials [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Attackers use phishing emails, social engineering tactics, or other methods to trick Jenkins administrators into revealing their credentials. Compromised admin credentials grant full control over Jenkins. * Mitigation: Conduct regular security awareness training for Jenkins administrators and users, focusing on phishing and social engineering. Implement strong email security measures.

Attack Tree Path: Pipeline Manipulation [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vectors: * Compromise Source Code Repository (Used by Jenkins) [CRITICAL NODE]: * Steal VCS Credentials [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Attackers steal credentials used by Jenkins to access the source code repository (e.g., GitHub, GitLab). This can be achieved through phishing, malware, or exploiting vulnerabilities in systems where credentials are stored. Stolen VCS credentials allow attackers to modify the source code. * Mitigation: Secure VCS credentials used by Jenkins. Use dedicated credential management plugins. Rotate credentials regularly. Implement strong access controls and audit logging for VCS access. * Manipulate Jenkinsfile/Pipeline Definition [CRITICAL NODE]: * Gain Access to Jenkins Configuration [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Attackers gain access to Jenkins configuration (e.g., through compromised accounts or vulnerabilities) and modify Jenkinsfile or pipeline definitions. This allows them to alter the build and deployment process. * Mitigation: Control access to Jenkins configuration and pipeline definitions using RBAC. Implement version control for Jenkinsfiles and treat them as code. Implement code review for pipeline changes. * Exploit Insufficient Pipeline Security [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities arising from insecure pipeline scripting practices, such as lack of input validation or insecure use of shell commands within pipelines. This can lead to code injection or pipeline hijacking. * Mitigation: Implement secure pipeline scripting practices. Sanitize inputs in pipeline scripts. Use parameterized builds carefully. Avoid executing untrusted code directly in pipelines. Implement pipeline security scanning. * Inject Malicious Code during Build Process [CRITICAL NODE]: * Compromise Build Dependencies (e.g., Dependency Confusion) [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Attackers leverage dependency confusion attacks to trick Jenkins into downloading and using malicious dependencies from attacker-controlled repositories instead of legitimate ones. This injects malicious code into the build process. * Mitigation: Implement dependency scanning and Software Composition Analysis (SCA) to detect and manage dependencies. Use private package registries or repository managers to control dependency sources. Verify dependency integrity using checksums or signatures. * Inject Malicious Scripts in Pipeline [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Attackers inject malicious scripts directly into the Jenkins pipeline configuration or Jenkinsfile. These scripts are executed during the build process, allowing for code injection, credential theft, or other malicious actions. * Mitigation: Implement pipeline code review and security scanning. Restrict modification access to pipeline configurations. Sanitize inputs used in pipeline scripts.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Jenkins Plugins [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vectors: * Identify Vulnerable Jenkins Plugin [CRITICAL NODE]: * Exploit Known Plugin Vulnerability (CVE) [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Attackers identify and exploit known vulnerabilities (CVEs) in installed Jenkins plugins. Plugin vulnerabilities are common, and outdated or vulnerable plugins can provide entry points for attackers to compromise Jenkins. * Mitigation: Implement a plugin update management process. Regularly review and update Jenkins plugins. Use plugin vulnerability scanners to identify vulnerable plugins. Only install necessary plugins from trusted sources.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Jenkins Credentials/Secrets Management [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vectors: * Retrieve Stored Credentials in Jenkins [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack: Attackers attempt to retrieve credentials stored within Jenkins. This could involve exploiting vulnerabilities in credential storage plugins or accessing unencrypted credential data in Jenkins configuration files. * Mitigation: Use secure credential storage mechanisms provided by Jenkins (e.g., Credentials Plugin with encryption). Avoid storing credentials in plaintext in Jenkins configuration or pipeline scripts. Implement access controls for credentials. * Exploit Weak Credential Management Practices [CRITICAL NODE]: * Credentials Stored in Pipeline Scripts (plaintext) [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Developers or administrators mistakenly store credentials directly in pipeline scripts in plaintext. This makes credentials easily accessible to anyone who can view the pipeline definition. * Mitigation: Prohibit storing credentials in plaintext in pipeline scripts. Enforce the use of Jenkins' credential management system. Implement code review and static analysis to detect plaintext credentials in pipelines. * Overly Permissive Credential Access Control [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Jenkins is misconfigured with overly permissive access control for credentials. This allows unauthorized users or pipelines to access sensitive credentials. * Mitigation: Implement the principle of least privilege for credential access. Regularly review and audit credential access permissions. Use RBAC to restrict credential access based on roles and responsibilities.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Jenkins Misconfigurations [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vectors: * Insecure Security Settings [CRITICAL NODE]: * Weak Authentication Mechanisms [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Jenkins is configured with weak authentication mechanisms that are easily bypassed or brute-forced. This weakens the overall security posture and makes credential compromise easier. * Mitigation: Enforce strong authentication mechanisms. Use a robust security realm (e.g., LDAP, Active Directory). Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA). * Overly Permissive Authorization Matrix [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Jenkins authorization matrix is misconfigured with overly permissive permissions, granting users or roles more access than necessary. This can lead to unauthorized actions and potential escalation of privileges. * Mitigation: Implement a restrictive authorization matrix based on the principle of least privilege. Regularly review and audit authorization settings. Use RBAC to manage permissions effectively. * Exposed Sensitive Information [CRITICAL NODE]: * Publicly Accessible Jenkins Instance (without proper hardening) [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: The Jenkins instance is publicly accessible without proper hardening or network segmentation. This exposes the Jenkins interface and potentially sensitive information to the internet, making it a target for attackers. * Mitigation: Harden the Jenkins instance according to security best practices. Place Jenkins behind a firewall or VPN to restrict public access. Implement network segmentation to isolate Jenkins within a secure network zone. * Information Disclosure via Jenkins API/Endpoints [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack: Vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in Jenkins API endpoints or other web interfaces lead to information disclosure, potentially revealing sensitive data such as configuration details, build logs, or even credentials. * Mitigation: Regularly review Jenkins configurations and API endpoints to prevent information disclosure vulnerabilities. Implement proper access controls for API endpoints. Sanitize API responses to avoid leaking sensitive information.