Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
68 lines (54 loc) · 3.92 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

68 lines (54 loc) · 3.92 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for jodaorg/joda-time

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code via Joda-Time Deserialization

Attack Tree Visualization

Attacker's Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code via Joda-Time Deserialization | ----------------------------------------------------------------- | 1. Exploit Deserialization Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK] | --------------------------- | 1.1. Untrusted Data Input [CRITICAL] | 1.1.1. Direct Deserialization [CRITICAL] | 1.1.2. Indirect Deserialization | 1.1.3. Via 3rd Party Library

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Deserialization Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK]

  • Description: This is the primary attack path. The attacker leverages vulnerabilities in how Joda-Time (or libraries using it) handles the deserialization of Java objects. When untrusted data is deserialized, it can lead to the execution of arbitrary code.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Very High (Complete system compromise)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Untrusted Data Input [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is the essential starting point. The attacker needs to provide data that the application will deserialize. This data is considered "untrusted" because it originates from a source the application cannot fully control (e.g., user input, external API, network request).
    • Likelihood: High
    • Impact: N/A (This is a prerequisite, not an attack itself)
    • Effort: Very Low
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Easy

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. Direct Deserialization [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The application explicitly uses Java's ObjectInputStream (or a similar mechanism) to deserialize data that contains Joda-Time objects (like DateTime, Interval, etc.) directly from an untrusted source. This is the most obvious and dangerous form of deserialization vulnerability. The attacker crafts a serialized object containing a "gadget chain" that, when deserialized, executes their code.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2. Indirect Deserialization

  • Description: The application uses a higher-level library or framework (e.g., a message queue, caching system, ORM) that internally performs deserialization. The application developer might not be aware that deserialization is happening, making this a more subtle vulnerability. The attacker provides input to the application, which is then passed to the vulnerable library, triggering the deserialization exploit.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3. Via 3rd Party Library

  • Description: A library used by the application (a dependency) itself contains a deserialization vulnerability related to Joda-Time. The application is vulnerable transitively through its dependency. The attacker exploits the vulnerability in the third-party library by providing input to the main application, which then gets processed by the vulnerable library.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: High
    • Skill Level: Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard