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Threat Model Analysis for jodaorg/joda-time

Threat: Remote Code Execution via Deserialization

Threat: Remote Code Execution via Deserialization

  • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious serialized Joda-Time object (e.g., a specially constructed DateTime or other class) and sends it to the application. If the application deserializes this object from an untrusted source without proper validation, it can trigger the execution of arbitrary code embedded within the malicious object. This exploits vulnerabilities in how certain Joda-Time classes handle the Java deserialization process.
  • Impact: Complete compromise of the application server. The attacker gains the ability to execute any command, steal data, modify the application, or use the server for further attacks (e.g., launching attacks against other systems). This is the most severe possible outcome.
  • Affected Joda-Time Component: Java Serialization mechanism, specifically affecting older versions (pre-2.9.5, but always check the latest release notes and security advisories). Vulnerable classes can include, but are not limited to: org.joda.time.tz.UTCProvider, org.joda.time.tz.DateTimeZoneBuilder$PrecalculatedZone. Custom serialization routines using Joda-Time objects are also at risk.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid Java Deserialization of Untrusted Data: The absolute best mitigation is to completely avoid deserializing Joda-Time objects that originate from untrusted sources (user input, external APIs, untrusted databases, etc.). This eliminates the vulnerability entirely.
    • Upgrade Joda-Time (Necessary but Insufficient): If deserialization is absolutely unavoidable, upgrade to the very latest version of Joda-Time. However, even the latest version may contain undiscovered deserialization vulnerabilities. Therefore, upgrading is a necessary but not sufficient mitigation on its own.
    • Strict Whitelist-Based Deserialization (If Unavoidable): If deserialization of Joda-Time objects from untrusted sources is completely unavoidable, implement a very strict whitelist of allowed classes that can be deserialized. This whitelist should be as restrictive as humanly possible, including only the absolutely essential Joda-Time classes. This requires a deep understanding of the application's code and data flow. Any unknown or unnecessary class should be excluded.
    • Use Safer Serialization Formats: Instead of Java serialization, use a safer serialization format like JSON (with a library that handles type information securely and explicitly, avoiding generic object mapping) or Protocol Buffers. These formats are significantly less prone to deserialization vulnerabilities.
    • Input Validation (Not a Primary Defense): While input validation is a good general security practice, it is not a reliable defense against deserialization attacks. Attackers can often craft malicious payloads that bypass input validation checks. It should be considered a supplementary measure, not a primary defense.