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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for keycloak/keycloak

Threat: Threat: Authentication Bypass via Malformed Redirect URI

  • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious redirect URI that, when used in an authorization code flow, allows them to intercept the authorization code. The attacker could register a domain similar to a legitimate one or exploit a vulnerability on client's side. They then trick a legitimate user into initiating the authentication flow with the malicious URI.
  • Impact: The attacker obtains the authorization code, which they can then exchange for an access token, impersonating the legitimate user and gaining unauthorized access to protected resources. This could lead to data breaches, unauthorized actions, and complete account takeover.
  • Affected Keycloak Component: Keycloak Authorization Endpoint (/auth/realms/{realm}/protocol/openid-connect/auth), Client Registration and Configuration (specifically, the allowed redirect URIs).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Redirect URI Validation: Configure Keycloak to strictly validate redirect URIs against a whitelist of exact URLs (not just domain matching). Avoid using wildcards.
    • Use PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange): Always use PKCE for all clients, even confidential ones. PKCE adds an extra layer of security that prevents authorization code interception attacks even if the redirect URI is compromised.

Threat: Threat: Token Forgery via Weak Signing Key

  • Description: An attacker gains access to the Keycloak server's signing key (either through a server compromise, misconfiguration, or weak key generation) or discovers that a weak signing algorithm (like none or a weak HMAC key) is being used. They can then forge JWTs with arbitrary claims, impersonating any user or granting themselves elevated privileges.
  • Impact: Complete system compromise. The attacker can bypass all authentication and authorization checks, gaining full access to all protected resources and potentially the Keycloak Admin Console.
  • Affected Keycloak Component: Keycloak Token Generation (/auth/realms/{realm}/protocol/openid-connect/token), Key Management (specifically, the active signing key for the realm).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Strong Asymmetric Keys: Use strong asymmetric algorithms like RS256 (RSA with SHA-256) or ES256 (ECDSA with SHA-256). Never use the none algorithm.
    • Secure Key Storage: Store signing keys securely, ideally using a Hardware Security Module (HSM) or a Key Management Service (KMS). Protect the Keycloak server from unauthorized access.
    • Regular Key Rotation: Implement a regular key rotation policy. Keycloak supports key rotation.

Threat: Threat: Privilege Escalation via Role Mapper Manipulation

  • Description: An attacker with limited access to the Keycloak Admin Console (or through a compromised user account with some administrative privileges) manipulates role mappers to grant themselves higher privileges. They might add themselves to a privileged group or modify existing mappers.
  • Impact: The attacker gains unauthorized access to sensitive resources or administrative functions within the application or Keycloak itself. This could lead to data breaches, system configuration changes, or denial of service.
  • Affected Keycloak Component: Keycloak Admin Console (specifically, the Role Mappers section within Client or Realm settings), User Management.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Strictly limit access to the Keycloak Admin Console. Grant users only the minimum necessary permissions.
    • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Require MFA for all Keycloak administrator accounts.
    • Auditing: Enable detailed auditing of all changes made within the Keycloak Admin Console, including role mapper modifications. Regularly review audit logs.
    • Separation of Duties: Implement separation of duties, requiring multiple administrators to approve sensitive changes.

Threat: Threat: Denial of Service via Authentication Request Flooding

  • Description: An attacker floods the Keycloak server with a large number of authentication requests, overwhelming its resources (CPU, memory, database connections) and making it unavailable to legitimate users.
  • Impact: Legitimate users are unable to authenticate, causing service disruption and potential business losses.
  • Affected Keycloak Component: Keycloak Authorization Endpoint (/auth/realms/{realm}/protocol/openid-connect/auth), Token Endpoint (/auth/realms/{realm}/protocol/openid-connect/token), Userinfo Endpoint, and potentially the database.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on all Keycloak endpoints, especially the authentication and token endpoints. Limit the number of requests per IP address, user, or client.
    • Resource Monitoring: Monitor Keycloak server resources and set alerts for unusual activity.
    • Scalable Infrastructure: Deploy Keycloak in a scalable environment (e.g., using a cluster) to handle increased load.

Threat: Threat: Session Hijacking via Insufficient Session Invalidation

  • Description: An attacker gains access to a user's session ID and uses it to impersonate the user. This is facilitated if Keycloak doesn't properly invalidate sessions on logout, password changes, or other security-sensitive events.
  • Impact: The attacker gains unauthorized access to the user's account and can perform actions on their behalf.
  • Affected Keycloak Component: Keycloak Session Management, Logout Endpoint (/auth/realms/{realm}/protocol/openid-connect/logout), User Account Management.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Proper Session Invalidation: Ensure that Keycloak sessions are properly invalidated on logout, password changes, and other relevant events.
    • Short Session Lifetimes: Use short session lifetimes and require users to re-authenticate frequently.
    • Secure Cookies: Use secure cookies (HttpOnly, Secure flags) to protect session IDs.
    • Session Rotation: Rotate session IDs after successful authentication.

Threat: Threat: Unpatched Keycloak Vulnerabilities (High/Critical CVEs)

  • Description: An attacker exploits a known, but unpatched, high or critical severity vulnerability in the Keycloak server software or its dependencies. This focuses specifically on vulnerabilities with a high CVSS score that directly impact Keycloak's core functionality.
  • Impact: The impact varies depending on the specific vulnerability, but could range from significant data breaches to complete system compromise, allowing for unauthorized access, data modification, or denial of service.
  • Affected Keycloak Component: Potentially any component of Keycloak, depending on the vulnerability.
  • Risk Severity: High/Critical (depending on the specific CVE)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regular Updates: Immediately apply security patches for Keycloak and its dependencies when they are released, prioritizing high and critical severity vulnerabilities. Subscribe to Keycloak security announcements.
    • Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan the Keycloak server for known vulnerabilities.
    • Penetration Testing: Conduct periodic penetration testing.