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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for lmax-exchange/disruptor

Attack Surface: Vulnerable Event Handler Logic Exploited via Disruptor

  • Description: Security vulnerabilities within the application's EventHandler implementations are directly exposed and potentially amplified by the Disruptor's high-throughput event processing. While the vulnerability is in the handler code, Disruptor provides the efficient mechanism for attackers to trigger these vulnerabilities at scale.
    • Disruptor Contribution: Disruptor's core function is to rapidly deliver events to handlers. This efficiency means that if handlers are vulnerable, Disruptor facilitates the rapid exploitation of those vulnerabilities by processing a high volume of malicious events quickly.
    • Example: An EventHandler susceptible to SQL injection processes events from the Disruptor. An attacker publishes a flood of events containing SQL injection payloads. Disruptor rapidly feeds these events to the vulnerable handler, leading to a large-scale SQL injection attack.
    • Impact: Data breach, data modification, unauthorized access, denial of service, remote code execution (depending on the specific vulnerability in the handler).
    • Risk Severity: Critical to High (depending on the vulnerability type and sensitivity of processed data).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure EventHandler Development: Implement rigorous secure coding practices within all EventHandler implementations, including input validation, output encoding, and parameterized queries.
      • Security-Focused Code Reviews: Conduct thorough code reviews of EventHandler logic with a strong focus on identifying potential security vulnerabilities.
      • Automated Security Testing: Integrate static and dynamic analysis security testing into the development pipeline to automatically detect vulnerabilities in EventHandler code.

Attack Surface: Deserialization Attacks via Disruptor Event Stream (If Serialization Used)

  • Description: If the application design involves serialization of events within the Disruptor pipeline (e.g., for inter-process communication or persistence), vulnerabilities in deserialization processes become a critical attack surface. Disruptor then becomes the conduit for delivering malicious serialized data to vulnerable deserialization points.
    • Disruptor Contribution: Disruptor can be used to transport serialized event data efficiently. If deserialization occurs within EventHandlers or components processing events from the Disruptor, the library effectively delivers potentially malicious serialized payloads to these vulnerable points.
    • Example: Events are serialized using Java serialization and placed in the Disruptor RingBuffer. An attacker injects a malicious serialized Java object into the event stream. When an EventHandler deserializes this object, it triggers a Java deserialization vulnerability, leading to remote code execution.
    • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), complete system compromise, data breach.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (due to potential for Remote Code Execution).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Avoid Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Disruptor Pipeline: Minimize or eliminate deserialization of data originating from untrusted sources within the Disruptor event processing flow.
      • Use Secure Serialization Alternatives: If serialization is necessary, prefer safer formats like JSON or Protocol Buffers over inherently vulnerable formats like Java serialization.
      • Input Validation Post-Deserialization: If deserialization is unavoidable, implement strict input validation and sanitization on the deserialized data within EventHandlers before further processing.
      • Regularly Update Serialization Libraries: Keep all serialization/deserialization libraries updated to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Ring Buffer Starvation leading to Denial of Service

  • Description: A maliciously small RingBuffer configuration, combined with an attacker's ability to flood the system with events, can lead to RingBuffer starvation. This causes producers to be blocked, effectively halting event processing and resulting in a denial of service.
    • Disruptor Contribution: The RingBuffer is a core, configurable component of Disruptor. Its size directly dictates the system's capacity to buffer events. A misconfiguration (too small) directly creates a vulnerability to DoS attacks by making it easier to overwhelm the buffer.
    • Example: The RingBuffer is configured with a minimal size. An attacker initiates a high-volume event stream targeting the application. The small RingBuffer quickly becomes full, blocking producer threads and preventing the application from processing legitimate events, leading to a DoS.
    • Impact: Denial of Service (DoS), application unavailability, service disruption.
    • Risk Severity: High (due to potential for significant service disruption).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Perform Accurate Capacity Planning for RingBuffer: Thoroughly analyze expected event throughput and system load to determine an appropriately sized RingBuffer.
      • Implement Load Shedding and Rate Limiting (Producers): Implement mechanisms to shed load or rate limit event producers to prevent overwhelming the RingBuffer, especially during potential attacks.
      • Monitoring and Alerting for RingBuffer Saturation: Monitor RingBuffer occupancy levels and set up alerts to detect situations where the RingBuffer is consistently near full capacity, indicating potential DoS attempts or misconfiguration.

Attack Surface: Potential Undisclosed Vulnerabilities in Disruptor Library

  • Description: Like any software library, Disruptor itself might contain undiscovered security vulnerabilities that could be exploited. While less likely due to its maturity, this remains a potential attack surface for applications relying on it.
    • Disruptor Contribution: Applications directly depend on the Disruptor library for core event processing functionality. Any vulnerability within the library directly impacts all applications using it.
    • Example: A hypothetical critical vulnerability is discovered in Disruptor's RingBuffer concurrency control mechanism, allowing for memory corruption or remote code execution. Applications using vulnerable versions of Disruptor become immediately susceptible to this exploit.
    • Impact: Potentially wide range of impacts, including Remote Code Execution (RCE), Denial of Service (DoS), data breaches, depending on the nature of the hypothetical vulnerability.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (potential for critical impact if a severe vulnerability is found).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Maintain Up-to-Date Disruptor Library: Always use the latest stable version of the Disruptor library to benefit from security patches and bug fixes.
      • Proactive Vulnerability Monitoring: Actively monitor security advisories and vulnerability databases for any reported issues related to the Disruptor library.
      • Include Disruptor in Security Audits and Dependency Scanning: Incorporate the Disruptor library into regular security audits and dependency scanning processes to identify and address any potential vulnerabilities proactively.