attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for macrozheng/mall

Attack Surface: 1. JWT Authentication and Authorization

• Description: Attacks targeting the JSON Web Token (JWT) based authentication and authorization mechanism.
  • How mall Contributes: mall uses JWT extensively for user authentication and session management. The entire security model relies on the correct implementation and handling of JWTs within mall's codebase.
  • Example: An attacker forges a JWT with an administrator role by exploiting a weak signing key hardcoded within mall or a vulnerability in mall's JWT validation logic.
  • Impact: Complete system compromise, unauthorized access to all data and functionality, potential data breaches, and financial loss.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Use a well-vetted and up-to-date JWT library (e.g., jjwt).
      • Implement strict validation of all standard JWT claims (signature, exp, nbf, iss, aud) within mall's authentication filters and related code.
      • Use strong, randomly generated secrets (HS256 or stronger) and store them securely (e.g., environment variables, a secrets vault, never hardcoded in mall's repository).
      • Implement robust secret rotation procedures within mall.
      • Consider short token lifetimes (e.g., 15-30 minutes) and use refresh tokens for longer sessions. Implement refresh token revocation within mall.
      • Thoroughly test all authentication and authorization flows within mall, including edge cases and error handling.
      • Implement rate limiting and account lockout within mall's login and password reset functionality to prevent brute-force attacks.

Attack Surface: 2. RBAC Implementation Flaws

• Description: Vulnerabilities arising from incorrect or incomplete Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) configuration or logic within mall.
  • How mall Contributes: mall implements a custom RBAC system to manage access to different administrative functions and resources. The correctness of this implementation within mall's code is crucial.
  • Example: A user with a "product manager" role is able to access order management functions due to a misconfigured permission assignment within mall's code.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data or functionality, potential data modification or deletion, disruption of service.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Adhere strictly to the principle of least privilege within mall's code. Grant only the minimum necessary permissions to each role.
      • Thoroughly review and test the RBAC implementation within mall, including all permission assignments and checks in the code.
      • Use a well-defined and documented authorization framework (Spring Security is used, but its configuration within mall is key).
      • Implement comprehensive unit and integration tests within mall to verify RBAC enforcement.
      • Regularly audit the RBAC configuration and user roles as defined within mall.

Attack Surface: 3. Order Management Manipulation

• Description: Attacks that attempt to modify order details (quantities, prices, addresses) after placement, potentially exploiting race conditions or insufficient validation within mall.
  • How mall Contributes: The core functionality of mall revolves around order processing. This makes order management, as implemented in mall's code, a prime target.
  • Example: An attacker intercepts an order update request and modifies the quantity of an item to a negative value, potentially causing a system error or financial loss, exploiting a vulnerability in mall's order processing logic.
  • Impact: Financial loss, fraud, data corruption, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Implement strong server-side validation of all order data before processing any changes within mall's order management services. This includes validating quantities, prices, addresses, and any other relevant parameters.
      • Use atomic operations or database transactions within mall's code to prevent race conditions during order updates.
      • Maintain a detailed audit log of all order modifications within mall, including the user who made the change, the timestamp, and the old and new values.
      • Implement input sanitization and output encoding within mall's order processing code to prevent injection attacks.

Attack Surface: 4. Database Interactions (Beyond Generic SQLi)

• Description: Vulnerabilities related to how mall interacts with its databases, focusing on data exposure through APIs and potential ORM-specific issues within mall's code.
  • How mall Contributes: mall uses multiple databases and relies heavily on database interactions for its core functionality. MyBatis is used as the ORM, and its usage within mall is the key concern.
  • Example: An API endpoint within mall intended to return a list of products inadvertently exposes internal database IDs or other sensitive information. A MyBatis dynamic SQL statement within mall is vulnerable to a subtle injection attack.
  • Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized data access, potential system compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Design APIs within mall to expose only the minimum necessary data. Use Data Transfer Objects (DTOs) to control the shape of API responses and avoid exposing internal database structures.
      • Implement strict authorization checks for all API endpoints within mall, ensuring that users can only access data they are authorized to see.
      • Avoid using dynamic SQL in MyBatis within mall where possible. If dynamic SQL is necessary, use parameterized queries or prepared statements to prevent injection vulnerabilities.
      • Thoroughly review all MyBatis XML mapper files within mall for potential injection vulnerabilities.
      • Regularly audit database queries and API responses generated by mall for sensitive data exposure.