Mitigation Strategy: Enforce Parameterized Queries in MyBatis
-
Description:
- Review All MyBatis Mappers: Examine all XML mapper files (
.xml
) and Java code using MyBatis annotations (@Select
,@Update
, etc.) within themall
project. - Identify String Concatenation: Locate any instances where SQL queries are built using string concatenation, especially involving user-supplied input. This includes direct concatenation (
+
in Java, string interpolation in XML) and the use of${}
in MyBatis. - Replace with Parameterized Placeholders: Replace all instances of string concatenation with parameterized placeholders. In MyBatis XML, use
#{parameterName}
. In Java annotations, pass parameters as method arguments and use#{parameterName}
in the SQL string. - Pass Parameters Correctly: Ensure that parameters are passed to MyBatis as Java objects, Maps, or primitive types. MyBatis will then handle the proper escaping and type conversion.
- Dynamic SQL Handling: For dynamic SQL sections (using
<if>
,<choose>
,<where>
,<foreach>
) withinmall
's MyBatis mappers, ensure that no user input is directly embedded within the SQL fragments. All user-supplied values must be passed as parameters using#{}
. - Testing: Thoroughly test all database interactions within
mall
, including edge cases and invalid input, to confirm that SQL injection is not possible.
- Review All MyBatis Mappers: Examine all XML mapper files (
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- SQL Injection: (Severity: Critical) - Prevents attackers from injecting malicious SQL code to access, modify, or delete data within the
mall
database. - Data Breach: (Severity: Critical) - Directly related to SQL Injection, preventing unauthorized access to
mall
's customer data. - Application Takeover: (Severity: Critical) - In severe cases, SQL injection can lead to complete takeover of the
mall
application.
- SQL Injection: (Severity: Critical) - Prevents attackers from injecting malicious SQL code to access, modify, or delete data within the
-
Impact:
- SQL Injection: Risk reduced to Near Zero if implemented correctly and consistently within
mall
. - Data Breach: Risk significantly reduced, directly proportional to the reduction in SQL injection risk within
mall
. - Application Takeover: Risk significantly reduced, as SQL injection is a common pathway to full control of
mall
.
- SQL Injection: Risk reduced to Near Zero if implemented correctly and consistently within
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially Implemented: Parameterized queries are sometimes used within
mall
's MyBatis mappers, but inconsistencies and potential vulnerabilities likely exist, especially in dynamic SQL.
- Partially Implemented: Parameterized queries are sometimes used within
-
Missing Implementation:
- Dynamic SQL Sections: The dynamic SQL sections of
mall
's MyBatis mappers are the most likely areas for missing implementation. - Consistency Across All Mappers: A project-wide audit of
mall
is needed to ensure all mappers adhere to the parameterized query approach.
- Dynamic SQL Sections: The dynamic SQL sections of
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Comprehensive XSS Protection in mall
-
Description:
- Identify User Input Points: Identify all locations within
mall
where user input is accepted (e.g., product descriptions, reviews, search fields, user profiles). - Input Validation (Whitelist): For each input field in
mall
, define a strict whitelist of allowed characters and patterns. Reject any input that doesn't conform to the whitelist. - Output Encoding (Context-Specific): Before displaying any user-supplied data within
mall
, encode it appropriately for the context:- HTML Context: Use
Encode.forHtml()
from OWASP Java Encoder. - JavaScript Context: Use
Encode.forJavaScript()
. - URL Context: Use
Encode.forUriComponent()
. - Attribute Context: Use
Encode.forHtmlAttribute()
.
- HTML Context: Use
- Rich Text Sanitization (if applicable): If
mall
allows rich text (HTML) input, use a library like OWASP Java HTML Sanitizer to remove dangerous tags and attributes. - Testing: Thoroughly test all areas within
mall
where user input is displayed, using various XSS payloads.
- Identify User Input Points: Identify all locations within
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): (Severity: High) - Prevents attackers from injecting malicious JavaScript into the
mall
application. - Session Hijacking: (Severity: High) - XSS is often used to steal session cookies, leading to account takeover within
mall
. - Website Defacement: (Severity: Medium) - Attackers can use XSS to alter the appearance of the
mall
website. - Phishing Attacks: (Severity: High) - XSS can be used to redirect
mall
users to malicious websites or display fake login forms.
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): (Severity: High) - Prevents attackers from injecting malicious JavaScript into the
-
Impact:
- XSS: Risk significantly reduced, approaching Low with comprehensive implementation within
mall
. - Session Hijacking: Risk significantly reduced, as XSS is a primary attack vector within
mall
. - Website Defacement: Risk significantly reduced for
mall
. - Phishing Attacks: Risk significantly reduced for
mall
.
- XSS: Risk significantly reduced, approaching Low with comprehensive implementation within
-
Currently Implemented:
- Likely Partially Implemented: Some output encoding might be present in
mall
, but it's unlikely to be comprehensive and context-specific. Input validation likely exists but may not be strict (whitelist).
- Likely Partially Implemented: Some output encoding might be present in
-
Missing Implementation:
- Consistent Output Encoding: A project-wide review of
mall
is needed to ensure all output is properly encoded. - Strict Input Validation (Whitelist): Input validation in
mall
needs to be strengthened, moving towards a whitelist approach. - Rich Text Sanitization: If
mall
allows rich text, a sanitization library needs to be integrated.
- Consistent Output Encoding: A project-wide review of
Mitigation Strategy: Strengthen Authentication and Session Management in mall
-
Description:
- Review Spring Security Configuration: Thoroughly review
mall
's Spring Security configuration to ensure it aligns with best practices. - Cookie Security:
- Ensure the
HttpOnly
flag is set on allmall
session cookies. - Ensure the
Secure
flag is set on allmall
session cookies.
- Ensure the
- Session Fixation Protection: Verify that session fixation protection is enabled in
mall
's Spring Security configuration. - Password Storage:
- Verify that
mall
uses a strong, adaptive hashing algorithm (BCrypt, Argon2) for password storage. - Confirm that passwords are never stored in plain text or using weak algorithms.
- Verify that
- Password Policies: Enforce strong password requirements (length, complexity) within
mall
. - Account Lockout: Implement account lockout after a configured number of failed login attempts within
mall
. - Secure Password Reset: Implement a secure, token-based password reset mechanism within
mall
(unique, time-limited tokens sent via email). Invalidate old tokens. - Testing: Thoroughly test all authentication and session management features within
mall
.
- Review Spring Security Configuration: Thoroughly review
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Broken Authentication: (Severity: Critical) - Prevents attackers from bypassing
mall
's authentication. - Session Hijacking: (Severity: High) - Protects against session hijacking in
mall
. - Brute-Force Attacks: (Severity: Medium) - Account lockout mitigates brute-force attacks against
mall
's login. - Credential Stuffing: (Severity: Medium) - Strong password policies and hashing in
mall
make credential stuffing less effective. - Weak Password Reset: (Severity: High) - Secure password reset in
mall
prevents easy account access.
- Broken Authentication: (Severity: Critical) - Prevents attackers from bypassing
-
Impact:
- All listed threats are significantly reduced by implementing these changes within
mall
.
- All listed threats are significantly reduced by implementing these changes within
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially Implemented:
mall
likely uses Spring Security, but configuration and best practices need verification. Password hashing is likely used, but the algorithm and strength need confirmation. Cookie security flags may not be consistently set.
- Partially Implemented:
-
Missing Implementation:
- Consistent Cookie Security: Ensure
HttpOnly
andSecure
flags are set on allmall
session cookies. - Session Fixation Protection: Verify enablement.
- Robust Password Reset: Implement a secure, token-based password reset.
- Account Lockout: Implement account lockout.
- Consistent Cookie Security: Ensure
Mitigation Strategy: Prevent Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in mall
-
Description:
- Identify Sensitive Resources: Identify all resources within
mall
that should be protected (orders, user profiles, product details, etc.). - Access Control Checks (Business Logic Layer): Implement access control checks before any operation on a sensitive resource within
mall
.- Verify the logged-in user has permissions to access the specific object (based on user ID, role, ownership).
- Perform these checks in
mall
's service layer (business logic), not just controllers.
- Spring Security Annotations: Use
@PreAuthorize
and@PostAuthorize
annotations withinmall
's service layer to enforce authorization rules at the method level. Example:@PreAuthorize("hasRole('ADMIN') or #order.userId == principal.id")
- Testing: Thoroughly test all access control logic within
mall
.
- Identify Sensitive Resources: Identify all resources within
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR): (Severity: High) - Prevents attackers from accessing or modifying data belonging to other users within
mall
. - Unauthorized Data Access: (Severity: High) - Directly related to IDOR, preventing unauthorized access to sensitive information within
mall
. - Data Modification: (Severity: High) - Prevents unauthorized modification of data within
mall
.
- Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR): (Severity: High) - Prevents attackers from accessing or modifying data belonging to other users within
-
Impact:
- All listed threats are significantly reduced by implementing these changes within
mall
.
- All listed threats are significantly reduced by implementing these changes within
-
Currently Implemented:
- Likely Partially Implemented: Some access control is likely present in
mall
, but it may be incomplete or inconsistent. The use of@PreAuthorize
and@PostAuthorize
needs verification and expansion.
- Likely Partially Implemented: Some access control is likely present in
-
Missing Implementation:
- Consistent Access Control Checks: A project-wide review of
mall
is needed to ensure all sensitive resources are protected by proper access control checks in the business logic. - Comprehensive Use of
@PreAuthorize
and@PostAuthorize
: Expand the use of these annotations withinmall
.
- Consistent Access Control Checks: A project-wide review of
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Handling of File Uploads in mall
(if applicable)
-
Description:
- Identify Upload Points: Determine where file uploads are allowed within
mall
(e.g., product images). - File Type Validation (Whitelist):
- Validate the file type based on content, not just extension or MIME type, within
mall
's upload handling logic. - Use a whitelist of allowed file types.
- Validate the file type based on content, not just extension or MIME type, within
- File Name Sanitization:
- Generate a new, unique file name on the server (e.g., using a UUID) within
mall
. - Store the original file name separately if needed.
- Remove or replace dangerous characters from the file name within
mall
.
- Generate a new, unique file name on the server (e.g., using a UUID) within
- File Size Limits: Enforce strict file size limits within
mall
's upload handling. - Storage Location:
- Store uploaded files outside the web root directory used by
mall
. - Serve files through a dedicated controller in
mall
that performs access control checks.
- Store uploaded files outside the web root directory used by
- Testing: Thoroughly test file upload functionality within
mall
.
- Identify Upload Points: Determine where file uploads are allowed within
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- File Path Traversal: (Severity: High) - Prevents attackers from uploading files to arbitrary locations on the server hosting
mall
. - Execution of Malicious Files: (Severity: Critical) - Prevents attackers from uploading and executing malicious scripts on the server hosting
mall
. - Denial of Service (DoS): (Severity: Medium) - File size limits mitigate DoS attacks against
mall
. - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): (Severity: High) - If uploaded files are displayed by
mall
, proper handling prevents XSS.
- File Path Traversal: (Severity: High) - Prevents attackers from uploading files to arbitrary locations on the server hosting
-
Impact:
- All listed threats are significantly reduced by implementing these changes within
mall
.
- All listed threats are significantly reduced by implementing these changes within
-
Currently Implemented:
- Unknown: Requires review of
mall
's code to determine if and how file uploads are handled.
- Unknown: Requires review of
-
Missing Implementation:
- All aspects need verification: If file uploads are present in
mall
, all of the above steps need implementation and testing.
- All aspects need verification: If file uploads are present in
Mitigation Strategy: Address Business Logic Vulnerabilities in mall
-
Description:
- Identify Critical Business Processes: Identify all critical business processes within
mall
(order placement, checkout, payment, coupon redemption, etc.). - Server-Side Validation:
- Re-validate all critical data (prices, quantities, discounts, user input) on the server-side before processing any transaction within
mall
. - Never trust client-side input or calculations within
mall
.
- Re-validate all critical data (prices, quantities, discounts, user input) on the server-side before processing any transaction within
- Atomic Operations:
- Use database transactions and appropriate locking mechanisms (optimistic or pessimistic locking) within
mall
's service layer to ensure critical operations are atomic and consistent.
- Use database transactions and appropriate locking mechanisms (optimistic or pessimistic locking) within
- Coupon Code Logic: Implement robust validation for coupon codes within
mall
(expiration, usage limits, product restrictions, minimum purchase). - Inventory Management: Implement robust inventory checks and prevent overselling within
mall
(database constraints or atomic operations). - Testing: Conduct thorough testing, including penetration testing and business logic testing, specifically targeting
mall
's e-commerce functionality.
- Identify Critical Business Processes: Identify all critical business processes within
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Price Manipulation: (Severity: High) - Server-side validation prevents attackers from changing prices within
mall
. - Inventory Manipulation: (Severity: High) - Robust checks and atomic operations prevent overselling in
mall
. - Coupon Code Abuse: (Severity: Medium) - Strong validation prevents unauthorized discounts in
mall
. - Race Conditions: (Severity: Medium) - Atomic operations and locking prevent race conditions in
mall
. - Other Business Logic Flaws: (Severity: Variable) - Thorough testing helps identify and address other flaws specific to
mall
.
- Price Manipulation: (Severity: High) - Server-side validation prevents attackers from changing prices within
-
Impact:
- All listed threats are significantly reduced by implementing these changes within
mall
.
- All listed threats are significantly reduced by implementing these changes within
-
Currently Implemented:
- Likely Partially Implemented: Some server-side validation likely exists in
mall
, but it may be incomplete. Atomic operations and locking may not be used consistently.
- Likely Partially Implemented: Some server-side validation likely exists in
-
Missing Implementation:
- Comprehensive Server-Side Validation: A project-wide review of
mall
is needed to ensure all critical data is re-validated. - Consistent Use of Atomic Operations: Ensure consistent use within
mall
's service layer. - Robust Coupon Code Logic: Implement comprehensive validation within
mall
. - Thorough Business Logic Testing: Conduct extensive testing of
mall
's e-commerce features.
- Comprehensive Server-Side Validation: A project-wide review of
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Logging and Error Handling within mall
-
Description:
- Log Levels: Configure appropriate log levels for
mall
in different environments (DEBUG for development, INFO/WARN for production). - Data Masking: Mask or sanitize sensitive data (passwords, tokens, PII) before logging within
mall
. This requires modifyingmall
's logging configuration and potentially custom log appenders. - Custom Error Handling:
- Implement custom error handlers within
mall
to display generic error messages to users. - Avoid exposing stack traces or internal error details in production deployments of
mall
. - Use Spring's
@ControllerAdvice
withinmall
for centralized error handling.
- Implement custom error handlers within
- Log Review: Regularly review
mall
's application logs.
- Log Levels: Configure appropriate log levels for
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Information Disclosure: (Severity: Medium) - Prevents sensitive information from being exposed in
mall
's logs or error messages. - Reconnaissance: (Severity: Low) - Reduces information available to attackers targeting
mall
.
- Information Disclosure: (Severity: Medium) - Prevents sensitive information from being exposed in
-
Impact:
- Information Disclosure: Risk significantly reduced with proper configuration and code changes within
mall
. - Reconnaissance: Risk reduced.
- Information Disclosure: Risk significantly reduced with proper configuration and code changes within
-
Currently Implemented:
- Likely Partially Implemented:
mall
likely has some logging, but data masking and custom error handling may be incomplete.
- Likely Partially Implemented:
-
Missing Implementation:
- Data Masking/Sanitization: Implement robust data masking within
mall
's logging. - Comprehensive Custom Error Handling: Ensure all errors within
mall
are handled gracefully.
- Data Masking/Sanitization: Implement robust data masking within