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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for mybatis/mybatis-3

Mitigation Strategy: Parameterized Queries (Using Placeholders)

Description:

  1. Identify all dynamic SQL queries in MyBatis mappers: Review your MyBatis mapper XML files and mapper interfaces to locate queries that incorporate user-provided input.
  2. Replace direct string concatenation with MyBatis placeholders: Ensure all dynamic SQL uses #{} syntax in XML mappers or @Param annotations in interface mappers for parameter substitution. Explicitly avoid using ${} syntax for user-provided input.
  3. Example (XML Mapper - Before - Vulnerable): SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '${username}'
  4. Example (XML Mapper - After - Secure): SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = #{username}
  5. Example (Interface Mapper - Before - Vulnerable): @Select("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '${username}'") List<User> getUserByUsername(@Param("username") String username);
  6. Example (Interface Mapper - After - Secure): @Select("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = #{username}") List<User> getUserByUsername(@Param("username") String username);
  7. Test MyBatis queries: After implementing parameterized queries, test all affected MyBatis mapper methods to confirm they function correctly and are protected against SQL injection.

List of Threats Mitigated:

  • SQL Injection (Severity: High) - Allows attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands through MyBatis, potentially leading to data breaches, data manipulation, and denial of service.

Impact:

  • SQL Injection: High Risk Reduction - Parameterized queries are the primary and most effective defense against SQL injection vulnerabilities within MyBatis.

Currently Implemented:

Partial - Implemented in most data retrieval and standard CRUD operations defined in UserMapper.xml and ProductMapper.xml.

Missing Implementation:

${} syntax is still present in dynamic filtering logic within AdminReportMapper.xml used for generating reports. This needs to be refactored to use parameterized queries or MyBatis' <bind> element for safe dynamic SQL construction.

Mitigation Strategy: Disable External Entity Processing in MyBatis XML Configuration

Description:

  1. Locate XML parsing configuration: Identify the code responsible for parsing MyBatis XML configuration files (mybatis-config.xml and mapper XMLs). This is typically done using DocumentBuilderFactory in Java.
  2. Disable external entities: Configure the DocumentBuilderFactory instance used by MyBatis to disable external entity processing by setting the following features to false:
    • factory.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
    • factory.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
    • factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd", false); (If DTD validation is not required and external DTD loading is possible)
  3. Apply to MyBatis XML parsing: Ensure these settings are applied specifically to the DocumentBuilderFactory instance used by MyBatis for parsing its configuration files.
  4. Verify MyBatis functionality: Test your application after disabling external entity processing to ensure MyBatis functions correctly and XML parsing is still successful without external entities.

List of Threats Mitigated:

  • XML External Entity (XXE) Injection (Severity: High) - Prevents attackers from exploiting XXE vulnerabilities through MyBatis XML configuration files to read local files, perform SSRF, or cause denial of service.

Impact:

  • XXE Injection: High Risk Reduction - Disabling external entity processing is the most direct and effective way to prevent XXE vulnerabilities in MyBatis XML configuration.

Currently Implemented:

Yes - External entity processing is disabled in the DocumentBuilderFactory configuration used specifically for parsing MyBatis XML files within the application's XML configuration loading utility class.

Missing Implementation:

No known missing implementation related to MyBatis XML parsing.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Custom MyBatis Type Handlers and Plugins

Description:

  1. Inventory custom MyBatis components: List all custom type handlers and MyBatis plugins developed and used in your project.
  2. Security review of custom code: Conduct a thorough security code review of each custom type handler and plugin. Focus on:
    • Deserialization safety: If type handlers deserialize data, ensure they are not vulnerable to insecure deserialization. Avoid deserializing untrusted data or use secure deserialization methods.
    • Injection vulnerabilities: Check for any potential injection points (e.g., command injection, code injection) within the custom code, especially if they process external input or interact with external systems.
    • Logic flaws: Review the business logic for any security-relevant flaws or unexpected behaviors that could be exploited.
  3. Apply secure coding practices: Ensure custom MyBatis components adhere to secure coding principles, including input validation (within the type handler if it processes external data), output encoding (if applicable), and least privilege.
  4. Dependency security: If custom components rely on external libraries, keep those dependencies updated and scan them for vulnerabilities.
  5. Testing custom components: Thoroughly test custom type handlers and plugins, including unit tests and integration tests, to verify their functionality and security. Consider security-focused testing like fuzzing or penetration testing for these components.

List of Threats Mitigated:

  • Deserialization Vulnerabilities (Severity: High) - Insecure deserialization in custom type handlers could lead to remote code execution within the MyBatis context.
  • Code Injection (Severity: High) - Poorly written custom code in type handlers or plugins could introduce code injection vulnerabilities exploitable through MyBatis.
  • Logic Bugs leading to Security Issues (Severity: Medium) - Logic errors in custom MyBatis components can create unexpected security loopholes within the application's data access layer.

Impact:

  • Deserialization Vulnerabilities: High Risk Reduction - Secure coding and avoiding insecure deserialization practices in custom type handlers significantly reduce this risk.
  • Code Injection: High Risk Reduction - Careful code review and secure coding practices are crucial to prevent code injection vulnerabilities in custom MyBatis components.
  • Logic Bugs leading to Security Issues: Medium Risk Reduction - Security-focused code review and testing help identify and mitigate logic-based security issues in custom MyBatis components.

Currently Implemented:

Partial - Custom type handlers for JSON data types have been developed and functionally tested, but a dedicated security review specifically targeting these components has not yet been performed. No custom plugins are currently in use.

Missing Implementation:

A formal security code review and potentially penetration testing of the custom JSON type handlers are needed. Establish a mandatory security review process for any future custom MyBatis type handlers or plugins before they are deployed.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure MyBatis Configuration Practices

Description:

  1. Principle of Least Privilege for Database User: Configure the database user credentials used by MyBatis to have the minimum necessary privileges required for the application to function. Grant only SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE permissions on specific tables as needed. Avoid granting broad permissions like GRANT ALL or DBA roles.
  2. Secure Database Credentials Management: Do not hardcode database usernames and passwords directly in MyBatis configuration files (e.g., mybatis-config.xml). Utilize secure methods for managing database credentials, such as:
    • Environment variables.
    • Secure configuration management tools (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager).
    • Encrypted configuration files.
  3. Minimize Information Disclosure in MyBatis Logging: Review MyBatis logging configuration. Avoid logging sensitive data (like SQL queries containing user passwords or PII) in MyBatis logs. Configure logging levels appropriately for production environments to minimize verbosity and potential information leakage.

List of Threats Mitigated:

  • SQL Injection (Impact Amplification) (Severity: High if broad database permissions) - Limiting database user privileges reduces the potential damage from a successful SQL injection attack through MyBatis.
  • Credential Theft (Severity: High) - Securely managing database credentials prevents attackers from easily obtaining them from MyBatis configuration files.
  • Information Disclosure (Severity: Low to Medium) - Minimizing logging verbosity and avoiding logging sensitive data in MyBatis logs reduces the risk of information leakage.

Impact:

  • SQL Injection (Impact Amplification): High Risk Reduction - Least privilege significantly limits the impact of a successful SQL injection attack.
  • Credential Theft: High Risk Reduction - Secure credential management makes it much harder for attackers to steal database credentials from MyBatis configuration.
  • Information Disclosure: Medium Risk Reduction - Reduces the risk of information leakage through MyBatis logs.

Currently Implemented:

Partial - Database user for MyBatis has restricted permissions, limited to necessary tables and operations. Database connection strings are stored as environment variables in production. Basic MyBatis logging is configured.

Missing Implementation:

Implement a secure secrets management solution (like HashiCorp Vault) for database credentials instead of relying solely on environment variables. Review and refine MyBatis logging configuration to ensure no sensitive data is logged and logging levels are appropriate for production.