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Threat Model Analysis for oracle/graal

Threat: Malicious Polyglot Code Injection

  • Threat: Malicious Polyglot Code Injection

    • Description: An attacker submits crafted input designed to be executed as code in one of the GraalVM-supported languages (JavaScript, Python, Ruby, R, etc.). The attacker aims to execute arbitrary code within that language interpreter's context, potentially escalating to the host JVM or OS. This leverages vulnerabilities in the guest language's GraalVM implementation or exploits weaknesses in inter-language communication managed by GraalVM.
    • Impact:
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE) within the guest language context.
      • Potential escalation to RCE on the host JVM or operating system.
      • Data breaches, data modification, denial of service.
    • Affected Component: GraalVM Polyglot API (org.graalvm.polyglot.*), specific language implementations within GraalVM (e.g., GraalVM's JavaScript, Python, Ruby implementations), Truffle framework (if a custom language is used, and the vulnerability is in the GraalVM integration).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Input Validation: Rigorous validation and sanitization of all input passed to any GraalVM guest language interpreter. Use whitelisting.
      • Sandboxing: Use GraalVM's context-based sandboxing (Context.Builder.allowAllAccess(false) and related options). Grant only the minimum necessary permissions. Use separate contexts for different trust levels.
      • Resource Limits: Enforce resource limits (CPU, memory) on guest language execution via GraalVM's context configuration.
      • Regular Updates: Keep GraalVM and all its language implementations up-to-date.
      • Least Privilege: Run the application with minimal OS privileges.
      • Isolate Untrusted Code: Consider running untrusted guest language code in separate processes/containers, managed outside of GraalVM's polyglot context if possible.

Threat: Guest Language Escape

  • Threat: Guest Language Escape

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability specifically within a guest language's implementation inside GraalVM to break out of the language's sandbox and gain access to the host JVM or, with Native Image, the underlying OS. This exploits bugs in the GraalVM-provided language interpreter, the Truffle framework (if applicable), or the GraalVM compiler itself. The vulnerability must be in GraalVM's handling of the guest language.
    • Impact:
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the host JVM or operating system.
      • Complete system compromise.
      • Data breaches, data modification, denial of service.
    • Affected Component: GraalVM Polyglot API, specific language implementations provided by GraalVM (e.g., GraalVM's JavaScript, Python implementations), Truffle framework, GraalVM compiler.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regular Updates: Prioritize updating GraalVM and all its language implementations to address known vulnerabilities in GraalVM components.
      • Sandboxing: Use the most restrictive sandboxing options available within GraalVM.
      • Vulnerability Monitoring: Actively monitor for security advisories specifically related to GraalVM and its supported languages.
      • Language Selection: Carefully consider the security of using less mature or experimental language implementations within GraalVM.
      • Least Privilege: Run with minimal OS privileges.

Threat: Reflection/JNI/Dynamic Feature Misconfiguration in Native Image

  • Threat: Reflection/JNI/Dynamic Feature Misconfiguration in Native Image

    • Description: An attacker leverages improperly configured reflection, JNI, or dynamic class loading in a GraalVM Native Image application. Native Image's closed-world analysis requires explicit configuration of these features. Misconfiguration can lead to unexpected runtime behavior. An attacker might influence reflection targets to call unintended methods/access fields, potentially leading to code execution or information disclosure. This is a direct consequence of how Native Image works.
    • Impact:
      • Unpredictable application behavior.
      • Potential for arbitrary code execution (if the attacker controls reflection targets).
      • Information disclosure.
      • Denial of service.
    • Affected Component: GraalVM Native Image compiler, native-image.properties (or equivalent configuration mechanism), reflection API, JNI interface as managed by Native Image.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Precise Configuration: Carefully and completely configure native-image.properties (or equivalent) to list all dynamic accesses.
      • Tracing Agent: Use the GraalVM Native Image tracing agent during testing to automatically identify and generate configuration.
      • Minimize Dynamic Features: Reduce reflection, JNI, and dynamic class loading. Favor static alternatives.
      • Input Validation: If reflection is unavoidable, strictly validate any data used to determine reflection targets.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Statically Linked Libraries (Native Image)

  • Threat: Vulnerabilities in Statically Linked Libraries (Native Image)

    • Description: An attacker exploits a known vulnerability in a library statically linked by GraalVM Native Image, such as the C standard library (glibc or musl). Because these libraries are part of the application binary (a direct result of Native Image's compilation), they cannot be patched independently.
    • Impact:
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE).
      • Denial of service.
      • Information disclosure.
      • Impact depends on the specific vulnerability.
    • Affected Component: GraalVM Native Image compiler, statically linked libraries (e.g., glibc, musl) included by the Native Image build process.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Minimal Base Image: Use a minimal base image (e.g., distroless) to reduce the number of statically linked libraries.
      • Regular Rebuilds: Frequently rebuild the Native Image with updated base images and GraalVM versions to get security patches.
      • Vulnerability Monitoring: Monitor for advisories related to the C library used by your Native Image and the base image.
      • Rolling Releases: Consider a base image using a rolling-release distribution.

Threat: GraalVM Compiler/Runtime Bug Exploitation

  • Threat: GraalVM Compiler/Runtime Bug Exploitation

    • Description: An attacker exploits a bug directly within the GraalVM compiler (either JIT or Native Image) or the GraalVM runtime itself. This could be a bug leading to incorrect code generation, a memory safety issue, or a flaw in the GraalVM garbage collector. The vulnerability must reside within GraalVM code.
    • Impact:
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE).
      • Denial of service.
      • Information disclosure.
      • Unpredictable behavior.
    • Affected Component: GraalVM compiler (JIT or Native Image), GraalVM runtime, Truffle framework (if the bug is in the framework itself).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regular Updates: Keep GraalVM up-to-date with the latest releases and patches. This is the primary mitigation.
      • Vulnerability Monitoring: Monitor for security advisories specifically related to GraalVM.
      • Extensive Testing: Thoroughly test, including fuzz testing and property-based testing, to identify potential GraalVM bugs.
      • Bug Reporting: Report any suspected bugs to the GraalVM team.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Custom Truffle Language Implementations

  • Threat: Vulnerabilities in Custom Truffle Language Implementations

    • Description: If a custom language is implemented using the GraalVM Truffle framework, an attacker exploits vulnerabilities within that custom language implementation. This could involve bugs in the language's parser, interpreter, or any custom native libraries integrated with Truffle. The vulnerability is exploitable because of the use of Truffle.
    • Impact:
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE) within the context of the custom language.
      • Potential escalation to the host JVM or OS.
      • Data breaches, data modification, denial of service.
    • Affected Component: GraalVM Truffle framework, custom language implementation (parser, interpreter, AST nodes, etc.), any native libraries used by the custom language and integrated with Truffle.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure Coding Practices: Follow secure coding practices rigorously when developing the custom language implementation for Truffle.
      • Thorough Testing: Perform extensive testing, including fuzz testing, unit testing, and integration testing with the GraalVM environment.
      • Sandboxing: Utilize GraalVM's sandboxing features to restrict the capabilities of the custom language.
      • Code Review: Conduct thorough code reviews.
      • Security Audits: Consider external security audits.