Objective: Degrade UX, Leak Chart Data, or Crash App via MPAndroidChart
Attacker's Goal: Degrade UX, Leak Chart Data, or Crash App via MPAndroidChart
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!!! 1. Data Manipulation/Leakage !!! *** 2a. Malformed Chart Data ***
/ | (e.g., Huge Datasets, Complex Charts)
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*** 1a. Injection *** 1b. Data
*** via Input *** Exposure
*** Fields *** in Tooltips
or Legends
Attack Tree Path: 1. Data Manipulation/Leakage
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!!! 1. Data Manipulation/Leakage !!! (Critical Node):
- Overall Description: This is the most critical area of concern, encompassing attacks that aim to steal or manipulate data displayed within the chart, or leverage the chart as a vector for other attacks (like XSS).
- Overall Likelihood: Medium (The likelihood of some form of data manipulation attack is moderate, given the commonality of input fields and the potential for design flaws.)
- Overall Impact: High to Very High (Data breaches are extremely serious, potentially leading to financial loss, reputational damage, and legal consequences.)
- Overall Effort: Low to Medium (Depending on the specific vulnerability, the effort required can range from trivial to moderately challenging.)
- Overall Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate (Many data manipulation attacks can be carried out with basic knowledge of web vulnerabilities.)
- Overall Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Detection can be challenging, requiring careful monitoring of inputs, outputs, and system logs.)
Attack Tree Path: 1a. Injection via Input Fields
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Sub-Node:
*** 1a. Injection via Input Fields ***
(High-Risk Path)- Description: If the application allows user input to directly or indirectly populate chart data (labels, values, etc.) without proper sanitization, an attacker could inject malicious payloads. This is primarily a vulnerability in how the application uses MPAndroidChart, not the library itself.
- Examples:
- JavaScript Injection (Indirect): If chart data is passed to a WebView and rendered using a JavaScript charting library via MPAndroidChart's data, an attacker could inject
<script>
tags. - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - Indirect: Similar to above, if chart data is displayed in a context where XSS is possible.
- SQL Injection (Indirect): If user input is used to construct SQL queries that then fetch data for the chart.
- JavaScript Injection (Indirect): If chart data is passed to a WebView and rendered using a JavaScript charting library via MPAndroidChart's data, an attacker could inject
- Likelihood: Medium (Highly dependent on the application's input handling practices.)
- Impact: High to Very High (Data breaches, XSS leading to account takeover, SQL injection leading to complete database compromise.)
- Effort: Low to Medium (Exploiting basic injection vulnerabilities is often straightforward.)
- Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate (Basic injection techniques are well-documented.)
- Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Requires monitoring input, output, and potentially server logs. WAFs can help.)
- Mitigation:
- Strict Input Validation: Implement rigorous input validation and sanitization on all user-provided data. Use whitelisting.
- Output Encoding: If data is passed to a WebView, ensure proper output encoding.
- Parameterized Queries: Always use parameterized queries (prepared statements) for database interactions.
- Principle of Least Privilege: Limit database user permissions.
Attack Tree Path: 1b. Data Exposure in Tooltips or Legends
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Sub-Node:
*** 1b. Data Exposure in Tooltips or Legends ***
(High-Risk Path)- Description: The application displays sensitive data directly within chart tooltips, legends, or labels without considering the context of display. This is a design flaw in how the application uses MPAndroidChart.
- Examples:
- Displaying full credit card numbers or PII in tooltips.
- Showing internal system IDs or API keys in chart labels.
- Likelihood: Medium (Depends on the application's design and data sensitivity.)
- Impact: Medium to High (Exposure of PII, sensitive business data, or internal system information.)
- Effort: Very Low (Simply viewing the chart.)
- Skill Level: Novice (No technical skill required.)
- Detection Difficulty: Very Easy (The exposed data is directly visible.)
- Mitigation:
- Data Masking/Truncation: Display only a portion of sensitive data.
- Aggregation: Display aggregated or anonymized data.
- Context-Aware Display: Consider the environment where the chart will be displayed.
- User Permissions: Implement access controls.
Attack Tree Path: 2a. Malformed Chart Data
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*** 2a. Malformed Chart Data ***
(High-Risk Path):- Description: An attacker intentionally provides extremely large datasets or creates overly complex chart configurations to overwhelm the library and cause the application to become unresponsive or crash (Denial of Service).
- Examples:
- Submitting a form that generates a chart with millions of data points.
- Creating a chart with an excessive number of series or groups.
- Likelihood: Medium to High (If the application doesn't limit input size or complexity, this is easy to trigger.)
- Impact: Medium (Application slowdown or crash, affecting user experience.)
- Effort: Low (Submitting large amounts of data is often straightforward.)
- Skill Level: Novice (No specialized knowledge required.)
- Detection Difficulty: Easy (Application slowdown or crash is usually obvious.)
- Mitigation:
- Input Limits: Enforce limits on the size and complexity of data.
- Data Aggregation: Pre-aggregate data on the server-side.
- Progress Indicators: Display a progress indicator during rendering.
- Asynchronous Processing: Render large charts in a background thread.
- Timeout mechanism: Implement timeout for chart rendering.