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Attack Tree Analysis for reactivex/rxjava

Objective: Compromise Application (DoS or RCE) [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      Compromise Application (DoS or RCE) [CRITICAL]
                                                  |
                                ---------------------------------------------------
                                |                                                 |
                      Denial of Service (DoS) [CRITICAL]                       Remote Code Execution (RCE) [CRITICAL]
                                |                                                 |
                ---------------------------------                  -------------------------------------
                |                               |                  |
  Resource Exhaustion (Threads/Memory) [CRITICAL]   Unexpected/Unhandled Errors      Vulnerable Deserialization
                |                               |                  |
    -> HIGH RISK -> --------------------------      --------------------------      --------------------------
    |          |                               |                  |
1. Infinite 2. Unbounded                 5. Unhandled         7. Untrusted
   Streams    Buffers                    Exception            Data Input
->HIGH RISK->->HIGH RISK->                Swallowing       ->HIGH RISK->
                                  -> HIGH RISK ->
                                                  |
                                        ---------------------------------
                                        |
                                  Improper Scheduler Use
                                        |
                                        --------------------------
                                        |
                                        10. Blocking Calls in Computation Scheduler
                                        -> HIGH RISK->

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application (DoS or RCE) [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The ultimate objective of the attacker: to either cause a Denial of Service (making the application unavailable) or achieve Remote Code Execution (gaining control over the application and potentially the underlying system).
  • Why Critical: This represents the successful completion of the attack, with severe consequences.

Attack Tree Path: Denial of Service (DoS) [CRITICAL]

  • Description: An attack that aims to make the application unavailable to legitimate users.
  • Why Critical: DoS can disrupt business operations, cause financial losses, and damage reputation.

Attack Tree Path: Remote Code Execution (RCE) [CRITICAL]

  • Description: An attack that allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the target system.
  • Why Critical: RCE is one of the most severe vulnerabilities, potentially leading to complete system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: Resource Exhaustion (Threads/Memory) [CRITICAL]

  • Description: A common attack vector in RxJava applications, where the attacker exploits vulnerabilities to consume excessive system resources (threads or memory), leading to a DoS.
  • Why Critical: This is a readily achievable and high-impact attack vector in RxJava.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Infinite Streams (-> HIGH RISK ->)

  • Description: Creating RxJava streams that never terminate (e.g., Observable.interval() without proper disposal). An attacker might trigger the creation of many such streams.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (DoS due to resource exhaustion)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Always dispose of subscriptions to Observables when they are no longer needed. Use Disposable and CompositeDisposable effectively.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Unbounded Buffers (-> HIGH RISK ->)

  • Description: Using RxJava operators like buffer(), window(), or toList() without specifying a maximum size or time window. An attacker could flood the system with data to trigger an OutOfMemoryError.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (DoS due to OutOfMemoryError)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Always specify a maximum size or time window when using buffering operators.

Attack Tree Path: Unexpected/Unhandled Errors

Description: Errors within RxJava pipeline that can lead to application crashes.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Unhandled Exception Swallowing (-> HIGH RISK ->)

  • Description: Using RxJava operators like onErrorResumeNext() to return a default value without logging or properly handling the error. This masks critical failures and can lead to data corruption or inconsistent state.
  • Likelihood: High
  • Impact: Medium (Instability, data corruption, masked vulnerabilities)
  • Effort: Very Low (attacker benefits from pre-existing vulnerability)
  • Skill Level: Novice (to introduce the vulnerability), Intermediate/Advanced (to exploit the consequences)
  • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard
  • Mitigation: Never silently ignore exceptions. Always log them and handle them appropriately.

Attack Tree Path: Vulnerable Deserialization

Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in deserialization process.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Untrusted Data Input (Deserialization) (-> HIGH RISK ->)

  • Description: If RxJava streams process data that is then deserialized, and the data source is untrusted, an attacker could inject malicious serialized objects. This is a general deserialization vulnerability, but RxJava might be the conduit.
  • Likelihood: Low (directly through RxJava; higher if RxJava is used to handle untrusted data)
  • Impact: Very High (potential for RCE)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Avoid deserializing data from untrusted sources. If necessary, use a secure deserialization library and validate the data after deserialization.

Attack Tree Path: Improper Scheduler Use

Description: Misusing RxJava schedulers.

Attack Tree Path: 10. Blocking Calls in Computation Scheduler (-> HIGH RISK ->)

  • Description: The computation() scheduler is for CPU-bound tasks. Making blocking I/O calls within this scheduler can lead to thread starvation. An attacker might trigger code paths that perform blocking operations on this scheduler.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (DoS due to thread starvation)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Use the correct scheduler for each operation. Use Schedulers.io() for I/O-bound tasks, and avoid blocking operations on Schedulers.computation().