Objective: Deanonymize Users, Intercept Messages, or Disrupt Service [CRITICAL]
[Deanonymize Users, Intercept Messages, or Disrupt Service] [CRITICAL]
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[Compromise Server-Side Logic] [Exploit Client-Server Interaction Vulnerabilities]
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[Eavesdrop] [Man-in-the-] [Compromise]
[Unencrypted] [Middle] [Client-Side]
[Traffic] [Server] [Implementation]
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[Intercept HTTP/2] [Compromise Server] [Exploit Weak]
[Connections] [CRITICAL] [CRITICAL] [Crypto in Client]
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[Exploit Server] [Supply Chain Attack]
[Vulnerabilities] [on Dependencies][CRITICAL]
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[Tamper with Server Code][CRITICAL]
Attack Tree Path: Deanonymize Users, Intercept Messages, or Disrupt Service
- This is the overarching attacker goal and is inherently critical. Success in any of these objectives represents a significant security breach.
Attack Tree Path: Exploit Client-Server Interaction Vulnerabilities
This is a high-level category encompassing several critical attack vectors.
Attack Tree Path: Eavesdrop on Unencrypted Traffic
Attack Tree Path: Intercept HTTP/2 Connections
- Threat: An attacker intercepts and decrypts communication between the client and server. This typically requires breaking or bypassing TLS encryption.
- Mitigation: Use strong TLS configurations (TLS 1.3), certificate pinning, HSTS, and regularly update TLS libraries.
- Likelihood: Very Low (if TLS is properly configured)
- Impact: Very High (complete compromise of communication)
- Effort: High (requires breaking TLS)
- Skill Level: Expert
- Detection Difficulty: Very Hard (if TLS is broken, detection is unlikely)
Attack Tree Path: Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)
Attack Tree Path: Compromise Server
- Threat: An attacker gains full control of the Signal Server, allowing them to intercept, modify, or block any communication.
- Mitigation: Strong physical security, regular patching, intrusion detection/prevention systems, strong access controls, secure development lifecycle (SDL).
- Likelihood: Very Low (requires significant resources and expertise)
- Impact: Very High (complete compromise of the system)
- Effort: Very High
- Skill Level: Expert
- Detection Difficulty: Hard (requires sophisticated intrusion detection)
- [Exploit Server Vulnerabilities]
- Threat: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the server software (operating system, web server, Signal Server code itself) to gain unauthorized access.
- Mitigation: Regular security patching, vulnerability scanning, penetration testing, secure coding practices.
- Likelihood: Low (if server is regularly patched)
- Impact: Very High (complete compromise)
- Effort: High
- Skill Level: Expert
- Detection Difficulty: Medium (intrusion detection systems)
Attack Tree Path: Exploit Server Vulnerabilities
- Threat: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the server software (operating system, web server, Signal Server code itself) to gain unauthorized access.
- Mitigation: Regular security patching, vulnerability scanning, penetration testing, secure coding practices.
- Likelihood: Low (if server is regularly patched)
- Impact: Very High (complete compromise)
- Effort: High
- Skill Level: Expert
- Detection Difficulty: Medium (intrusion detection systems)
Attack Tree Path: Compromise Client-Side Implementation
Attack Tree Path: Exploit Weak Crypto in Client
- Threat: The client application (not the Signal Server itself) has vulnerabilities in its cryptographic implementation, allowing an attacker to decrypt messages or impersonate users.
- Mitigation: The client must use strong, well-vetted cryptographic libraries, follow best practices for key management, and undergo regular security audits.
- Likelihood: Low to Medium (depends on the client's security)
- Impact: Very High (message decryption, impersonation)
- Effort: High (requires finding and exploiting crypto vulnerabilities)
- Skill Level: Expert
- Detection Difficulty: Very Hard (requires analyzing the client's code)
- [Supply Chain Attack on Dependencies] [CRITICAL]
- Threat: An attacker compromises a third-party library or component used by the Signal Server, injecting malicious code.
- Mitigation: Use a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), dependency pinning, checksum verification, regular dependency audits, consider using a private package repository.
- Likelihood: Low (but increasing in frequency)
- Impact: Very High (complete compromise of the system)
- Effort: High (requires compromising a trusted dependency)
- Skill Level: Expert
- Detection Difficulty: Very Hard (requires sophisticated supply chain security measures)
- [Tamper with Server Code] [CRITICAL]
- Threat: An attacker gains unauthorized access to modify the server's source code directly.
- Mitigation: Strict access control to the codebase, code signing, integrity checks, robust code review process, secure CI/CD pipeline.
- Likelihood: Very Low
- Impact: Very High
- Effort: High
- Skill Level: Expert
- Detection Difficulty: Medium
Attack Tree Path: Supply Chain Attack on Dependencies
- Threat: An attacker compromises a third-party library or component used by the Signal Server, injecting malicious code.
- Mitigation: Use a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), dependency pinning, checksum verification, regular dependency audits, consider using a private package repository.
- Likelihood: Low (but increasing in frequency)
- Impact: Very High (complete compromise of the system)
- Effort: High (requires compromising a trusted dependency)
- Skill Level: Expert
- Detection Difficulty: Very Hard (requires sophisticated supply chain security measures)
Attack Tree Path: Tamper with Server Code
- Threat: An attacker gains unauthorized access to modify the server's source code directly.
- Mitigation: Strict access control to the codebase, code signing, integrity checks, robust code review process, secure CI/CD pipeline.
- Likelihood: Very Low
- Impact: Very High
- Effort: High
- Skill Level: Expert
- Detection Difficulty: Medium