Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
93 lines (78 loc) · 8.18 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

93 lines (78 loc) · 8.18 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for spring-projects/spring-boot

Attack Surface: Actuator Endpoint Exposure

  • Description: Unsecured or improperly secured Spring Boot Actuator endpoints expose sensitive application and environment information, and can allow for remote control of the application.
  • How Spring Boot Contributes: Spring Boot Actuator provides these endpoints by default, making them readily available if not explicitly secured. This is a direct contribution.
  • Example: An attacker accesses /actuator/env and obtains database credentials. An attacker uses /actuator/shutdown to cause a denial of service. /actuator/jolokia (if present) is used for RCE.
  • Impact: Information disclosure, denial of service, potential remote code execution (RCE).
  • Risk Severity: Critical (if exposed publicly without authentication) / High (if exposed with weak authentication).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Disable Unnecessary Endpoints: Use management.endpoints.web.exposure.include/exclude in application.properties/yml. Disable in production if possible.
    • Require Authentication and Authorization: Use Spring Security. Configure specific roles (e.g., ACTUATOR_ADMIN).
    • Network Restrictions: Restrict access via firewall rules or Spring Security's hasIpAddress(). Consider a separate port.
    • Sanitize Sensitive Data: Use property placeholders and external configuration. Customize /actuator/env output.
    • Monitor Access: Log and monitor all access. Implement intrusion detection/prevention.

Attack Surface: Vulnerable Dependencies (Supply Chain Attacks) - Indirectly via Starters

  • Description: Spring Boot applications can be vulnerable to attacks exploiting vulnerabilities in their dependencies.
  • How Spring Boot Contributes: While dependency management is not unique to Spring Boot, Spring Boot Starters can simplify the inclusion of vulnerable transitive dependencies, increasing the likelihood of unknowingly including a vulnerable library. This is an indirect, but significant contribution.
  • Example: A Spring Boot Starter pulls in an old version of a library with a known RCE vulnerability.
  • Impact: Remote code execution, data breaches, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: Critical / High (depending on the specific vulnerability).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Dependency Scanning: Use OWASP Dependency-Check, Snyk, or similar tools.
    • Regular Updates: Keep Spring Boot and all dependencies updated.
    • Minimal Starters: Choose the most specific Starters.
    • Explicit Dependency Management: Consider explicitly declaring dependencies.
    • Software Bill of Materials (SBOM): Generate and maintain an SBOM.

Attack Surface: Auto-Configuration Misuse

  • Description: Spring Boot's auto-configuration can lead to unintended exposure of services or insecure default settings.
  • How Spring Boot Contributes: Auto-configuration is a core feature of Spring Boot, making this a direct and significant contribution.
  • Example: Auto-configuration enables an embedded H2 database console at /h2-console without authentication.
  • Impact: Information disclosure, data modification, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Understand Auto-Configuration: Read the Spring Boot documentation.
    • Override Defaults: Explicitly configure security settings and critical parameters.
    • Disable Unnecessary Auto-Configuration: Use the exclude attribute of @SpringBootApplication or @EnableAutoConfiguration.
    • Review Effective Configuration: Use secured actuator endpoints like /actuator/configprops and /actuator/beans.

Attack Surface: Data Binding Vulnerabilities (Mass Assignment)

  • Description: Attackers can manipulate request parameters to set unintended object properties.
  • How Spring Boot Contributes: Spring Boot's data binding mechanism, a core feature for handling web requests, is directly involved in this vulnerability.
  • Example: An attacker adds admin=true to a registration form, gaining admin privileges.
  • Impact: Unauthorized data modification, privilege escalation.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Data Transfer Objects (DTOs): Use DTOs instead of binding directly to domain objects.
    • Whitelist Allowed Fields: Use @InitBinder and setAllowedFields().
    • Input Validation: Use Spring's validation framework (@Valid, @Validated, validation annotations).

Attack Surface: SpEL Injection

  • Description: Untrusted input in Spring Expression Language (SpEL) expressions allows for code injection.
  • How Spring Boot Contributes: SpEL is deeply integrated into Spring and Spring Boot, used in security annotations (@PreAuthorize, etc.) and potentially in template engines. This is a direct contribution.
  • Example: An attacker injects SpEL into a search field used in a @PreAuthorize annotation.
  • Impact: Remote code execution, data exfiltration, bypassing security.
  • Risk Severity: Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid Untrusted Input: Never use untrusted input directly in SpEL.
    • Sanitize Input: Thoroughly sanitize if user input is unavoidable. Use a whitelist.
    • Parameterized Expressions: Use parameterized SpEL where possible.
    • Restricted Evaluation Context: Use SimpleEvaluationContext or a custom context.

Attack Surface: Template Injection (Thymeleaf, etc.) - Indirectly via Integration

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious code into templates if untrusted input is used directly.
  • How Spring Boot Contributes: While template engines are not part of Spring Boot, Spring Boot provides seamless integration with them (e.g., Thymeleaf), making them a common choice and thus increasing the risk if not used securely. This is an indirect, but significant contribution.
  • Example: An attacker injects malicious JavaScript into a comment field displayed unsanitized in a Thymeleaf template (XSS).
  • Impact: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), session hijacking, data theft.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Contextual Escaping: Ensure the template engine is configured for auto-escaping (Thymeleaf does this by default).
    • Sanitize Input: Sanitize user input before displaying it, even with auto-escaping.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strong CSP.
    • Avoid Inline Scripts/Styles: Minimize their use in templates.

Attack Surface: Embedded Server Vulnerabilities - Indirectly via Inclusion

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in the embedded web server (Tomcat, Jetty, Undertow) can be exploited.
  • How Spring Boot Contributes: Spring Boot applications typically include an embedded server by default. While the server itself isn't part of Spring Boot, its inclusion is a direct consequence of using Spring Boot, making this an indirect but significant contribution.
  • Example: An attacker exploits a known vulnerability in an older version of Tomcat embedded in a Spring Boot application.
  • Impact: Varies; potentially RCE, DoS, or information disclosure.
  • Risk Severity: High / Critical (depending on the vulnerability).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep Spring Boot Updated: Updating Spring Boot usually updates the embedded server.
    • Explicit Server Version: If needed, explicitly specify the server version in your build configuration.
    • Secure Server Configuration: Harden the configuration of the embedded server. Disable unnecessary features and use strong security settings.