Objective: Gain unauthorized remote code execution (RCE) or sensitive data exfiltration on a Spring Boot application by exploiting Spring Boot-specific features or misconfigurations.
[Attacker's Goal: RCE or Sensitive Data Exfiltration via Spring Boot] | --------------------------------- | | [1. Exploit Spring Boot Actuators] [4. Leverage Spring Boot Configuration Issues] | --------------------------------- --------------------------------- | | [1.1 Unprotected]=> =>[4.2 Hardcoded Credentials] Endpoints] | | | [1.1.1 /env]=> =>[4.2.1 In application.properties] [1.1.2 /heapdump]=> [1.1.3 /threaddump]
Attack Tree Path: [1. Exploit Spring Boot Actuators]
- Description: Spring Boot Actuators are built-in endpoints that expose operational information about a running application. If not properly secured, they provide a direct path for attackers to gather sensitive data or even achieve remote code execution. This is a critical area due to the high likelihood of misconfiguration and the low effort required for exploitation.
- Why Critical: High Impact (data breach, RCE), High Likelihood (common misconfiguration), Low Effort (easy to access if unprotected).
Attack Tree Path: [1.1 Unprotected Endpoints]
- Description: This refers to Actuator endpoints that are enabled and accessible without any authentication or authorization checks. An attacker can simply access these endpoints via a web browser or automated tool.
- Why Critical: High Impact (direct access to sensitive data/functionality), High Likelihood (common oversight), Very Low Effort (no authentication required).
- High-Risk Path: The direct path to these unprotected endpoints is a high-risk attack vector.
Attack Tree Path: [1.1.1 /env]
- Description: The
/env
actuator endpoint exposes the application's environment variables. These variables often contain sensitive information such as database credentials, API keys, cloud service secrets, and other configuration details. - Why Critical: High Impact (exposure of sensitive credentials), Medium Likelihood, Very Low Effort.
- Attack Vector: An attacker can access
http://<target-application>/actuator/env
(or a similar URL) to retrieve the environment variables.
Attack Tree Path: [1.1.2 /heapdump]
- Description: The
/heapdump
actuator endpoint allows an attacker to download a heap dump of the running Java Virtual Machine (JVM). This heap dump contains a snapshot of all objects in memory, which can include sensitive data like user credentials, session tokens, and internal application data. - Why Critical: Very High Impact (potential exposure of all in-memory data), Medium Likelihood, Very Low Effort.
- Attack Vector: An attacker can access
http://<target-application>/actuator/heapdump
to download the heap dump file. Analysis of the heap dump requires some skill, but tools are readily available.
Attack Tree Path: [1.1.3 /threaddump]
- Description: The
/threaddump
actuator endpoint provides a snapshot of all active threads in the JVM. While not directly exposing sensitive data like/env
or/heapdump
, it can reveal information about the application's internal workings, running processes, and potential vulnerabilities. This information can be used to aid in further attacks. - Why Critical: Medium Impact (information disclosure aiding further attacks), Medium Likelihood, Very Low Effort.
- Attack Vector: An attacker can access
http://<target-application>/actuator/threaddump
to obtain the thread dump.
Attack Tree Path: [4. Leverage Spring Boot Configuration Issues]
- Description: This refers to exploiting vulnerabilities that arise from improper configuration of the Spring Boot application.
- Why Critical: High Impact (RCE, data breach), Medium Likelihood (common mistakes), Variable Effort.
Attack Tree Path: =>[4.2 Hardcoded Credentials]
- Description: This refers to the practice of embedding sensitive credentials (passwords, API keys, etc.) directly within the application's source code or configuration files. This is a highly insecure practice.
- Why Critical: Very High Impact (direct access to protected resources), Low Likelihood (should be caught in code review, but still happens), Very Low Effort (easily discovered if source code is accessible).
- High-Risk Path: The path leading to hardcoded credentials represents a significant risk.
Attack Tree Path: =>[4.2.1 In application.properties]
- Description: This is a specific, and unfortunately common, instance of hardcoding credentials. The
application.properties
(orapplication.yml
) file is the primary configuration file for Spring Boot applications. Storing credentials directly in this file makes them easily accessible to anyone with access to the source code or the deployed application artifact. - Why Critical: Very High Impact (direct access to protected resources), Low Likelihood (should be caught in code review, but still happens), Very Low Effort (easily discovered).
- Attack Vector: An attacker who gains access to the source code, the deployed application package, or a compromised server can easily read the
application.properties
file and extract the credentials. - High-Risk Path: This is a direct and easily exploitable path.