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Threat Model Analysis for spring-projects/spring-boot

Threat: Authentication Bypass via Misconfigured Spring Security

  • Description: An attacker exploits weaknesses specifically in the Spring Security configuration within a Spring Boot application to gain unauthorized access. This is a Spring Boot concern because Spring Security is the de facto security framework integrated with Spring Boot, and its auto-configuration and ease of use can lead to misconfigurations if not carefully managed. Examples include:

    • Incorrectly configured HttpSecurity rules (e.g., overly permissive antMatchers, incorrect use of permitAll(), authenticated(), etc.) - Spring Boot's auto-configuration can make it easy to accidentally expose endpoints.
    • Flaws in custom UserDetailsService implementations – a common Spring Security component.
    • Misconfigured OAuth2/OIDC integration (e.g., weak client secrets, improper redirect URI validation) – Spring Boot provides starters for easy OAuth2/OIDC integration, but incorrect setup is a direct threat.
    • Disabled or misconfigured CSRF protection, a feature provided by Spring Security.

  • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data, unauthorized modification of data, complete system compromise, reputational damage, legal and financial consequences.

  • Affected Spring Boot Component: Spring Security (specifically HttpSecurity configuration, UserDetailsService, authentication providers, CSRF protection mechanisms).

  • Risk Severity: Critical

  • Mitigation Strategies:

    • Thoroughly review and test all HttpSecurity configurations. Use a least privilege approach, explicitly defining access rules for each endpoint. Do not rely solely on auto-configuration for security-critical aspects.
    • Validate all user input and ensure proper escaping.
    • Implement robust unit and integration tests for all authentication and authorization flows, including negative test cases. Use Spring Security's testing support.
    • Regularly audit security configurations.
    • Keep Spring Security and related dependencies up-to-date.
    • Ensure CSRF protection is enabled and properly configured.
    • If using OAuth2/OIDC, follow best practices for secure configuration (strong secrets, proper redirect URI validation, PKCE).

Threat: Actuator Endpoint Exposure

  • Description: An attacker accesses sensitive information or performs unauthorized actions by exploiting exposed Spring Boot Actuator endpoints. This is a direct Spring Boot threat because Actuator is a built-in feature of Spring Boot. These endpoints (e.g., /actuator/env, /actuator/beans, /actuator/httptrace, /actuator/shutdown) provide information about the application's internal state and can be used to modify its configuration.

  • Impact: Information disclosure (environment variables, configuration properties, bean definitions, HTTP request traces), denial of service (via /actuator/shutdown), potential for remote code execution (if combined with other vulnerabilities).

  • Affected Spring Boot Component: Spring Boot Actuator

  • Risk Severity: High (can be Critical if sensitive information is exposed or RCE is possible)

  • Mitigation Strategies:

    • Restrict access to Actuator endpoints using Spring Security. Require authentication and authorization.
    • Disable unnecessary Actuator endpoints using management.endpoints.web.exposure.exclude. This is a Spring Boot-specific configuration property.
    • Expose Actuator endpoints only on a separate management port or internal network.
    • Use management.endpoints.web.exposure.include and management.endpoints.web.exposure.exclude carefully.
    • Monitor access to Actuator endpoints.
    • Consider a custom security configuration for Actuator endpoints.

Threat: Dependency Vulnerabilities (Supply Chain Attack) - Focusing on Spring Boot Aspects

  • Description: An attacker exploits a known vulnerability in a Spring Boot dependency (including transitive dependencies) to gain control. While dependency management is a general concern, Spring Boot's reliance on "Starters" and its extensive dependency tree increases the attack surface and makes this a more prominent threat. The ease of adding dependencies in Spring Boot can lead to developers including more than necessary, increasing the risk.

  • Impact: Complete system compromise, data breaches, denial of service, reputational damage.

  • Affected Spring Boot Component: Any Spring Boot Starter or third-party dependency managed by Maven or Gradle, particularly those auto-configured by Spring Boot.

  • Risk Severity: Critical

  • Mitigation Strategies:

    • Use a dependency scanning tool (OWASP Dependency-Check, Snyk, Dependabot, JFrog Xray).
    • Keep all dependencies up-to-date, applying security patches promptly. Pay close attention to updates for Spring Boot Starters.
    • Use a private repository manager (Nexus, Artifactory).
    • Implement dependency verification (checksums, signatures).
    • Regularly audit dependencies and remove unused or unnecessary ones. Be mindful of the dependencies pulled in by Spring Boot Starters.
    • Consider using an SBOM.

Threat: Deserialization Vulnerabilities - Focusing on Spring Boot Usage

  • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious serialized object that, when deserialized by the application, executes arbitrary code. This is relevant to Spring Boot if the application uses Spring's object serialization mechanisms or libraries like Jackson or Gson for handling data, especially in contexts like message queues (Spring AMQP) or remote method invocation (Spring RMI, though less common now).

  • Impact: Remote code execution, complete system compromise.

  • Affected Spring Boot Component: Components that use object serialization/deserialization (e.g., ObjectInputStream, Jackson, Gson, Spring's RestTemplate if configured for object serialization, Spring AMQP, Spring RMI).

  • Risk Severity: Critical

  • Mitigation Strategies:

    • Avoid deserializing untrusted data whenever possible.
    • If deserialization is necessary, use a safe deserialization library or implement strict whitelisting of allowed classes.
    • Use alternative data formats like JSON with proper validation and avoid using Java serialization.
    • Keep serialization libraries up-to-date.
    • Implement input validation and sanitization before deserialization.

Threat: Spring Expression Language (SpEL) Injection

  • Description: An attacker injects malicious SpEL code into the application, which is then executed by the Spring Framework. This is a direct threat because SpEL is a core part of the Spring Framework, and Spring Boot applications often use it extensively. This can occur if user-provided input is used directly within SpEL expressions without proper sanitization. Common in @Value annotations, Spring Security's @PreAuthorize and @PostAuthorize, and Spring MVC.

  • Impact: Remote code execution, data breaches, denial of service, privilege escalation.

  • Affected Spring Boot Component: Spring Framework components that use SpEL (e.g., @Value annotations, Spring Security's @PreAuthorize and @PostAuthorize annotations, Spring MVC view resolvers).

  • Risk Severity: Critical

  • Mitigation Strategies:

    • Avoid using user input directly in SpEL expressions.
    • If user input must be used, sanitize and validate it thoroughly.
    • Use parameterized SpEL expressions where possible.
    • Consider a different templating engine if SpEL is not strictly required.
    • Use a secure SpEL parser configuration.

Threat: Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in Spring Data REST

  • Description: An attacker manipulates identifiers exposed by Spring Data REST to access or modify resources they are not authorized to access. This is a direct Spring Boot threat because Spring Data REST is a Spring Boot module that simplifies the creation of REST APIs for data repositories. Its default configuration can expose entities without proper authorization checks if not configured carefully.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data, unauthorized modification of data, data breaches.
    • Affected Spring Boot Component: Spring Data REST
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement proper authorization checks using Spring Security. Use @PreAuthorize, @PostAuthorize, or custom security expressions to restrict access.
      • Avoid exposing internal IDs directly. Use UUIDs or other non-sequential identifiers.
      • Validate all user input.
      • Use Spring Data REST's projection and excerpt features to limit exposed data.
      • Consider a custom repository implementation for additional security checks.

Threat: XML External Entity (XXE) Injection in XML Parsers - Focusing on Spring Boot Usage

  • Description: If the Spring Boot application processes XML input from untrusted sources, an attacker could inject malicious XML. This is relevant if using Spring's XML parsing capabilities, often through Spring OXM (Object/XML Mapping) or when integrating with legacy systems that use XML.
    • Impact: Information disclosure, denial of service, SSRF.
    • Affected Spring Boot Component: Spring OXM (Object/XML Mapping), any component using XML parsing libraries, potentially through Spring integration.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Disable external entity resolution in XML parsers.
      • Use a secure XML parser configuration.
      • Validate and sanitize all XML input.
      • Avoid processing XML from untrusted sources.
      • If using Jaxb2Marshaller (part of Spring OXM), configure it to disable DTDs and external entities.