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Threat Model Analysis for spring-projects/spring-framework

Threat: Spring Expression Language (SpEL) Injection

  • Description: An attacker provides input that is directly incorporated into a SpEL expression without proper sanitization. The attacker could inject malicious SpEL code, such as T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('...'), to execute arbitrary commands on the server. This is a direct threat from Spring's SpEL capabilities.
  • Impact: Remote code execution (RCE), complete system compromise.
  • Affected Component: Spring Expression Language (SpEL) engine, used in various contexts (e.g., @Value annotations, Spring Security expressions, Thymeleaf templates if SpEL is used unsafely).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid using SpEL with untrusted input whenever possible.
    • If unavoidable, rigorously sanitize and validate user input before it's used in a SpEL expression. Use a strict whitelist approach.
    • Consider using parameterized SpEL expressions.
    • If full SpEL power isn't needed, use a more restricted expression language.

Threat: Authentication Bypass due to Spring Security Misconfiguration

  • Description: An attacker exploits flaws in the Spring Security configuration, such as incorrect HttpSecurity rules, a flawed custom AuthenticationProvider, or improper use of @PreAuthorize/@PostAuthorize. They might bypass authentication entirely or impersonate another user. This is more likely with Spring Security than a custom solution due to the framework's complexity.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to protected resources, data breaches, potential compromise of the entire application.
  • Affected Component: Spring Security module (specifically, HttpSecurity configuration, custom AuthenticationProvider implementations, method-level security annotations).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Thoroughly review and test all Spring Security configurations. Follow established best practices.
    • Use Spring Security's testing support (@WithMockUser, @WithUserDetails) for comprehensive security tests.
    • Employ static analysis tools that understand Spring Security.
    • Regularly audit security configurations.
    • Use the latest Spring Security version and apply patches promptly.

Threat: Insecure Deserialization

  • Description: If the application uses Spring's object serialization/deserialization features (e.g., with RestTemplate, message queues, or caching and accepts serialized objects from untrusted sources), an attacker could inject malicious serialized data to execute arbitrary code. This is a direct threat if Spring's serialization mechanisms are used with untrusted input.
  • Impact: Remote code execution (RCE), complete system compromise.
  • Affected Component: Spring's object serialization/deserialization mechanisms (e.g., ObjectInputStream, RestTemplate with default converters when used with untrusted input).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid deserializing data from untrusted sources whenever possible.
    • If deserialization is necessary, use a secure deserialization mechanism that restricts the types of objects that can be deserialized (e.g., a whitelist-based approach).
    • Consider using alternative data formats (e.g., JSON with strict type checking) instead of Java serialization.
    • Keep Spring and related libraries up-to-date.

Threat: Privilege Escalation via Method-Level Security Misconfiguration

  • Description: An attacker exploits a misconfiguration in Spring Security's method-level security (e.g., @PreAuthorize, @PostAuthorize, @Secured) to execute methods they should not have access to. This could be due to incorrect annotations, flawed SpEL expressions within the annotations, or logic errors in custom security expressions. This is a direct threat from Spring Security's features.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to protected functionality, potential data manipulation or privilege escalation.
    • Affected Component: Spring Security's method-level security features.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Thoroughly review and test all method-level security configurations.
      • Use the principle of least privilege.
      • Use Spring Security's testing support to write comprehensive security tests for protected methods.
      • Regularly audit security configurations.
      • Avoid complex SpEL expressions in security annotations; prefer simple role-based checks.

Threat: XML External Entity (XXE) Injection via Spring's XML Parsing

  • Description: If the application processes XML input and uses Spring's integration with XML parsing libraries, an attacker could inject malicious XML containing external entity references. If the underlying XML parser is misconfigured or vulnerable, this can lead to information disclosure, denial of service, or even server-side request forgery (SSRF). This is a direct threat if Spring's XML handling is used without proper precautions.
  • Impact: Information disclosure, denial of service, SSRF, potential for remote code execution.
  • Affected Component: Spring's integration with XML parsing libraries (e.g., JAXB, DOM, SAX) when used to process untrusted XML input.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use a secure XML parser (e.g., a recent version of Xerces) and configure it to disable external entity resolution (DTD and external entities).
    • Keep XML parsing libraries up-to-date.
    • Validate and sanitize XML input before parsing it. Prefer a whitelist approach for allowed XML structures.